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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
The Role of the Ar»Tinfli nnwf erence in the Conservative Party 
The Conservative Party Conference originally developed in the 
nineteenth century as the governing body of a wozking class grass roots 
party organisation which was largely promoted by the parliamentary 
leadership. Despite a gradoial increase in middle class influence within 
the National Union and the efforts of Lord Randolph Churchill to tuzn 
the Conference into an instrument of grass roots contioi» the parliamentary 
party was able to retain a firaOy independent position over policy making 
which has continued up to the present day and has stron^y influenced 
the relationship between the grass roots party organisation and the parl^ 
iamentary leadership. 
Both the composition of the modem Conferenccf which i s largely 
dominated by self-selected middle class activists, and i t s size make i t 
an unsuitable body for detailed policy making and this has tended to 
reinforce the leadeirship* s traditional independence over the fomdilation 
of policy although the Conference has been able to directly influence a 
number of (mostly minor) matters and on a nmber of other issues i t may 
well have had a more indirect effect. 
While the Conference has no real influence over the choice of party 
leader i t provides him with a useful opportunity to communicate with the 
party's supportexs. The increased media coverage of the Conference has 
developed i t s importance as a part of the party* s communications structure 
and although there i s l i t t l e evidence that the Conference has any vezy 
direct effect on voting behaviour i t provides a valuable opportunity for 
the party to publicise i t s policies and i t s image to the eLect«rate at 
large as distinct from the narrower audience of party activists inside 
the Conference Hall. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although a l l three of the major B r i t i s h parties s t r e s s the importance 
of t h e i r annual conferences as an opportunity for the ordinary party worker 
to influence party policy, the constitutional position of the conference 
varie s considerably. 
I n the case of the Labour Party the conference i s ostensibly the 
f i n a l authority for almost everything i n the party. H i s t o r i c a l l y the mass 
party preceded parliamentary representation and "since i t s purpose was to 
bring into being a party i n Parliament i t would have been natural enough i f ^ 
the outside party had asserted i t s control over the psu-ty i n Parliament ... 
The party's constitution makes i t quite clear that both the general manage-
ment of the party and i t s p o l i t i c a l programme are to be under the direction 
of the conference. Furthermore, the Conference i s the source of i t s own 
authority as i t alone i s empowered to change the constitution and s'temding 
orders of the pairty^ and i t also chooses the major figures of the mass 
party leadership^ including most of the "Shadow Qabinet" when the party i s 
not i n power. 
While t h i s apparently gives the conference a high degree of control 
over the management and p o l i c i e s of the party, i n practice t h i s control has 
been l i m i t e d by a niamber of factors. The most important of these have 
been the obvious need for the Parliamentary Labour Party to retain the f l e x i -
b i l i t y to respond to day-to-day p o l i t i c a l issues and the limitations which 
parliamentary p r i v i l e g e imposes on efforts to control the psirliamentary 
party through an outside body and the constitutional freedoms enjoyed by a 
government i n power. 
I n general the Parliamentary Labour Party and the mass party have care-
f u l l y t r i e d to avoid confrontation but there have been occasions when the 
two bodies have differed and i n such cases the Parliamentary party has 
invariabljr been able to follow an independent line. 5 The most important 
examples have been At t l e e ' s decision to disregard a resolution passed at 
the 1933 conference demanding that^when forming a Labour Government the 
Labour Prime Minister should consult with the Parliamentary Comraitteejand 
when deciding to ask for a dissolution of Parliament he should consult with 
the PLP and with the Cabinet^ G a i t s k e l l ' s decision to defy the Conference's 
policy on nuclear disarmament i n 1960; and Wilson's decision to continue 
with the Labour Government's prices and incomes policy despite a five-to-one 
defeat a t the 1968 conference,. 
1) P. Gordon-V/alker 'The Cabinet' (Jonathan Cape: London; 1970) p.23 
2) Labour Party Constitution 1966 - Clauses V ( l ) and V l ( l ) 
3) Labour Party Constitution 1966 - Clause Z I I I 
4) I n p r a c t i c e however many of i t s decisions are pre-empted by the 
Parliamentary Party's power to choose i t s own leadership separately 
5) For objections) P. Sedgwick 'The End of Laborism' (New P o l i t i c s Vol V I I I No. 3 
to t h i s see ) 1969/70) pp 79-81 
P. Allaun ' B r i t i s h Labor aft e r the Elections' (New 
P o l i t i c s Vol V I I I No. 3 1969/70) pp. 92-93 
6) R. M. Punnett ' B r i t i s h Government & P o l i t i c s ' (Heinemann 1970) p. 120 
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Such exceptional instances do not however prove that the Labour 
Conference i s impotent. Generally the two sections of the party either 
have agreed to coniproraise or to respect each others viewsl and although i n 
theory the Parliamentary Labour Party might operate entirely independently 
of the wishes of the conference, i n the unlikely event of i t trying to do so 
p e r s i s t e n t l y i n the face of repeated opposition i t s p o l i t i c a l position v/ould 
eventually become untenable - i f only because conference delegates ultimately 
exercise a high degree of control over the readoption of parliamentary 
candidates. 
The L i b e r a l Party's Assembly occupies a position broadly similar to 
that of the Labour Party Conference. I t i s a sovereign body i n the sense 
that: 
"Rules forming a part of the Constitution of the Party can only 
be made, amended, or rescinded by a resolution of the Assembly, „ 
c a r r i e d by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting 
and most of the party's major o f f i c e s are f i l l e d throngh elections held at the 
Annual Conference,' although somewhat unusually the standing orders for the 
Assenbly are i n fac t made by the Party Council. 
On policy the Assembly's position i s s l i g h t l y l e s s clear than that of 
the Labour Party Conference because although the party constitution 
provides that: 
" I t s h a l l be the duty of the Assembly and the Council working i n 
f r e e co-operation with the Sc o t t i s h L i b e r a l Party to define the 
general objectives of the party "3 
the p r e c i s e r o l e s of the various participants are not spelt out i n d e t a i l 
and i n practice the Parliamentary Party has had a f a i r l y free hand although 
i t s members are expected to avoid d i r e c t l y contradicting p o l i c i e s adopted 
by the Assanbly^ 
Relations between the Assembly and the Parliamentary party have been 
l e s s of a problem however, pa r t l y because of the small s i z e of the P a r l i a -
mentary Party and p a r t l y because the proppect of power has been s u f f i c i e n t l y 
remote to prevent the issue becoming c r i t i c a l . 
The position of the Conservative Party Conference i s very different. 
Under the rioles of the National Union the conference has no. powers to 
control i t s own constitution and standing orders which sure made by the 
Central Council5 and although i t can and does discuss resolutions on policy 
there i s no suggestion that i t s resolutions are binding on the peurliamentary 
party. Furthermore the conference plays no formal part i n elections to 
party o f f i c e . 
The reasons for t h i s difference are partly h i s t o r i c a l . The 
Conservative Party was a fially developed parlisunentary grouping well before 
the mass party was put onto an organised footing and the mass party was i n 
many respects created at the behest of the parliamentary leadership . As a 
r e s u l t the two bodies have always been clesirly independent and consequently 
the parliamentary party's right to s e t t l e policy has not been seriously 
questioned since the turn of the century, 
1) W. D. Muller 'Trade Union Sponsored Members of Parliament i n the Defence 
Dispute of 1960-61' (Parliamentary A f f a i r s Vol X X I I I 1970) pp258-276 
2) L i b e r a l Party Constitution 1962 Clause 31 
5) L i b e r a l Party Constitution 1962 Clause 4 
4) J . S. Rasmussen 'The L i b e r a l Party' (Constable 1965) pp 62-69 
Rules of the National Union - Rules XXII and XXIII 
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Although the h i s t o r i c a l origins of the conference do much to explain 
i t s constitutional position i n the party structure the party i s generally 
much more deferential to leadership i n i t s ethos-*- and while the conference's 
formal strength may be l e s s than that of i t s Labour and L i b e r a l equivalents^ 
i t has had the great compensating benefit i n the eyes of many Conservative 
supporters that embarrassing confrontations between the parliamentary and 
grass roots parties have been largely avoided. 
l ) G. K. Roberts ' P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s and Pressure Groups i n B r i t a i n ' 
(Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1970) p 129. Also H V Wiseman 'Politics 
i n Everydoy Life (Blaekwell 1966) p 131 
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Some examination of the h i s t o r i c a l background to the growth of the 
Conservative Party organisation and the Annual Conference i s essential to a 
f u l l understanding of the functions and importance of the Conference as i t 
i s today. 
When the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s developed i n the eighteenth century and the 
f i r s t quarter of the nineteenth century they were orientated around 
Parliament and the franchise v/as small enough to be e a s i l y managed through 
'influence' .1 
With the Reform Act of 1832 the franchise v/as greatly extended and 
although there was s t i l l considerable scope for managing elections, the 
enlarged electorate and the increased importance of voter registration stimu-
lat e d the rapid development of an embryonic mass-party structure - mostly 
based on Registration Associations^ the importaunce of which was stressed by 
Peel as early as the 1837 Tamworth Dinner:-
" I t may be disagreeable, and indeed, inconvenient, to attend to 
the r e g i s t r a t i o n of voters which annually takes place throughout 
the country. A l l t h i s may be revolting; but you may depend upon 
i t that i t i s better you should take that trouble than you 
should allow the Constitution to become the victim of f a l s e 
friends, or that you should be trampled under the hoofs of a 
r u t h l e s s democracy. The advice which has been given by some 
persons was, "Agitate, agitate, a g i t a t e l " The advice which I 
give you i s t h i s - "Register, r e g i s t e r , r e g i s t e r l " 3 
The origins of the r e g i s t r a t i o n associations were largely spontaneous 
and voluntary but t h ^ received considerable support from the party leader-
ship although not without some qualms about the d e s i r a b i l i t y of creating a 
ma as party outside Parliament.^ 
Between the 1832 Reform Act and i t s successor i n 1867, the reg i s t r a t i o n 
associations developed considerably, often under the auspices of a l o c a l 
s o l i c i t o r or similar person acting as the part-time agent of the magnate who 
exercised a decisive influence i n the elections of the area. 
Inevitably, however, the monbers began to demand the right to have 
some say i n the selectipn of the o f f i c e r s of the associations and a degree 
of control over t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . I t was not long before the functions of 
the associations exteiidedbeyond electam^l registration, and an example of 
t h i s was the Liverpool Registration Association o r i g i n a l l y formed i n 1832 
but reorganised on a l a r g e l y representative basis after pressure from 
members i n 1848. The new associations had much i n common with present-day 
constituency associationsSbut t h e i r growth was only gradual and by 1867:-
l ) H J Hanham 'Elections & Parly HianageoeDt' (Loognans 1959). Also 
, sT 
•The Formation of the L i b e r a l Party 1857-1868' (Constable 1966) 
pp 82-96 
3) J . R. White 'The Conservative Tradition' (Black 1964) p 161. 
4) P. Smith 'DisJiSraelian Conservatism 8z S o c i a l Reform' (Routledge Kegan 
Paul 1967) pp 116-127 ^ 
5) I3ulmer Thomas 'The Party Syston i n Great B r i t a i n ' (Phoenix 1953) PP 18-19 
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"the t o t a l number of Conservative Associations of a l l types 
i n England and Wales was reckoned to be nearly 800. At that 
date they were s t i l l mainly unrepresentative i n character, 
but the s i z e of the membership differentiated them from the 
old r e g i s t r a t i o n s o c i e t i e s and made i t only a matter of time 
before a representative character was bound to be conceded. 
The next major development came with the 186? Reform Act. Although 
i t was passed by a Conservative CJovernment, the enfranchisement of the 
a r t i s a n had been a major elonent of L i b e r a l policy and D i s r a e l i ' s move was 
i n some respects l i t t l e more than an attanpt to s t e a l h i s opponents' 
clothes. I t was therefore by no means certain that the Conservatives 
would win the working-class vote and t h i s , together with the s i z e of the 
new electorate, forced' the party to adapt i t s machinery so that i t 
established more contact with the new voters,^ 
As a r e s u l t the function of the associations increasingly expanded 
beyond the re g i s t r a t i o n of voters- to include a c t i v e l y seeking t h e i r 
support. C l e a r l y a more broadly based constituency organisation was 
necessary and the elimination of the old self-perpetioating committees which 
ran them was hastened. 
At the same time, the increased working-class vote began to r e f l e c t 
i n the establishment of new p o l i t i c a l outlets such as working-men's 
associations and party clubs, which, although primarily s o c i a l clubs, also 
served p o l i t i c a l objects. 
I n 186? hov/ever the Conservative Party outside Parliament was s t i l l 
not r e a l l y a national organisation at a l l but a niimber of independent 
p o l i t i c a l associations c a l l i n g themselves by a vairiety of names such as 
Conservative Associations, Constitutional Associations, and Conservative or 
Constitutional Working Men's Associations. I n the North there had been 
attempts to co-ordinate a c t i v i t y and a Yorkshire Federation existed on a 
very nebulous l e v e l , but during the early part of 186? a number of con-
ferences, mainly attended by representatives from the northern associations, 
were held to discuss forming a cen t r a l organisation which would operate on a 
national basis. These l e d to the f i r s t annual conferenc^inaugural meeting 
of the National Union, held on 12th November 186? i n the Freemason's Tavern 
i n London. 
Although there had been spontaneous pressure for the meeting the 
organising s p i r i t was an MP, John Gorst;-3 who made i t c l e a r that the new 
organisation was aimed a t the a r t i s a n : -
"V/e a l l of us believe that we Conservatives are the natural 
leaders of the people, and we a l l of us intend, I believe, 
from t h i s day forward as i n former times to pursue a popular 
but at the same time perfectly constitutional course i n the 
government of t h i s country. I for one do not believe that the 
true i n t e r e s t s of the people, the populace i f you l i k e to c a l l 
i t so, of t h i s country are r e a l l y at variance with good 
constitutional government,"^ 
1) l.B\almer Thomas 'The Party System i n Great B r i t a i n ' (Phoenix: 1953) p.19 
2) P. B. Smith 'The Making of the Second Reform B i l l ' (CUP: 1966) pp 5-6 
3) Another major figure at the opening conference was H. C. Raikes who was 
also c l o s e l y associated with the Parliamentary Party. 
4) NUCUA Conference Minutes 186? Ep3-4 
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I n i t i a l l y the National Union was essentially a working man's organisa-
t i o n encouraged by the parliamentary leadership. The importance of the 
working class vote was a central issue f o r the party and remained so for 
many years but the party "leadership was determined to remain i n control. 
As D i s r a e l i had t o l d the House of Commons i n 1848:-
"Why are the people of England forced to f i n d leaders among 
these persons? The proper leaders of the people are the 
gentlemen of England. I f they are not the leaders of the people, 
I do not see why there should be gentlemen."! 
The background to the Conference was outlined by Gorst:-
"The working classes of England some time back commenced 
forming themselves i n t o associations to support the present 
Government upon the question of reform, and to maamtain the 
fxindamental principles of oior ancient constitution. I t was f e l t that 
t h e i r position would be strengthened and t h e i r influence augmented 
by the foundation of a central union On the present 
occasion i t i s proposed to f i n a l l y s e t t l e the name, rules and 
con s t i t u t i o n of t h i s society, and to appoint the f i r s t o f f i c e r s . 
This association w i l l a f f o r d a centre of communication and 
action between l o c a l associations supporting constitutional viess." 
He also made i t clear that the relationship between the new organisation 
and the l o c a l associations would continue to be a federal one:-
"There i s of course no intention to in t e r f e r e i n any way vtith 
l o c a l action; the object of the union i s to strengthen the hands of 
l o c a l associations, where existing i n t h e i r respective d i s t r i c t s , 
and to encourage the establishment of associations i n d i s t r i c t s 
where they are weinting, and further to organise associations by 
the holding of meetings f o r the general expression and diffusion 
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s , and the dissemination of sound 
information upon topics of general p o l i t i c a l interest, and to ^ 
secure the combined action of a l l constitutional association." 
and the independence of the l o c a l associations has ranained a significant 
feature i n the Conservative party structure.3 
Equally important the conference, i t was made clear from the 
beginning, had no pretensions to deciding policy:-
" I t i s not a meeting f o r the discussion of Conservative 
pr i n c i p l e s on which vie are a l l agreed; i t i s only a meeting to 
consider by what p a r t i c u l a r organisation we may make those , 
Conservative principles more effective among the masses .... " 
1) J. R. White 'The Conservative Tradition' (Black: 1964) p. 164 
2) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1867 pp 5-6 
3) See f o r example'the treatment of the "Interim Report on the Party 
Organisation" at the 1948 Conference - NUCUA Conference Minutes 1948, 
pp 35-4^ 
4) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1867 P 4 
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The d i f f i c u l t i e s which the Conference encountered i n such a comparatively 
simple task as choosing a name for the new organisation reflected both i t s 
working class composition and i t s inadequacy as a body f o r taking detailed 
decisions. Proposals to c a l l i t 'The Conservative Union' were stoutly opposed 
by a Northern delegate who:-
"was a f r a i d that i f the wor^ 'Conservative' was used i n the Union, 
the association with which he was connected could not j o i n . I n a 
Radical town l i k e Newcastle, and a Radical d i s t r i c t l i k e North-
umberland, they v/ould be unable to get men i n to t h e i r unions by 
using the word 'Conservative'. He was not a Conservative, he 
never pretended to be one, and never should be ...."1 
and undeterred by "hisses and confusion" which the chairrnan blandly described 
as a "very unparliamentary prpceeding" he continued that: 
"•he was quite sure they i n his d i s t r i c t v/ould be unable to get 
working men int o t h e i r association i f the word 'Conservative' 
were used. He had mixed v/ith working men f o r years, being the 
son of a working man, and was sure that i f they adopted the word 
'Conservative' they might just as well never form the Union."2 
As a resuliv only a f t e r extended argument, was the t i t l e "National Union of 
Conservative and Constitutional Associations" eventually settled. 3 
Membership was also an area of controversy. A Birmingham delegate 
pointed out that i f branches rather than associations were allowed to j o i n 
the Union, associations would be encouraged to break down into as many 
branches as possible enabling associations such as his own to send between 
24 and 30 members to the conference instead of one. Eventually however his 
suggestion that a l l the branches i n any one town should be regarded as one 
association with only one or two delegates at the annual conference,4 was 
overruled and i t was agreed that branches would be able to j o i n subject to a 
lov/er l i m i t of 100 members.5 
Even the term 'conference' i t s e l f caused dispute. I t had o r i g i n a l l y 
been intended that the new national association's. governing body would be 
called the 'Council' but a f t e r a lengthy exchange, including the following 
arguments, i t was agreed that i t should be called the 'Conf erence':-
"Mr. Dibb said he would press f o r the adoption of the r u l e as i t 
now stood, a l t e r i n g the word 'Council' to 'Conference':- 'That 
each Association s h a l l be e n t i t l e d to send two representatives 
to attend and vote at the Conference of the Union 
Dr. Royle would second that Resolution and on t h i s ground, that 
on the 15th Rule they had a Committee elected by the Conference. 
Now that Committee would properly be the Council because they 
had a l l the work to do. I t would therefore make the thing more 
correct to change the work 'Council' wherever i t occurred i n the 
rules to 'Conference'. Then the deputies would be sent to a 
•Conference' to be held i n London every year, and the rules as 
1) NUCUA conference Minutes 186? p 16 
2) " " " 1867 P 17 
3) " " " 1867 PP 7-iP; 14 
4) " " " 1867 PP 22-25; 31 
5) " " " 1867 p 34 
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provided by the Committee were that that National Conference 
should elect an Executive Committee or Council .... 
Mr. Charnley said the word 'Council' was adopted because i t 
gave rather more of an idea of prominence than 'Conference' did ..." 
Mr. Raikes had no very great objection to the substitution of 
the word 'Conference' f o r 'Council'. He preferred the l a t t e r v/ord 
as pointing to the importance and di g n i t y of that v/hich was to be 
the governing body of the Union. I t would be i t s function to 
a l t e r and rescind the rules and to elect o f f i c e r s . 'Conference' 
gave the idea of gentlemen being brought together haphazard from 
time to time while 'Council' was more expressive of s t a b i l i t y . " ! 
I t was however eventually decided that:-
"Each Association s h a l l be e n t i t l e d to send two representatives to 
attend and vote at any Conference of the Union"! 
and that 
"The regulation and control of a f f a i r s of the Union shall be 
vested i n a Conference to consist of:- ( l ) The President, Vice-
Presidents and Trustees of the Union; (2) The representatives of 
Subscribing Associations; (3) and such Honorary Members as sha l l 
also be members of the Committee."2 
The outcome of t h i s discussion was that the formal powers of the 
Conference v/ere considerably greater than they are today. I t was o r i g i n a l l y 
set up as a representative body to control the overall management of the 
National Union and the current situation under which the Council i s the 
ultimate source of power v/ithin the party only developed at a l a t e r date. 
The sirrangements f o r c a l l i n g meetings of the Conference also drew 
c r i t i c i s m . Although Raikes and the organising committee recommended that 
they should decide when Conferences v/ere to be held, delegates f e l t that a 
certain number of Associations should be able to demand a meeting and a f t e r 
considerable argument i t was eventually agreed that an extraordinary meeting 
would be held i f twenty Associations demanded one.3 The powers of the 
committee to s e t t l e the venue of future Conferences were also challenged and 
the pro v i n c i a l character of the new union reflected i n considerable pressure 
f o r the Annual Conference to move siround the country but a compromise was 
event-oally reached that:-
"An Annual Meeting of the Conference shall be held at such time 
and place as the next preceding Annual Meeting shall have 
appointed; but the Conference may vary, and i n the absence of any 
appointment f i x , the time and place of any meeting, providing 
every t h i r d year the Conference shall be held i n London."4 
The arrangements f o r convening the Conference were generally acceptable 
and provided that:-
"Notice of the time and place of ariy meeting of the Conference 
shall be given by the Committee by a c i r c u l a r l e t t e r to be despatched 
by post not less than seven days previously, and to be addressed 
to the Subscribing Associations, or t h e i r Secretaries or other 
1) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1867 pp 37-40 
2) " " " 1867 PP 41-42 
3) " " " 1867 p 46 
4) " " " 1867 P 49 
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responsible o f f i c e r s respectively and by advertisement to be 
published at l e a s t seven days previously i n two London dail y 
newspapers."! 
I n the l i g h t of subsequent developments i t i s si g n i f i c a n t that the 
rul e s also specified that the Union's main o f f i c e r s should be elected by the 
conference:-
"The President and Vice-President s h a l l be elected at the Annual 
Meeting of the Conference and r e t a i n o f f i c e u n t i l the close of 
the next Annual Meeting a f t e r election. Any person who has served 
the o f f i c e of president of the Union s h a l l , i f w i l l i n g , remain 
without f\irther election a vice-president of the Union. "1 
The appointment of the union's treasurer and trustees however reopened 
the dispute about the r o l e of the committee.1 Raikes was anxious to ensure 
that the selection of the f i n a n c i a l o f f i c e r s was l e f t i n the hands of the 
committee on the grounds that:-
" the Conference might be disposed to believe the Committee would 
use i t s best endeavours to procure the most distinguished names 
i t possibly could."2 
but delegates were equally anxious to avoid leaving such a v i t a l area i n the 
committee's hands:-
" I n order to leave the Union as free and independent as possible 
the r u l e should be l e f t as i t stood, that the o f f i c e r s be r e -
appointed or appointed annually by the Conference. I t would leave 
the government of the Union i n the hands of the Conference where • 
i t ought to be."3 
and the choice was f i n a l l y l e f t i n the hands of the conference. The election 
of the committee was also i n the hands of the conference iinder Rule 15:-
"The management and direction of the a f f a i r s of the Union s h a l l , 
subject to the regulation and control of the conference be vested 
i n a committee, to consist of:- ( l ) The President, Vice-Presidents, 
Treasurer and Trustees; (2) Twenty-four persons to be selected at 
the annual meeting of the Conference from the representatives and 
Honorary Members of the Union, and to hold o f f i c e u n t i l the next 
succeeding Annual Meeting; (3) The Honorary Secretaries, not 
exceeding two, v/hom the Committee may appoint."4 
The discussion around t h i s subject sheds further l i g h t on the aspirations of 
the men se t t i n g up the new union:-
",... on the Committee might be some of the most distinguished 
men of the Conservative Party. Unless the Union ^vas managed by 
the leaders of the Conservative Party i t would have no force and 
no effect whatever. They ought to have on the Council men of 
leading position, men i n whom they had confidence and who could 
communicate to them the views of the Government. "5 
1) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1867 p 50 
2) " " " 1867 p 53 
3) " " " 1867 P 53 
4) " " " 1867 p 56 
5) " "• " 1867 p 57-58 
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Although delegates were anxious that the parliamentary notables should 
par t i c i p a t e i n the new union and be influenced by i t they were clearly 
determined t o ensure that the l o c a l associations retained control. A 
further r e s t r a i n t vas placed on the Coiraiittee by providing that:-
"The Committee'^'shall submit, at the Annual Conference, a Report 
• of the Proceedings, and a statonent, c e r t i f i e d by two Auditors 
to be elected by the Conference, of the Receipts and 
Expenditure of the Union f o r the previous year The 
Statement of Account, as audited, shall be printed, eind be open 
f o r inspection of a l l representatives and Honorary Members at 
the o f f i c e s of the Union f o r ten days at least before the 
Annual Meeting of the Conference, and a copy of the same shall 
be sent to each subscribing Association."2 
This opensess about finance distinguished the National Union from the machinery 
controlled by the parliamentary leadership and was based on the premiseJ. 
that as i t was a voluntary body a l l members should be e n t i t l e d to know the 
state of i t s finances. Although t h i s r e l a t i v e candour was subsequently used 
as a weapon, by Randolph Churchill, to attack the more secretive orgsuaisa-
tions maintained by the Parliamentary Party, subsequently the Union i t s e l f 
became highly secretive,3 
The sovereign position of the conference was put beyond doubt by 
Rule 1 9 : -
"These Rules may be altered at any Conference by a majority of two-
th i r d s present and e n t i t l e d to vote, provided that notice of the 
proposed a l t e r a t i o n be given w i t h the notice of the meeting by 
c i r c u l a r , . . ."4 
and i t i s clear that although basically an annual conference was envisaged, 
delegates foresaw the p o s s i b i l i t y of holding them more often.5 I t was 
then agreed that the 'Committee' should be re-named the 'Council'6 with the 
rather curious r e s u l t that the body intended to be the executive committee 
of the Union became known as the Council and only at a much l a t e r date when 
the Council i t s e l f became too large and unwieldy was a proper Executive 
Committee established.7 
Proposals that the next conference be held i n Leeds and that Lord 
Feversham be elected President raised further controversy.8 
1) Amended to 'Council' i n Gorst's oiivn corrections to printed draft rules, 
NUCUA ConferQice Minutes 1867, p 97 
2) NUCUA Conference Minutes I863, p 63 
3) See NUCUA Conference Rep. 1948; also J. D. Hofftaian 'The Conservative 
Party i n Opposition 1945-51' (MacGibbon & Kee 1964) p 100 
4) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1867, p 68 
•5) " " " 1867, p 65 
6) " " " 1867, pp 68; 76 
7) " " " 1910 
8) " " " I867, pp 78-8-1 
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Rivalry between the Yorkshire and the Birmingham associations became acrirao-
nious^and eventually i t was agreed to delegate the decision to the Council:-
" the f i r s t meeting of the Conference be held at Birmingham 
at such time as the Council shall appoint."2 
and Lord Dartmouth was elected President.3 To some extent the l a t t e r 
decision seems to have reflected delegates' unwillingness to be pressurised 
by the party hierarchy i n the shape of Raikes and his committee. 
Paradoxically, however, the delegates knew i t was essential to involve the 
parliamentary party and of the twenty-seven vice-presidents elected unani-
mously, including Gkjrst, Raikes, W. H. Smith and Sampson Lloyd, just under 
h a l f were peers and a furt h e r eight were MPs.^ The election of the Council 
proved more d i f f i c u l t however and again reflected the v/orking class 
character of the Union as the following exchanges show:-
"Mr. Cotter said they did not wish to have second-rate names on 
the committee. His own name was there, and he was very sorry to 
hear i t read out. He had objected to i t very strongly. The 
committee v/as not the place f o r a working man, but should be 
composed of the best men they could possibly obtain 
l i r . Smith (of Rotherhithe) said t h e i r leaders should make the 
Council heard. What ..could working men do there? They required 
men o f influence and men of money. He hoped the twenty-four 
gentlanen whose names were read over by Dr. Royle v/ould be 
elected. They were some of the best names i n the country. He 
was a working man and would s t i c k up f o r the working men, but 
s t i l l he had no business at that board. His business v/as at 
his own lo c a l i t y , 5 
while another delegate f e l t t hat:-
." the committee should be of a mixed character comprising 
both the upper and the working classes " 
The meeting then closed a f t e r the formsQ. votes of thanks to the organi-
sing committee and the London and Westminster Working Men's Association? 
The exact functions o f the Union were not clearly l a i d down, but i n 
practice they were mostly concerned with printed propagandaj7 and meeting 
demands f o r lecturers and t r a v e l l i n g agents.° I t i s significant that the 
inaugural Conference did not discuss policy at a l l and Gorst's view9 that 
support f o r Conservative policy could be taken f o r granted appears to have 
been well-founded, judging from the proceedings of the early conferences. 
1) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1867, pp 81-86 
2) " " " 1867, P 87 
3) " " " 1867, pp 87-88 
4) " " " 1867, pp 89-91 
5) " " " 1867, pp 89-93 
6) The London Associations, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the London & Westminster 
Vforking Men's Association, appear to have been a key element i n most 
of the early conferences. 
7) See Council Report, IWCUA Conference Minutes, 1873 
8) See NUCUA Conference Minutes 1869 and NUCUA Conference Minutes 1873 
(Council Report) 
9) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1867, P 4 
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Such conferences were almost exclusively concerned with organisational 
questions and there was a f a i r l y general acceptance that policy was something 
to be se t t l e d by the parliamentary leadership. This reflected the National 
Union's o r i g i n s . Although the local associations were mostly working class 
organisations the parliamentary leadership had taken the lead i n c r y s t a l l i -
sing the demand f o r establishing a national organisation, and as Blake points 
out i n comparing the Conservative Party w i t h the Liberal Caucus: 
"The Caucus was a grass roots a f f a i r which grew up i n the provinces 
without any f o s t e r i n g or encouragement from the Liberal leadership 
at the centre .... the National union began the other way round; 
i t grew under the aegis of Central Office, and i t was the leader-
ship which encouraged the associations to send d e l ^ a t e s to the 
annual conference ! 
This set the pattern f o r the f u t u r e relationship between the National Union 
and the parliamentary party as one of cordial independence w i t h the p a r l i a -
mentary party free to follow i t s own policy l i n e s . 
I n i t i a l l y the National Union was only one of a number of similar 
bodies and i t s influence i n the parliamentary party which was dominated by 
the landed gentry was sraall^ but i n 1868 the Conservatives l o s t the election 
and Gorst was entrusted by D i s r a e l i with the job of reorganising the party 
structvire. D i s r a e l i appears to have regarded the subsequent election success 
i n 1874 as being largely due to his efforts3 and as the National Union had 
figured effectivaLy i n his reorganisation i t s position also proppered. 
The 1868 Conference however was f a r from successful. Held i n Birmingham 
only a fev/ days a f t e r Christmas i t seems to have been attended by only seven 
delegates. The reasons f o r t h i s axe not clear and although i t has been 
suggested that the date was responsible^ i t i s possib3.e that the minutes are 
inaccurate. I n any event, Raikes persuaded the Conference to ronove the re-
quirement that every t h i r d conference should be held i n London5 and the 
council was also allowed to f i l l f o r i t s e l f any vacancies which might occur 
i n i t s ranks during the course of the year6 This l a t t e r development resulted 
i n the Council eventvially becoming a self - e l e c t i v e body f o r a l l p ractical 
purposes. 
The 1869 Conference, held i n Liverpool, v/as better attended (by 
sixteen associations) and proceeded to elect Lord Derby as Patron, r e f l e c t i n g 
the Union's improved standing i n the eyes of the leadership. The emphasis on 
organisation continued w i t h renewed demands from the constituencies f o r t r a -
v e l l i n g agents and lecturers.7 The procedure which was used at the 1867 and 
1868 meetings f o r nominating Council Members was used again - namely that an 
i n f l u e n t i a l member of the conference proposed a block l i s t while delegates 
continued to emphasis the importance of the working class vote on the grounds 
tha t : -
1) R. Blake 'The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill' (Eyre & 
Spottiswoode:1970) p 155 
2) E. J. Feuchtwanger 'Disraeli, Donocracy and the Tory Party' (Clarendon: 
1968) pp 79, 105, 123-13! 
3) W. S. Churchill 'Lord.Randolph Churchill' fOdhams 1951) p 114. See also R Blake 'Disraeli • (Eyre & SpottiSTOode f966) pp 556-537 
4) R. Blake 'The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill' (E^yre & 
Spottiswoode: 1970) p 114 
5) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1868 
6) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1868 
7) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1869 
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".... i t was necessary to show the Conservative Party leaders 
that they must r e l y upon the Conservative Democracy which had 
been enfranchised by Mr. D i s r a e l i . " ^ 
There were increasing signs that the Council was beginning to develop a 
powerful position i n the structure of the Union. 
The conference did however make i t s f i r s t attempt to discuss policy -
on the I r i s h Church issue - and at the end of the meeting i t was unanimously 
resolved:-
"... that a P e t i t i o n against the I r i s h Church B i l l from the 
. Conference should be signed on i t s behalf by the Hon. Edward 
Douglas,"^ 
. By 1871 the Council had strengthened i t s position to a point where 
the venue of the next Conference and the choice of President was l e f t i n 
i t s hands. Membership of the National Union continued to grow and at the 
1873 Conference the Council was able to report:-
"The accession of many important Associations, some of which are 
among the most i n f l u e n t i a l i n the country, affords the most 
satisfactory assurance, not only of the steady growth of 
Conservative p r i n c i p l e s throughout the Kingdom, but also of 
increased confidence i n and appreciation of, the services the 
National Union i s i n a position to offer."2 
This r e f l e c t e d i n growing prestige with the parliamentary party and i n 
D i s r a e l i ' s decision i n 1872 to use the conference as an opportunity to make 
a maior policy speech. The services provided Raw included the appointment 
of a t r a v e l l i n g agent and the emphasis continued to be organisational. 
There was considerable concern about parliamentary candidates and the 1873 
Conference passed the following resolution:-
. " that t h i s Union, being f u l l y convinced of the steady 
growth of Conservatism since the l a s t Parliamentary election i n 
many d i s t r i c t s . h i t h e r t o looked upon as favourable to Radical 
p r i n c i p l e s , and also of the increasing iinpopularity of the 
present Ministry, would most strongly urge upon a l l constituencies 
throughout the Kingdom the necessity f o r considering the i r 
prospects of successfully bringing forward Conservative candidates 
at the next election, and for the i r being prepared with suitable 
candidates where i t may be deemed necessary, and that the 
honorary secretaries of t h i s Union be afforded every information 
on the subject, and allowed f a c i l i t i e s for reporting as to the 
exact positions of the constituencies throughout the country."-^ 
This r e f l e c t e d a grov/ing r o l e f o r the Associations which were beginning to 
expand t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s considerably and undertake the adoption of candi-
dates as w e l l as merely getting out the vote. 
The c l a s s problem continued to exercise the Union as the following 
extracts from the Council's Reports to the 1875 and I876 Conferences show:-
1) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1869 
2) " " " 1873 
3) !• " " 1873 
4) T. Lloyd 'The General E l e c t i o n of 1880' (OUP 1968) pp 61-89 
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" the fact that a very considerable number of these 
Associations are composed almost entirely of the artisan class .... 
appears to be the refutation, i f , after the last general election, 
any were wanting, of the statement so often made by Radical 
speakers i n and out^of Parliament, that the Conservative working 
man was a f i c t i o n . " 
" i t would be impossible to omit mention of the enormous 
development of Conservative feeling i n the ranks of the working 
man, which has led to the establishment i n a l l parts of the 
country, of vigorous organisations formed and conducted by 
artisans, and which have rendered service to the pairty of the 
highest importance i n times of danger and d i f f i c u l t y . Prior to 
1867 these societies were fev/ i n number and weeik i n influence, 
and had few f a c i l i t i e s for mutual intercourse, and no central 
organisation through which their wishes might be made known to 
.the chiefs of the party. The latter disadvantages have now i n 
great measure been removed."2 
I t i s important to note however that these wishes were s t i l l almost entirely 
confined to organisational issues although increased interest i n policy was 
becoming apparent ,and reflected i n a resolution on the Eastern Question which 
was passed at the I876 Conference:-
",... that this Conference condemns as unpatriotic the conduct of the 
Radical section of the Liberal Party i n stimulating Russian 
aggression and arresting the revival of British influence i n 
foreign af f a i r s , and records i t s entire adhesion to the- foreign 
policy of Her Majesty's Government."3 
The main business of the I876 Conference however was a proposal 
submitted by Gorst that the Council should be elected on a more represen-
tative basis. This v/as designed to remedy the Council's tendency to become a 
self-elective and self-perpetuating body but i t was a toucly issue and the 
Conference went 'in csimera' for the f i r s t time before eventually accepting 
Gorst's suggestion i n principle^. His specific proposals for reform, put 
forward the following year, suggested that:-
"The Executive powers of the Union shall be vested i n a Council 
to consist of: 
1. . The President, Trustees and Honorary Treasurer of the Union; 
2. Twenty-four elected members to be elected by the Conference 
at i t s Annual Meeting from the officers and delegates of 
Subscribing Associations and the Vice-Presidents and 
Honorary Members of the National Union. 
The intention was that the composition of the Council should change annually 
but the Council members, led by Eaikes, put up a determined effort to protect 
their position and Gorst had to accept a compromise formula which provided 
that:-
1) MJCUA Conference Minutes I875 
2) .: " " " 1876 
3) " " " 1876 
4) " " " 1877 
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"The r e t i r i n g members of the Council shall be capable of being 
re-elected; but not more thsm two-thirds of such members shall 
be proposed for re-election by the Covuicil i t s e l f . " ! 
I n the same year i t was suggested that the Union should set up an area 
structurel and the Conference's determination to control the Council also 
reflected i n a new procedure for calling meetings:-
"The ordinary meetings of the Conference shall be held annually 
at such time and place as the Council shall appoint. The 
Council may, and i f required by not less than ten subscribing 
Associations shall, at any time, summon a Special Meeting of 
the Conference to be held at such time and place as the Council 
shall think f i t . The Conference at any Ordinary or Special 
Meeting may vary, and i n the absence of an appointment, f i x the 
time and place of any Annual Meeting."! 
I n the same year the Council's report to Conference responded to the 
success of the Birmingham Caucus and accused the Liberals of copying the 
National Union:-
"Appreciating the value of an organisation of this kind, the 
Liberal party has lately endeavoured to set on foot a similar 
machinery having Birmingham for i t s centre, and i t i s believed 
that every endeavour w i l l be made by them to wrest from the 
Conservative party some of the f r u i t s of their hardly'-earned 
victory i n 1874. 
Although accusing the Liberals of imitation the Conservatives were sensitive 
to their efficiency. The main membership of the National Union had tended 
to consist of larban working men's associations and i t became necessary to 
cast the net further afield hy instructing the Council to " take 
measures for extending the formation of Conservative and Constitutional 
Associations i n the rural d i s t r i c t s of England and V/ales."l 
The National Union had originally grown up very much as a propaganda 
device rather than as a machinery for communication betv/een the parliamentary 
party and the grass roots2 but the Caucus now also intensified pressure to 
give the grass roots a more active share i n the managanent of the party.3 
This trend was accelerated by the activities of Lord Randolph Churchill,4 
who was highly c r i t i c a l o f the conventional Tory leadership under Sir Stafford 
Northcote and Lord Salisbury. I t i s not alv/ays easy to distinguish Lord 
Randolph's genuine belief that the established party leadership had not come 
to terms with the v4.dened franchise of the 186? Reform Act5 from his personal 
p o l i t i c a l ambition,o but whatever his motives he quickly became identified 
as the leader of the 'Tory democracy' movement. 
1) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1877 
2) E. J. Peuchtwanger 'Disraeli Donocracy and the Tory Party' (Clarendon: 
1968) pp 128, 130. 
3) I . Bulmer-Thomas 'The Party System i n Great Britain' (Phoenix: 1953) 
pp 20-21 
4) V/. S. Churchill 'Lord Randolph Churchill' (Odhams 1951) 
Lord Roseberry 'Lord Randolph Churchill' (Humphreys 1906) 
R. S. Churchill 'Lord Randolph Churchill' i n 'Great Conservatives' 
(GPC 1953) 
R. Rhodes James 'Lord Randolph Churchill'(Weidenf eld & INicolson 1959) 
5) Lord Chilston 'Chief Whip' (Routledge I96I) 
6) A. J. Balfour 'Chapters of Autobiography' (Cassell 1930) pp 159J I6O-I7O 
Also R. T. McKenzie 'British P o l i t i c a l Parties' (Mercury 1964) p I67 
R. Rhodes James 'Churchill - A Study i n Failure' 1900-1939 (Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson;i970) p 11 
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The National Union, with i t s roots in the working class p o l i t i c a l 
organisation was closely associated with 'Tory democracy',^ and was a 
natural vehicle for Lord Randolph to use. The movement had been given some 
apparent support by Disraeli at the 1872 Conference when he re-emphasised the 
importance of working-class votes:-
"The Tory Party, unless i t i s a national party, i s nothing. I t 
i s not a confederacy of nobles, i t i s not a democratic multitude; 
i t i s a party formed from a l l the numerous classes i n the realm -
classes alike and equal before the law, but whose different 
conditions and different aims give xigour and variety to our 
national- l i f e . " 2 
Although Disraeli was sharply av/are of the need to captmre the working-class 
vote i t i s doubtful whether he supported a "democratic" party structure i n 
the sense that we think of "democracy" and indeed he is on record as having 
said that:-
".... we do not l i v e - and I trust i t w i l l never be the fate of 
this country to l i v e - under a danocracy." 3 
but some members of the party interpreted h i s opposition to a party dominated 
by the gentry as support for a working class dominated "democratic" movement^ 
The main protagonists of the importance of the working class vote were 
the "Itourth Party" .5 The key figures in this parliamentary group were 
Churchill, Gorst, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff and (for a relatively brief 
period) Arthur Balfour. Their professed objective was to reform the 
Conservative Party so that i t v/as established on a soundly representative 
basis reflecting working-class views and i n some respects competing with the 
Liberal 'Caucus' concept.6 They publicised their views by conducting a 
campaign of obstruction against the established party leadership i n 
Parliament but although they had some success thqr did not succeed i n 
influencing most of the old-guard Conservatives and i t was logical for them 
to turn to the National Union for support.7 Lord Randolph Churchill was 
"an adroit manipulator of the party machine"^ and appreciated that the 
National Union was a possible means of bringing pressure to bear on the 
party leadership which was increasingly dependent on the National Union after 
the Corrupt Practices Act.9 
1) R. Blake 'The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill' (l^yre & 
Spottiswoode 1970) pp 151-152 
2) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1872 
3) H. C. Deb, l 8 t h March 1867; also Lord Chilston 'Chief Whip' (Routledge 
. 1961) p 19; R, Blake 'The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill' 
(Eyre & Spottisv/oode 1970) pp 100, 123; S i r G. Butler 'The Tory 
Tradition' (CPC 1957) pp 48-72 and P. B. Smith 'The Making of the 
Second Reform B i l l (CUP 1966) p 235 
4) T. E. Kebbell 'Lord Beaconsfield' (Mitchell Kennerley; 1907) pp 254-260 
Also T. E. Utley i n 'Tradition & Change' (CPC 1954) p 23 
cf Lord Chilston 'Chief Whip' (Routledge 196l) pp 24-26 
5) Sir I . Jennings 'Party Polities' (CUP 196l) Vol I I pp 143-158 
6) Earl of Oxford & Asquith 'Fifty Years i n Parliament' (Cassell 1926) Vol I p6l 
7) Sir I . Jennings 'Party Politics' (CDP 1961) pp 143-158; also 
E. J. Feuchtwanger 'Disraeli Denocracy and the Tory Party' (Clarendon 
1968) pp 167-189 
8) R. B. McDowell 'British Conservatism 1832-1914' (Paber 1959) p 138 , 
9) P. Thompson 'Socialists, Liberals and Labour' (Routledge Kegan Paul 1967) 
P 74 
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The decision to rely on popular support as a means of pressurising the party 
hierarcl^yl i s summed up by Lord Chilston: 
"Lord Randolph had become f u l l y aware that .... a l l the most 
infl u e n t i a l Conservatives i n the House of Commons and the Carlton 
Club were united i n their dislike, distrust and Jealousy of him. 
Therefore, having made the formal gesture of inviting Salisbury 
to come forward and head the 'Tory Democratic Movement', he 
turned away from the leaders i n Parliament and began to base his 
p o l i t i c a l power on his undoubted popularity in the country. 
I t was i n conformity with this policy that Lord Randolph 
deliberately set to work to capture as much as he could of the 
Conservative Party organisation,"2 
At the 1883 Conference, Gorst and Churchill concentrated their efforts 
on getting the l a t t e r elected Chairman of the Council instead of Lord Percy. 
This would put them i n a position to "weld the Council into a powerful 
p o l i t i c a l organisation strong enough to set the 'front-bench men' at 
defiance."3 Their efforts were successful and Churchill was elected Chairman 
with an adequate majority on the Council, 
The attack on the party hierarchy, was launched at the same Conference, 
Lord Randolph wrote to Sir Henry V/olff on 28th September 1883:-
" I have seen Gorst and arranged with him that at the meeting of 
the delegates at Birmingham I am to declare war against the 
Central Committee."4 
The Central Committee established by Disraeli after the 1880 election failures 
was the precursor of the modern Central Office and was controlled entirely 
by the Party Leader and the Chief Whip. Despite Gorst's attempted reform 
during the I870's the National Union's Council had become largely co-optative 
and was dominated by the Central Committee.5 Both organisations gym^olised 
the hierarcl\y and Randolph Churchill centred his attack on them6 enabling him 
to claim that he was only trying to make the party's machinery more 
efficient, rather than attacking the leadership.? 
The Council was heavily cri t i c i s e d in a resolution passed by the 
Conference:-
"That the Conference of the National Union while thanking the 
• Council for the past year for their services directs the Council 
for the ensuing year to take such steps as may be requisite for 
securing to the National Union i t s legitimate influence in the 
party organisation."8 
1) F. H. Herrick 'Lord Randolph Churchill and the Popular Organisation of 
the Conservative Party' (Pacific Historical Review Vol XV 1946) pp I78-I9I 
2) Lord Chilston 'Chief Y/hip' (Routledge I96I) p 32; Also W. S. Churchill 
•Lord Randolph Churchill' (Odhams 1951) p 237 
3) J. M. Maclean 'Recollections of Westminster and India' (Sherratt & Hu^s 
1902) p 59 
4) H. E. Gorst 'The Fourth Party' (Smith Elder 1906) p 252 
5) R, Blake 'The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill' (Eyre & 
Spottiswoode 1970) pp 151-152 
6) H. Felling 'Modern Britain 1885-1955' (Nelson 1960) pp 7-8 
7) L. J. Jennings (^Iditor) 'Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Lord Randolph Churchill, MP 
1880-88' (Longman's I889) 2 Vols. 
8) NUCUA Conference Minutes I883 
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which Churchill also interpreted as a direct invitation to diminish the power 
of the Central Committee'-:-
"They (the Central Committee) decided to centre i n their hands a l l 
the powers and the available financial resources of the 
Conservative Party .... i t was necessary that a l l r i v a l bodies 
should be s t i f l e d I should l i k e to see the control of the 
party organisation taken out of the hands of a self-elected body, 
and placed i n the hands of an elected body. I should l i k e to see 
the management of party funds taken out of the hands of an 
irresponsible body. The Central Committee i s a saLf-elected and 
irresponsible body, while the Council i s a responsible and elected 
body."2 
I t i s a curious paradox, however, that although Churchill constantly 
upheld the importance of the working classes and was popular with them,3 
i t was i n fact their diminishing influence within the National Union and the 
rising influence of middle class participation., i n the organisation which was 
making i t less pliable to the wishes of the parlieimentary leadership.4 
Having obtained a k ^ position i n the National Union and launched his 
attack, Churchill spent the following year i n trying to secure the abolition 
of the Central Committee. This involved negotiations with Salisbury who held 
firm views about the relationship between the National Union and the Parlia-
mentary Party :-
" I t appears to us that the organisation /the National Uniory'is, and 
must remain, i n a l l i t s essential features local. But there is s t i l l much 
work which a central body l i k e the Council of the National Union can perfom 
with great advantage to the party. I t i s the representative of many 
Associations on whom, i n their respective constituencies, the work of the 
party greatly depends. I t can superintend and stimulate their exertions; 
furnish them with advice; and i n some measure with funds; provide them with 
lecturers; aid them i n the improvement and development of the local press; 
and help them in perfecting the machinery by which the registration is con-
ducted and the arrangements f o r providing volunteer agency at election times. 
I t w i l l have special opportunity of pressing upon the local associations 
which i t represents the paramount duty of selecting in time, the candidates 
who are to come forward at the dissolution."5 
Churchill seems to have misunderstood this l e t t e r as a promise to make 
considerable changes in the party structure^ but any illusions which he had 
were f i i T a l y dispelled by a subsequent le t t e r from Salisbury making i t quite 
clear that he intended to retain the Central Committee".- Although Salisbury 
and Northcote subsequently had the National Union evicted from the offices 
which i t shared with the Central Committee i t was generally accepted that 
continued guerilla warfare would not do either section of the party ai^ y good 
and a compromise was negotiated which resulted in a slight increase i n the 
funds given to the National Union by the Central Committee but l i t t l e else.7 
1) L. J. Jennings (Editor) 'Speeches of the Rt, Hon. Lord Randolph 
Churchill, MP 1880-88' (Longnan's 1889) 2 Vols. 
2) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1883 
3) Lord Chilston 'Chief Whip' (Routledge 196l) p 28; 
W. S. Churchill 'Lord Randolph Churchill' (Odhams 1951) pp 21i(^215 
4) R. Blake 'The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill' (Eyre & 
Spottiswoode 1970) p 151 
5) W. S. Churchill 'Lord Randolph Churchill' (Odhams 1951) P 314 
6) " " " " . " / " P 316; R. T. McKenzie 'British P o l i t i c a l Parties (Mercury 1964) p 172 
7) " " " " " " " p. 173 
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Northcote and Salisbury v/ere uneasy as the 1884 Conference approached. 
They were afraid that Churchill would take the opportunity to raise the 
National Union's grievances again. After consulting Akers-Douglas, the Chief 
Whip, Northcote wrote to Churchill trying to dissuade him from anything which 
might encourage disunity but i n general the parliamentary leadership decided 
that the best policy was to ignore the Conference altogether and 'loyal' 
members of the Council were informed that Northcote did not wish to tender 
any advice about the agenda,1 This neutralism became characteristic of the 
party leadership's relationship with the Conference - as Lowell was to write 
later that "The action of the Conference was /jio^ fettered: i t ^waj7 
ignored,"2 -
I n the event the Conference was quiet: Churchill had already resigned 
as Chairman of Council as a tactical move and supported the nomination of 
Hicks Beach as his successor. The discontent began to wane shortly after-
wards. The Central Committee liquidated i t se l f3 but was replaced by the 
Central Office which retained substantially the same character and l i t t l e 
concession was made by the party hierarchy. The reasons why the pressure for 
'Tory Democracy' petered out have been the subject of some controversy. 
Certainly a major factor v/as loss of interest on Lord Randolph's part. 
Chilston takes the view that i t was the strong pro-hierarchy elanent on the 
Council which caused t h i s ^ whereas Balfour^ whose viev/ i s t a c i t l y approved by 
:.Mckenzie,6 thought that Churchill realised that the leadership of the 
Parliamentary party v«,s potentially within his grasp, and appreciated more 
sharply how unwise i t would be to have his power circumscribed by the National 
Union. 7 
Irrespective of Churchill's motives, the outcome was clear:-
"The point at issue was v/hether the rank and f i l e i n the 
constituencies, on whom the parties now depended for electoral 
victory i n a v/ay they never did before 1867, were to have a 
decisive voice in policy-making the issue was settled early 
and i t was settled against the rank and f i l e . " 8 
The 1884 Conference was largely notable for the introduction, after con-
siderable debate, of some 'Tory Doiiocracy' into the National Union's own 
structure; the Council was enlarged to 36 members, a l l of them elected by 
Conference, 9 and by 1885 the object of discussing (as distinct from deciding) 
Lord Chilston 'Chief Whip' (Routledge 1961) p 36 
A. L. Lowell 'The Government of England' (Macmillan 1908) p 563 
See McKenzie 'Political Parties' (Mercury 1964) p 173; also R, Rhodes James 
'Lord Randolph Churchill' (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1959) PP 150-153 
Lord Chilston 'Chief Whip' (Routledge 1961) p 37 
A, J. Balfour 'Chapters of Autobiography' (Cassell 1930) pp 107-70; also 
K. Young 'Arthior James Balfour' (Bell 1963) pp 87-88 
R. T. McKenzie 'British P o l i t i c a l Parties' (Mercury 1964) p 167 
See also R. Blake 'A Centuiy of Achievonent' (Conservative Central 
Office 1967) p 22 
'The Party Conference - Reality tS: Illusion of Popular Control' - Times 
29th September 1952 
NUCUA Conference Minutes 1884 
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policy had been accepted as being a suitable one for the Conference^nd 
increasingly the Conference becam^policy discussion body. Although this 
potentially contained the seeds of further dispute with the parliamentary 
party, i n practice relationships remained cordial - largely i t has been 
suggested, due to the astute management of Captain Middleton who combined 
the offices of Chief Agent and Secretary of the National Union.2 
Thereafter there were few major developments i n the role of the Gonference:-
"The general structure of English parties i n the country had 
been established by the 1880's, and in the period 1906-31 
arrangements were amended and extended but not fundamentally 
changed "3 
and i t s functions remained much as they had been i n 1885. 
The 1905 Conference was the scene of a highly publicised internal 
s p l i t over t a r i f f s 4 which resulted i n the resignation of some of the more 
convinced protectionists from the government andoafter the I906 election 
defeat a Special Conference v/as called to discuss the reasons for the 
defeat. Although the Conference began to play a slightly more forceful 
part i n the party's structure, generally speaking relations between the 
Conference and the parliamentary party reflected the e l i t i s t tradition which 
i s s t i l l characteristic of the party as a whole,5 The National Union:-
".... represented local democracy and held conferences to foster 
the s p i r i t and express the mood of the party; and the Central 
Office acted as an administrative arm and to some extent an 
advisory arm of the parliamentary leaders. Prom that day to the 
present the National Union has been concerned mainly with 
arousing and sustaining activity at the local level, encouraging 
workers and ordinary folk to participate, and disseminating 
information to local units and members. I t determines tactics 
ra ther than strategy, which i s l e f t to the parliajnentaiy chiefs 
assisted by the Central Office "6 
and despite very sharp controversy over the 'Irish Treaty' in 192l7 and 
attempts to use the Conferences i n the early 1930's to pressurise the 
leadership^ over the Indian issue, this remained the basis of the relation-
ship u n t i l after the Second World Wiar. 
1) NUCUA Conference Minutes I885 
2) R. T. McKenzie 'British P o l i t i c a l Parties' (Mercury 1964) p 177 
3) A. Beattie (Editor) "English Party Politics' Vol I I 1906-1970 
(Weidenf eld & Nicolson 1970) p 235 
4) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1905 
5) E. a. Nordlinger 'The Working Class Tories' (MacGibbon & Kee 1967) pp 13-45 
6) A. Brady 'The Briti s h Two Party System' (Political Science: Vol 8 No. 1; 
March 1956) p 12 
8) S. C. Ghosh 'Decision-Making and the Conservative Party: A Case Study of 
the Indian Problem 1929-34' ( P o l i t i c a l Studies Vol X i i i 1965) pp 198-212 
?) NUCUA Conference Minutes 1921 
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CONFERENCE COMPOSITION 
Although history played an important part i n settling the framework 
within which the Conference operates, i t s current operation is clearly 
influenced by the sort of people who attend. There tends to be a general 
assunaption that a l l of the party conferences are dominated by 'party 
militants' and although detailed examination of the sort of resolutions 
submitted to both the Labour and Conservative conferences has shown that the. 
constituencies are surprisingly non-partisan the fact ranains that party 
monbers who make the effort to attend the Conferences must be more firmly 
committed to the party's objectives than the average voter. 
I n parties where the Conference exercises direct power over the 
leadership or policies of the parliamentary party, the composition of the 
conference, cam become a subject of active debate - as in the case of the 
Labour Party's trade union representation2 - or even i n some cases, as in 
the United States, of radical reform. In the Conservative Party, hov/ever, 
the absence of any direct control over the parliamentary party has meant that 
delegate selection has not been an important issue and although delegates 
have always been anxious to ensure that the numbers entitled to attend the 
Conference are not reduced,3 the method by which they are chosen has not 
caused any real controversy. Nevertheless, attendance at the Conference i s 
often prized by constituency workers on social grounds:-
"Tri v i a l as i t may seem to the outsider, perhaps the most 
significant prize that can be offered to the hard-working 
constituency worker is attendance at the various party 
conferences and particularly at the Annual Party Conference, 
The privilege of attending the Conference i s the most common 
reward for constituency work of course there i s 
comparatively l i t t l e political-function attached to attending 
the Party Conference 
As a result the selection of delegates is treated i n a relaxed way. 
The Conference Standing Orders do not lay down any procedure for choosing 
delegates and selection arrangements are l e f t entirely i n the hands of 
individual constituencies. Significant indicators of their attitudes are 
the fact that the writer was accredited by one constituency although he had 
no connection with the Conservative Party at a l l , , and the number of delegates' 
wives who attend i n a purely social capacity although they are f u l l y accredited 
delegates i n their own right.5 
1) R, Rose 'The P o l i t i c a l Ideas of English Party Activists' (American 
P o l i t i c a l Science Review Vol LVI 1962) p 360-371 and R. Rose (Editor) 
'Studies i n British Politics' (Macmillan 1966) p 307 
2) e,g. The Economist, 26th September 1970; R. Rose 'Between Miami Beach 
and Blackpool' (Political Quarterly Vol 43 1972) p 421; 'Socialism or 
Social Donocracy' J. P. Mackintosh (Political Quarterly Vol 43 1972) p 482; 
G. Cynax 'Labour and the Unions' (Political Quarterly Vol 31 1960) 
3) NUCUA Conference Report 1950 p 72 f f 
4) J. B i f f en 'The Conservative Opportunity' (Batsford & GPC 1965) P 187 
5) See also R. T. Mckenzie 'British P o l i t i c a l Parties' (Mercury 1964) pp 194-5 
for information on this problan prior to 1945 
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The number of delegates'^ which each constituency can send to the 
Conference i s l a i d dovm in the National Union's Rules as follows:-
(a) Two representatives (one of each sex) including, i f possible, 
the Chairman of the Association and the Chairman of the V/omen's 
Divisional Advisory Committee 
(b) The Honorary Treasurer (or a deputy) of the Association; 
(c) The Chairman (or a deputy) of the Young Conservative and 
Unionist Divisional Committee 
(d) The Chairman (or a manber) of the Trade Unionist Advisory 
Committee. The representative must be a bona fide member 
of a trade union 
(e) Two additional representatives appointed by each Constituency 
Association. One of these representatives shall be a Young 
Conservative nominated .by the Young Conservative Constituency 
Committee. Where only one Young Conservative Branch exists, 
this Branch, for the purposes of this Rule shall have the 
same powers as a Constituency Committee. Where no Young 
Conservative organisation exists one of the two additional 
representatives appointed by the Constituency Association 
shall be a member of the Association who i s not more than 
t h i r t y years of age.2 
A l l full-time agents aoid certificated organisers are also entitled to attend 
and each area can send i t s President, Chairman, Treasurer and one member of 
the Area Council together with the Chairman and one member of each of the 
following Area CoiTnnittees:-
Young Conservatives Committee 
V/omen's Committee 
Trades Unionists' Advisory Committee 
CPC Coramittee3 
Education Advisory Committee 
Clubs Committee 
Certain national organisations such as the Young Conservatives, the 
Association of Conservative Students and the Primrose League are entitled to 
send representatives and a l l Conservative MPs, candidates and peers receiving 
the vrfiip are also entitled to attend. 
As a result the composition of the Conference i s dominated by office-
holders within the party, many of whom can be expected to be either activists 
or local notables. A conscious effort i s made to ensure that a l l sections of 
the party are represented by specifying that delegates must be drawn from 
various groups but i n practice i t i s impossible to enforce such restrictions 
and constituencies frequently nominate other delegates i f for example they do 
not have the requisite number of Young Conservatives who wish to attend. 
Furthermore there has never been any effort to relate Conference representa-
tion to c r i t e r i a such as constituency membership or electoral success as i n 
the German or US Conf erences4 and each constituency i s entitled to be 
represented equally irrespective of i t s size or level of activity. 
1) Although the term 'delegates' i s used i n this study for convenience, those 
attending the Conference are s t r i c t l y speaking 'representatives' of their 
constituencies and there are no formal arrangonents for mandating them. 
2) NUCUA Rules - Rule No. XVII 
3) The Conservative P o l i t i c a l Centre (CPC) i s the party's p o l i t i c a l 
education organisation. 
4) c.f. S. Henig and J. Pinder (Editors) 'European P o l i t i c a l Parties' (Allen & 
Unwin 1969) pp 35 , 47 , 55 for German parties 
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The only aspect of conference membership which has drawn strong 
feelings from delegates i s the question of numbers.1 The present composition 
of the Conference gives a t o t a l potential attends.nce of rather over 5»500:-
7 representatives from each constituency 3,878 
Constituency Agents 554 
MPs and candidates 625 
Peers 100 
Representatives from areas and central organisations 320 
Ex-officio and co-opted members 70 
Representatives from Scotland and Northern Ireland 43 
5,590 
The numbers actually attending are more d i f f i c u l t to assess as there is 
no check at the conference i t s e l f and many constituencies apply for creden-
t i a l s but do not use them. Some of the post-war conferences were reputedly 
attended by over 4,000 delegates but a count of the numbers actually attending 
debates at the 1967 Conference showed that the attendance was about 2,900 
(at the opening session) and this was broadly corroborated by the vote i n the 
same year on a major education debate i n which 2,300 votes T«ere cast' (after 
allowing for abstentions etc.). 
L i t t l e information is available about tliose who attend and a small-
scale questionnaire survey was therefore carried out among delegates from the 
party's Northern Area attending the 1967 Conference. Interviews were carried 
out i n November and December immediately following the Conference.? 
Delegates are often perplaced by last-minute substitutes or drop OUT; 
altogether for personal reasons unknown even to their constituencies and as a 
result i t was impossible to arrive at a definitive figure for the numbers who 
attended from the Northern Area but the best available estimate was 76. 
Successful interviews were conducted with 31 of these; of the remainder, 5 
refused to be interviewed, 6 were v/ives attending purely i n a social capacity, 
and the rest could not be contacted for various reasons. 
Although the actual numbers interviev/ed were small they represented 
almost half of those who attended from the Northern Area and they survey 
results probably reflect the Area's representation accurately. 
Caution must be used, however, i n applying them to the Conference as a 
whole. The estimated attendance from the Northern Area was almost exactly a 
t h i r d of those entitled to attend (76 out of 226) whereas the national figure 
seems to have been over half (2,900 out of 5,590), In this context i t is 
significant that the number of Labour dominated seats in the Northern Area i s 
comparatively high and as a result some of the constituency organisations are 
i n poor health. Attendances from Northern constituencies was probably also 
depressed because the 1967 Conference was at Brighton vidiich was comparatively 
inaccessible. 
The sample also becomes less reliable stati s t i c a l l y when applied to the 
Conference as a whole. Although i t covered about 42^ of the representation 
from the Northern Area i t only formed about 1% of the to t a l conference atten-
dance. I t was however sufficient to give some insight into one region's 
contribution to the Conference and does give a broad guide to the background 
and attitudes of delegates generally. 
1) Interim and Final Reports of the Committee on Party Organisation (NUCUA 1949 
PP 47-50) 
2) For questionnaire see Appendix. For comparison wi th Canadian experience 
see C R Santos 'Some Collective Characteristics of liie Delegates to the 
1968 Liberal Barty Leadership Convention' (Canadian Journal of P o l i t i c a l 
Science Vol I I I 1970) pp 299-303 
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58^ of .those interviewed were men and were women"'' and although not 
directly representative of the national sex distribution i t does reflect the 
much larger part which women play i n constituency p o l i t i c s than i n 
parliamentary politics.2 They provide an important nucleus for certain 
types of pao'ty work - particularly fund-raising - and the party's structure 
gives them a sizeable independent role with their ovm national machinery 
including a Women's National Advisory Committee and their own annual 
Conference.3 I t v/ould therefore be logical to expect them to play a 
substantial role i n the conference and further factors which favour a high 
fanale attendance are the fact that much of the Conference f a l l s during the 
working wedc and the number of wives v/ho accompany husbands to the Conferences 
as accredited delegates. The niamber of female speakers i n debates during the 
period 1947-1966 shows that their participation is considerably smaller than 
their overall niambers at the Conference would suggest. Although women have 
never formed less than 9^ of a l l speakers, the high of 18^ i s s t i l l well 
below the overall percentage of female delegates at the Conference:-
Table 2.1 
PARTICIPmON BY WOMEN SPEAKERS 1947-70 Conference No, of women Total Percentage of 
Date speakers speakers women speakers 
1947 11 97 11.3 
1948 27 150 18.0 
1949 12 98 12.2 
1950 12 95 12.6 
1951 No Conference 
1952 10 75 13.3 
1953 10 75 13.3 
1954 11 79 13.9 
1955 15 90 16.6 
1956 13 86 15.1 
1957 10 78 12.8 
1958 14 120 11.6 
1959 No Conference 
1960 15 114 13.2 
1961 15 118 12.7 
1962 16 114 14.0 
1963 22 122 18.0 
1964 No Conference 
1965 18 115 15.7 
1966 14 117 12.0 
1967 15 98 15.3 
1968 10 105 9.5 
1969 17 118 14.4 
1970 16 124 12.9 
303 2,188 13.9 
1) Counts carried out during the 1967 Conference showed that approximately 
35^ of the delegates attending debates were women. 
2) For information on sex distribution of party militants see A. Kornberg, 
J. Smith, M. J. Clarke and H. D. Clarke 'Participation in Local Party 
Organisations i n the US and Canada' (American Journal of Pol i t i c a l 
Science Vol XVII 1973) PP 23-47 
3) F. Bealey, J. Blondel, W. P. McCann 'Constituency Politics' (Faber 1965) 
pp 111, 117 
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and although some allov/ance must be made for the random distribution of 
opportunities to speak there are grounds for thinking that many of the 
women delegates attend purely to hear the leadership or accompany their 
husbands rather than to participate actively i n the proceedings. 
Female delegates are sometimes caricatured as being preoccupied with 
the crime problem and the press often pictures the party managers as 
t e r r i f i e d "lest the television cameras should catch rows of middle-aged 
women screaming for the cat for sexual off enders... ."1 but analysis of the 
issues on which women delegates spoke during the period 1947-65 sliows tliat 
the majority were i n fact concerned about the econon^ y, the social services, 
housing, education, or party organisational questions (see Table 2.2) 
and although the low numbers taking an interest in subjects such as industrial 
relations or transport are hardly surprising, the larger numbers participa-
ting i n foreign affairs debates are perhaps more unusual. 
There does not appear to have been any significance in the marital 
status of interviewees (32$!? single; 68^ married/widowed) but the age dis-
tribution is of considerable interest. 20> of those interviewed were under 
30 and almost 60^ were over 50 (including 2 ^ who were over 60) v/hereas 
only 10) fell into the 30-50 age group. 
Heavy emphasis on the party's youth movement i s an aspect of the 
Conference's composition. Young Conservatives should f i l l at least three of 
each constituency's seven Conference seats and the figure could be larger i f 
some of the constituency officers happened to be Young Conservatives. 
Although the significance of this i s somewhat tempered by the fact 
that members can remain 'Young' Conservatives u n t i l they are 30, the high 
representation given to them reflects the compsLratively harmonious relation-
ship wHsh the party's youth movement has enjoyed with the leadership,2 i n 
contrast with both the Labour and Liberal parties v/hich have been acutely 
embarrassed at times by their younger supporters.3 In addition to being 
well represented at the Conference they play an active part i n i t s proceed-
ings and a conscious effort i s made by the Chair to ensure a proportion of 
younger speakers. During the period 1962-66 the number of Young 
Conservative speakers was:--
Number of Young m „ M o z 
^ Conservative Speakers l i b l e . L l 
1962 16 
1963 13 
1965 15 
1966 25 
The lack of participation by voters i n the 30-50 age group generally -
not just at the Conference - has been a subject of some concern to the 
party. While i t reflects the inevitable pressures which work and domestic 
commitments place on people i n this age group i t also means that the party 
is deprived of the services of a particularly energetic and capable section 
of i t s supporters. I n this the Conference contrasts significantly with the 
experience of the US parties (whose conventions are admittedly less often) 
., -
1) The Economist Oct/Dec 1958 Vol 189 p 211 
2) Z. Layton-Henry 'The Young Conservatives 1945-70' (Journal of 
Contemporary History Vol 8 1973) PP 143-156 
3) See for exajnple 'The Economist' 26th September 1970 
4) NUCUA Conference iieport 1966 p 117 
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where about 6C^ of the delegates f a l l into the 30-50 age group:-
Table 2,4 
Age Distribution at 1968 US National Conventions'^ 
Democratic Republican 
Age 30 and under 18^ % 
31 - ¥ ) 30% 27% 
41 - 50 3 ¥ 32?2 
Ov&r 50 21% 32% 
I t also has the effect of giving older people a disproportionate share of 
influence i n the affairs of the party which can be embarrassing when i t i s 
trying to appeal to younger voters. 
The range of occupations from which interviewees came varied con-
siderably from company directors to lorry drivers. The distribution by 
categories using the Market Research Society's classification2 was as 
follows: 
Table 2.5 
Class Percentage 
A 35 
B 29 
CI 23 
C2 6 
D 3 
E 3 
and the fact that 64% of delegates interviewed f e l l into the AB class 
which may be broadly described as middle class appears to suggest that the 
activists i n the party are feir from representative of the social background 
of a large proportion of the party's voters.3 This was also illustrated by 
the educational background of the delegates. A l l had attended both primary 
and secondary schooling and 19% had gone on to university whilst a sub-
stantial proportion (over 25%) had attended other types of further education 
or some form of professional training. Equally significantly, only a third 
of those interviewed had attended normal state schools whilst over half had 
attended private schools and the remainder had been educated at direct 
grant schools.^ 
This heavy concentration of eonference representation amongst middle 
class supporters to some extent reflects the strength which the Conservative' 
party enjoys i n that area but i t does mean that the Conference is largely 
dominated by a middle class ethos which i s not part of the lives of many who 
vote for the party at eLections5 and is certainly far removed from the 
working-class origins of the Conference. 
1) J. H. Parrns 'The Convention Problem' (Brookings 1972) p 59 
2) See D. Butler and D. Stokes 'Political Change in Britain' (Penguin 1971) 
PP 95-96 for discussion of different methods of classification. 
3) See D. Berry 'The Sociology of Grass Roots Politics' (Macmillan 1970) 
pp 28 , 42-43 for relationship between class and activism. Also c.f. 
J. W. Davis 'National Convention' (Barron's 1972) pp 13-28 and 
P. T. David, R. M. Goldman, R. G. Bain 'Politics of National Party 
Conventions' (Brookings 1960) for comparison with US Convention delegates. 
4) c.f. J. Blondel 'Voters Parties and Leaders' (Penguin 1966) pp 37-42 
5) c.f. J, Blondel 'Voters Parties and Leaders' (Penguin 1966] pp 32-33; 56-58 
A.J. Allen 'The English Voter' (English Universities Press 1964) P 94; 
D. Butler & D, Stokes 'Political Change in Britain' (Penguin 1971) PP 171-18J 
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A number of questions were included i n the questionnaire to try and 
assess the level of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y amongst delegates. 
Almost half of those interviewed claimed to have been active party 
members for more than 15 years; over three-quarters were attending at least 
their second Conference and half had attended five Conferences or more. 
This suggests high continuity between the membership of the Conference i n 
one year and another which has been the subject of criticism within the 
party on the groimds that i t tends to encourage stereotyped attitudes and 
the Maxwell Fyfe Committee i n fact recommended that specific steps should 
be taken to ensure regular changes i n representation-'- although they do not 
appear to have been very effective. 
Clearly this long-term support was partly a function of the age group 
into which the majority of delegates f e l l and also reflected i n the fact 
that over 7Qfo were office-holders of some kind with their local parties. 
Delegates were asked about the range of organisations to which they 
belonged. Membership of the Young Conservatives and i t s immediate predeces-
sor, the Junior Imperialist Le^ewere the most common - 55?^  of those 
interviewed had belonged to one or other of these organisations at some time, 
and almost half were current members. The next most common, surprisingly 
perhaps, was the Primrose League of which 23^ were either current or former 
members. 13?2 were current or former members of the Universities Conservative 
Association and other bodies with " '. representation were Trades Union 
Advisory Coiincils and the Association of Conservative Teachers, but the 
party's 'intellectvial' organisations v/ere poorly represented - only one 
delegate belonged to the Bow Group and none had any connection with either 
the Monday Club or PEST. This may to some extent reflect the fact that both 
bodies tend to be London orientated. 
Just under a t h i r d of the delegates had been to at least one of the 
peripheral meetings held at the Conference. Those which v/ere attended by 
most delegates were the GPC Meeting and the joint Young Conservative 
Conservative Students Association meeting and over 80^ of those interviewed 
had also attended a conference other than the national one during the previous 
f i v e years. 
Interviewees were also asked about their activities during the previous 
general election. A l l had been involved i n some v/ay including one delegate 
who had been a candidate himself. The range of activities i s shown below:-
Table 2.6 
Canvassing 8 ] ^ 
Car driving 2 ^ 
Car loan 2 ^ 
Addressing circulars 5 ^ 
Secretarial help 29fo 
Polling Booth Clerk 2 ^ 
Escorting candidates 3 ^ 
Addressing meetings ISifo 
Committee room work i j f f o 
Speaking on loudspeaker l^o 
1) Pinal Report of the Committee on Party Organisation (NUCUA 1949) p 58 
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Other a c t i v i t i e s mentioned included organising cars, addressing polling 
cards, ward agent, scrutineer, aide to agent, loan of loudspeakers, 
knocking up voters, sub-agent and loan of committee rooms. 
Although the level of involvement i n campaigning act i v i t y was f a i r l y 
predictable the level of involvanent i n local politics was perhpas more 
surprising. Almost 70% of those interviewed had contested seats on a local 
council and more than a quarter had i n fact held such seats. 
There i s therefore a considerable amount of evidence to suggest that 
Conference delegates are "activists" in the sense that they participate 
actively i n the organisational activities of the party although i t does not 
necessarily follovi of csourse that t h ^ are militant i n their views. 
In view of the predominantly middle class circumstances of the 
delegates i t was perhaps surprising that almost 30% were either current or 
former members of a trade union. 1 
V/hile^with this exception^ the background of Conference delegates 
largely matches the sort of pattern which one might anticipate from sub-
jective observation, possibly the most remarkable thing about the delegates 
was the extent to vfhich they were self-selected. On the basis that attenr: 
dance at the Conference i s a sought-after prize one tends to assume that 
there must be heavy competition to attend which is resolved through elections 
at constituency level. In practice nothing i s further from the truth and 
although this situation can arise in very active constituencies the majority 
of delegates attend simply because they offer to do so and their offer i s 
accepted by the association, or else by virtue of their office. Thus of 
those interviewed i n 1967, over a t h i r d attended ex o f f i c i o and of the 
remainder only 20^ were asked to go by their constituencies, the others 
being volunteers. In no case was the competition so intense that an 
election was necessary. 
This absence of competition partly reflects a general acceptance that 
the Conference's role is purely advisory (supported by three-quarters of the 
delegates - only a handful f e l t that the gonference should be able to man-
date the leadership) but i t i s also based to some extent on cost. The expense 
i s not inconsiderable, particularly since the Conference was extended by a 
day i n 1958. 
Of the delegates interviewed, only 10^ had received some form of 
financial assistance from their associations and while a further 20% 
believed that help would have been available i f required, the remainder 
were quite clear that no help would have been available.2 Interviews with 
20 constituency associations chosen from random i n the Northern Area revealed 
only 6 which helped with expenses. Where help was given i t s scope varied 
considerably :-
1) c.f. D. Berry 'Psirty Manbership and Social Participation' (Political 
Studies Vol XVII No. 2 1969) pp 196-207 for low level of Trade Union 
participation generally amongst Conservative Party members. 
2) See also The Economist Vol. 181 October/Deconber 1956, p 216 . For 
effects of finance on Labour Conference delegates see E Janosik *Coi>-
. stituency Labour Parties i n England' (Pall Mall 1968) pp 156-181 
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Table 2.7 
Constituency 'A' paid 2nd Class r a i l fare plus reasonable 
subsistence ejcpenses f o r a l l delegates i f requested. 
Constituency 'B*: Chairman's expenses paid. 
Constituency 'C; Association gave 'financial assistance' i f 
requested - amount and scope unspecified. 
Constituency 'D': Two 'scholarships' covering r a i l t r a v e l and 
hotel expenses available. Branches i n v i t e d to send i n 
nominations which were then drawn from a hat. 
Constituency 'E': grant of £25 available to be shared between 
four delegates. 
I n addition the women's branch delegate was helped by 
her branch which held fund-raising events for that 
purpose. 
Two f u r t h e r delegates were assisted by the Conservative 
Club. 
Constituency 'P': Expenses of two delegates paid. 
Such f i n a n c i a l support as there was appeared to come exclusively from 
the constituency associations or related bodies and there was no evidence of 
the sort o f private f i n a n c i a l patronage which has been responsible f o r allega-
tions of undue pressure on delegates to the US Conventions. 
While the absence of f i n a n c i a l assistance f o r Northern Area delegates 
was not necessarily f u l l y t y p i c a l of the national situation - many Northern " 
associations operate i n heavily Labour areas and f i n d fund-raising 
d i f f i c u l t whilst at the same time they tend to have a substantial number of 
lower middle and working class supporters who would need f i n a n c i a l help to 
go to the Conference,- there can be l i t t l e doubt that cost i s a factor which 
tends to reduce representation from lower income party manbersl and as a 
resu l t the Conference i s inevitably f a r from t y p i c a l of a cross-section of 
Conservative voters i n i t s composition.2 
There i s also some evidence that Conference delegates are con-
siderably better informed about policy than the electorate at large.3 A 
series of questions were put to delegates on a v/ide range of policy issues 
to assess t h e i r l e v e l of knowledge of party policy. I n each case the issue 
had been covered at the 196? Conference by a major platform speaker. The 
po l i c i e s covered were:-
Education 
Delegates were asked whether ±b was party policy that a l l schools should be 
made i n t o comprehensives. This had been a major issue at the 196? 
Conference and had been the subject of a b a l l o t . 
1) See Final Report of the Coimnittee on Party Organisation (NUCUA 1949) p 59 
f o r recommendations on pool fare system and Area assistance with 
expenses. 
2) E. A. Nordlinger 'The Working Class Tories' (Mac&ibbon & Kee 196?); 
R. T. McKenzie and A, Silver 'Angels i n Marble' (Heineraann 1968) 
3) c.f. J. Or. Blumler and D. McQiiail 'Television i n P o l i t i c s - I t s Uses 
and Influences' (Paber 19b8) pp 158-161 
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Housing 
Delegates were asked v/hether i t was party policy that Council house tenants 
with high incomes should pay the same rents as those with low incomes. 
D i f f e r e n t i a l council house rents were i n fact a major platform of 
Conservative policy. They were also asked v/hether the party would abolish 
the Land Commission ( t o which i t v/as f i r m l y committed) and whether the party 
supported option mortgages (which i t did although i t was committed to 
improving them). 
Transport 
Delegates were asked two questions. The f i r s t was on a major issue, namely 
whether the party supported a National Freight Authority. The second was on 
a more obscure issue - whether the party believed that bus services should 
be supported by investment allowances. I n fact the party leadership was 
strongly opposed to the concept of a National Freight Authority but favoured 
the re-introduction of investment allowances f o r bus companies. 
Social Security 
Delegates were asked v/hether i t was party policy that National Insurance 
benefits should be selective. The p r i n c i p l e of s e l e c t i v i t y i n the social 
services was a major issue and the party leadership was strongly i n favour 
of i t . 
Taxation 
On taxation policy three questions were put. Two were on major issues, and 
one on a minor issue. The two major questions were whether the party would 
abolish Selective Employment Tax completely (to which i t was i n fact f i r m l y 
committed) and whether the party would reduce indirect taxation. I n f a c t , 
although the party had a commitment to. reduce taxation generally the emphasis 
was almost en t i r e l y on the reduction of direct personal taxation. There was 
no commitment to reduce i n d i r e c t taxation and i n fact an amendment to the 
motion on the -subject at the Conference s p e c i f i c a l l y made reference to the 
fact that higher i n d i r e c t taxation might be inevitable, i n order to provide 
f o r reduced direct taxation. The minor issue was on the question of special 
tax allowances fo r working wives which Macleod had sp e c i f i c a l l y promised to 
introduce. 
Agriculture 
Delegates were asked whether i t was party policy that a g r i c u l t u r a l subsidies 
were preferable to import controls as a means of a g r i c u l t u r a l support. The 
party v/as f i r m l y committed to a policy of replacing subsidies by import 
controls. 
I n d u s t r i a l Relations 
Delegates were asked whether i t was party policy that onployers should be 
l e g a l l y obliged to recognise and negotiate with trade unions i f more than 
50^ of t h e i r employees so v/ished and also whether the party supported 
i n d u s t r i a l courts. Both po l i c i e s v/ere supported by the party leadership. 
Foreign A f f a i r s 
Delegates were asked v/hether i t was party policy that a solution to the 
Rhodesian question must be based on the '5 Principles' - S i r Alec Douglas 
Home had made i t clear that t h i s would be the basis of ar^y settlement nego-
t i a t e d by a Conservative Gtovernraent. 
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The replies were as follows:-
Table 2.8 
Percentage of Delegates' Replies which were: 
Issue Correct Incorrect Don't Ki 
Comprehensive schools 84 10 6 
Council house rents 90 10 -
Lsmd Commission 48 26 26 
Option Mortgages 52 3 45 
National Freight Authority8 45 - 55 
Investment allowajices f o r 
bus services 10 6 84 
Selective National 
Insiorance benefits 68 19 13 
A b o l i t i o n of SET 90 - 10 
Reduced indirect taxation 26 71 3 
Tax i- e l i e f f o r working 
wives 39 13 43 
A g r i c u l t u r a l subsidies 39 36 25 
Recognition of Trade Unions 61 13 26 
I n d u s t r i a l Courts 74 7 19 
Rhodesia 68 6 26 
I t i s clear from the results that most delegates were well-informed 
on the major issues - comprehensive schools, selective council house rents 
and social security benefits, a b o l i t i o n o f SET, Rhodesia and i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s policy. I t was also apparent that the party's policy on tsixation 
had been widely misinterpreted and the general commitment to reduce 
taxation and p a r t i c u l a r l y direct personal taxation had been construed as 
including a commitment to reduce indirect taxation. On less importsint 
policy issues the delegates' knowledge v/as much less comprehensive although 
i n most cases they simply d i d not knov/ the party's policy as d i s t i n c t from 
having misunderstood i t . 
Although the majority of delegates appear to be middle class 
' a c t i v i s t s ' the l e v e l of a c t i v i t y varies considerably between constituencies 
as the l e v e l of conference p a r t i c i p a t i o n shows. 
Since the War the average Conference has discussed about seventeen 
motions-^ and provided an opportunity f o r approximately 100 delegates other 
than Ministers to speak. I n practice, however, at least 17 of these f l o o r 
speakers have been chosen before the Conference opens because the choice of 
agenda motions pre-determines the opening speaker. 
1) A conscious decision to reduce the mraiber of motions debated was taken 
i n 1957 i n order to provide f u l l e r debate. See NUCUA Conference 
Report 1957 P 31 
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The selection of the rennaining f l o o r speakers does not take place 
u n t i l shortly before the motion i s debated and the scope f o r 'screening' 
speakers i s f a i r l y l i m i t e d . Representatives who wish to speak obtain a 
duplicated form from the stewards which asks f o r : -
(a) the speaker's name; 
(b) the motion he wishes to speak onj 
(c) whether the speaker supports or opposes the motion; 
(d) any organisation which the speaker represents; 
(e) the speaker's occupation; 
( f ) any o f f i c e held i n the party; 
(g) whether the speaker i s an MP, candidate, trade unionist. 
Young Conservative, or student. 
The completed forms are collated by the stewards who pass than to the Chairman 
of the Executive Committee and the Secretary of the National Union f o r the 
actual selection of speakers to be called. The Conference Chairman could 
a l t e r t h e i r decision but i n practice r e l i e s on t h e i r advice. 
Prom interviews vdth the Secretary of the National Union i t i s apparent 
that general guidelines are applied i n selecting speakers. A conscious 
e f f o r t i s made to maintain a balance between d i f f e r e n t groups withi n the 
party, e.g. MPs, candidates and Young Conservatives. Some e f f o r t i s also 
made to r e l a t e a speaker's occupation to the subject matter of the debate -
f o r example the majority of speakers i n agriculture debates are nearly 
always farmers. A speaker's position on the motion can also have a bearing 
on his chances of being called. There i s nearly always a shortage of 
speakers to oppose the established party viewpoint and consequently a 
speaker wishing to oppose the motion has a better chance of being calledr 
Although the number of genuine f l o o r speakers at any Conference i s 
f a i r l y small, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e l a t i o n to the numbers who apply to speak, 
and even they are to some extent screened by the process outlined above, 
the extent to which constituencies participate i n the Conference does give 
some indi c a t i o n of t h e i r l e v e l of a c t i v i t y . 
During the period 1947-1966 there were 1,435 f l o o r speakers from the 
constituencies a f t e r excluding those from Liberal seats. Analysis of the 
number o f speakers per constituency and the division o f the constituencies 
by party allegiance (using the results of the 1955 General Election as a 
f a i r l y a r b i t r a r y c r i t e r i o n ) shows wide variations i n pa r t i c i p a t i o n betv/een 
constituencies ranging from almost 25% of a l l constituencies which did not 
have a single speaker at any of the 17 Conferences to one v/hich had 21 
speakers over the same period:-
l ) This sometimes leads to speakers spiiriously claiming that they intend to 
oppose a resolution simply i n order to improve th e i r chances of being 
call e d to speak - see The Economist October/December 1955 Vol. 177 
p 184 
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1947-66 
Table 2.9 
Number of delegates 
per constituency 
speaking at a l l 
Conferences 1947-66 
Party Allegiance at 
1955 General Election Total Total 
Conservative Labour Seats Speaker; 
Seats Seats 
0 66 59 125 — 
1 54 48 102 102 
2 . 43 40 '83 166 
3 52 40 92 276 
4 22 19 41 164 
5 16 6 22 110 
6 18 6 24 m. 
7 10 8 18 126 
8 6 2 8 64 
9 3 3 - 6 54 
10 3 1 4 40 
11 1 1 2 22 
12 5 5 60 
13 3 3 39 
14 1 1 14 
15 - -16 1 1 16 
17 1 1 17 
18 - -
19 - -20 - -
21 1 1 21 
loT 235 539^ 1,435 
Note:- l ) doe? not add up to f u l l number of seats because of Liberal seats 
and allowances f o r seats v/hich were eliminated or fundamentally 
altered by boundary revisions. 
Because of the heavy pressure f o r opportunities to speak^ chance 
ine v i t a b l y plays a part i n determining the number of speakers selected from 
any one constituency but i f a constituency i s active and has alarge number 
of delegates regularly applying to speak, i t s chances of having some of them 
selected are inevitably higher than those of inactive constituencies. 
Diuring the period under consideration only 96 associations (l8^ of 
the t o t a l ) produced over half of the f l o o r speakers at the Conference 
(727 speakers). None of these associations produced less than f i v e speakers 
and on average they produced 7.5 speakers each - or roughly one f l o o r 
speaker every other year. During the same period the ronaining 443 
associations only produced an average of 1.6 speakers or roughly one 
speaker every ten years. 
A more detailed look at the 96 constituencies which produced f i v e 
f l o o r speakers or over shows that more than tv/ice as many were 'Labour' 
seats as 'Conservative' (2,3 : l ) ' although the overall r a t i o n of seats was 
304 Conservative to 235 Labour ( i . e . 1.3 : l ) . This might indicate that 
operating against strong Labour opposition stimulates more a c t i v i t y amongst 
associations but there does not appear to be much other evidence to support 
t h i s . The average number of speakers produced by a l l constituencies was 
2,6 whereas the overall average fo r Labour-held seats was 2.3. Furthermore, 
a look at the figures f o r two t y p i c a l heavily Labovir-dominated areas - the 
county seats i n Durham and Wales, shov/s that the average number of speakers 
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produced from those areas was well below the average f o r Labour-held seats 
generally, with figures of 1.8 and 0.75 speakers respectively. 
The most l i k e l y explanation of t h i s l i e s i n marginality. 
Constituencies v/hich are heavily dominated by Labour majorities are 
u n l i k e l y to be very active while those which are marginal are l i k e l y to be 
stimulated into a high l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y which r e f l e c t s i n t h e i r 
Conference p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I f the l e v e l of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n terms of 
ntraibers of speakers per constituency i s plotted against a range of election 
margins! the r e l a t i v e marginality between constituencies producing more than 
four speakers and those producing four speakers or less was as shov/n i n 
Tables, 2.10,,2.11 and 2.12. 
Adapted from A. J. Allen 'The English Voter' (English Universities 
Press 1964) p 138. For relationship between efficiency of party 
machine and seat 'safety' see J C Brom 'Local Party Efficiency 
as a Factor i n the Outcome of B r i t i s h Elections' ( P o l i t i c a l Studies 
Vol VI June 1958) pp 174-178 
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Table 2.12 
NUMBER OF SEATS 
(Percentages i n brackets) 
HAEGIN RANGE 
0-20^ Over 20^ 0 Total 
119 (50.2) 118 237 
37 (55.2) 
15^ 
30 
l55 
>67 
304 
108 (52.2) 
25 (89.3) 
99 
3 
207 
28 
133 102 235 
•Conservative' ' seabs, 
'Conservative' seats 
Associations producing 4 speakers or less 
" " more than 4 speakers 
'Labour' seats 
Associations producing 4 speakers or less 
" " more than 4 speakers 
A comparison of the figures shows that i n the 
associations with margins of under 2(^q formed i)i)>6 or tne associations 
producing more than 4 speakers, whereas they only formed 5P?S of the 
associations producing 4':-speakers or less. The significance of a 5% 
v a r i a t i o n needs to be treated cautiously when such small numbers are 
involved and allowances must be made f o r the chance factors i n the selection 
of speakers but i n the 'Labour' seats the si t u a t i o n i s much more clear cut. 
Associations producing more than 4 speakers were almost entirely i n the 
under 20^ marginality range whereas only just over 50^ of the associations 
producing 4 speakers or less f e l l i n t o t h i s range. 
Consequently i t appears that not only i s Conference participation 
concentrated heavily i n a r e l a t i v e l y small number of cjonstituencies which 
ma^ ' reasonably be inferred to be ' a c t i v i s t ' but i t i s also f a i r l y clear that 
the Conference accurately r e f l e c t s the lack of a c t i v i t y which i s often 
apparent i n seats which are heavily dominated by massive Labour majorities. 
Bacik Bench P a r t i c i p a t i o n 
I t i s f a i r l y common f o r p o l i t i c a l parties to include extensive 
representation from the parliamentary party i n the composition of t h e i r 
annual Sonferences, and such pairticipation i s usually intended to ensure 
that the both sections of the party are j o i n t l y committed to policy ia.feexsi6jas 
taken at the Conference, Although the Conference does not usually feature 
i n the more commonly recognised sources of MPs' information2 i t provides a 
useful opportunity f o r dialogue w i t h the party's grass roots supporters v/ho 
can voice t h e i r aspirations and frustrations while the parliamentarians 
can put across the p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c i i l t i e s of implementing m i l i t a n t s ' desEHinds. 
While the control v/hich the Conservative Conference exercises over 
p o l i c y i s comparatively small and i t s r o l e i n leadership selection i s n e g l i -
g i b l e the parliamentary party plays a significant part i n the proceedings. 
A l l Conservative MPs and Peers are automatically e n t i t l e d to attend, but 
before the War comparatively few of them bothered to do so3 and the 
Conference tended to be the National Union's event as d i s t i n c t from a general 
party occasion. However a f t e r 1946 Woolton actively encouraged MPs to attend 
and the majority now do so although many only come f o r / l f i e proceedings. 
1) See f o r example J. A. Storing 'Norwegian Democracy' (Allen & Unwin 1963) 
P 127 
2) P. G. Richards 'Honotirable Members' (Paber 1964); D. G. Crockett 
•The MP and his Constituent is' (Parliamentary A f f a i r s Vol XX No. 3 1967) 
pp 28iL-284 
3) J. B i f f e n 'The Conservative Opportunity' (Batsford & CPC 1965) p 189 
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Although attendance by MPs has increased^their primary r o l e i s to make 
contact v/ith t h e i r constituents and support the platform and i t i s generally 
recognised that they shoiild not dominate the Conference.-"- I t i s quite 
common f o r MPs to apologise f o r speaking at a l l and i n some cases the 
Chairman has made i t clear that the number of MPs called to speak has been 
r e s t r i c t e d i n t e n t i o n a l l y i n order to prevent such domination.2 
Nevertheless back-bench MPs form a high percentage of a l l speakers at 
the Conference:-
BACK-BENCH MPs' CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION 1949-70 
Number of back- Total Percentage 
bench speakers Speakers ^ 
1949 19 98 19.1 
1950 25 95 26.3 
1952 14 75 26.3 
1953 10 75 13.3 
1954 7 79 8.8 
1955 10 90 • 11.1 
1956 7 86 8.1 
1957 10 78 12.7 
1958 13 120 10.8 
1960 12 114 10.5 
1961 16 118 13.5 
1962 . 18 . 114 15.7 
1963 16 122 13.1 
1965 18 115 15.6 
1966 11 117 9.4 
1967 11 98 11.2 
1968 7 105 6.6 
1969 9 118 7.6 
1970 9 124 7,3 
Average: 242 1,941 8,1 
although the figures appear to have been f a l l i n g i n recent years - possibly 
because of a greater s e n s i t i v i t y on the part of MPs. This pa r t i c i p a t i o n has 
i n f a c t been concentrated amongst a r e l a t i v e l y small number of MPs who have 
been p a r t i c u l a r l y active - almost 65^ of the 242 speeches made at 
Conferencesbetween 1949 and I97O were made by only 46 MPs. 
Number of Speeches 1949-70 Table 2.14 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
Number "*" 
of MPs 87 16 14 6 6 1 3 242 
1) NUCUA Conference Report 1965 P 129 
2) NUCUA Conference Report 1952 p 76; NUCUA Conference Report 1956 p 78j 
NUCUA Conference Report 1958 p 55; NUCUA Conference Report 1962 p 20; 
NUCUA Conference Report 1962 p 46 
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This r e f l e c t s the f a c t that certain MPs - f o r example Enoch Powell, Duncan 
Sandys, Selwyn Lloyd, John Boyd-Carpenter, 7/illiam Deedes, Patrick Wall and 
Angus Maude, have been highly 'Conference-minded' whilst the remainder have 
played a more passive r o l e . 
Although I\5Ps play a surprisingly large part i n the Conference there i s 
l i t t l e evidence to suggest that they occupy a p a r t i c u l a r l y i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e 
i n the proceedings. While senior back-bench MPs are more or less guaranteed 
an opportunity to speak and are usually listened to a t t e n t i v e l y , they do not 
control the Conference i n the same way as delegation leaders at the US 
National Conventions but i n some cases MPs have been instrumental i n 
c r y s t a l l i s i n g opposition to the party leadership's policies at the 
Conference. Typical examples have been an attempt i n 1963 to get the 
Government to set a housing target o f 500,000 houses a year;-^ S i r Derek 
Walker-Smith's and Robin Turton's parts i n leading the opposition to Common 
Market entry i n 1961 and 1962;2 and Angus Maude's r o l e i n the debate on 
comprehensive schools i n 1968.3 Generally, however, the same group pressures 
which prevent MPs from r e b e l l i n g openly i n Parliament4 operate to curb t h e i r 
more reiellLous views at the Conference but on those occasions when overt 
opposition surfaces i t can be highly embarrassing and i f the party leadership 
knov/s that i t i s l i k e l y to occur steps may we l l be taken to f o r e s t a l l i t . 
For example the whips t r i e d to dissuade back-benchers from putting forward 
a c r i t i c a l resolution on Suez5 and S i r Alec Douglas Home i s known to have 
exerted pressure on Enoch Powell at the 1966 Conference to modify his speech 
on B r i t a i n ' s interests east of Suez.6 
1) NUCUA Conference Report 1963 pp 26-33 
.2) NUCUA Conference Report 1961 pp 47-49; also NUCUA Conference Report 1962 
pp 46-66 
3) NUCUA Conference Report 1968 p 42 
4) R. J. Jackson 'Rebels and Whips' (Macraillan 1968) pp 306-307 
5) M. Laing 'Edward Heath - Prime Minister' (Sidgwick and Jackson 1972) p 115 
6) A. Alexander and A. Watkins 'The Making of the Prime Minister 1970' 
(Macdonald 1970) p 86 
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4. TWO CASE STUDIES IN DECISION MAKING 
The size of the Conference has already been noted and t h i s , 
together with i t s composition clearly has a bearing on i t s capacity 
to make decisions. The d i f f i c u l t i e s of taking detailed decisions 
through such an unwieldy body are sharply i l l u s t r a t e d by the way i n 
which the Conference dealt with two organisational questions - the 
so-called Maxurell-Fyfe reforms and the Conference venue. 
Party finance was an important question which had to be settled 
a f t e r the Conservative Party's post war election defeat. Previously 
constituencies had only been responsible for t h e i r own e^qpenditure and 
e:q>enditure at national level had o r i g i n a l l y been covere^ by c i r c u l a r i -
sing known ivealthy supporters of the party and the peers and l a t t e r l y 
by approaches to large companies. 
After the war the s i t u a t i o n changed. Woolton's plans to 
r e v i t a l i s e the party involved a substantial expansion of s t a f f and 
expenditure at Central Office. He also wanted to subsidise the 
weaker constituencies which needed heavy e3q)enditure p a r t i c u l a r l y on 
f u l l - t i m e agents - i f they were to improve t h e i r electoral position. 
He believed that fund-raising would improve party morale by increasing 
party members' a c t i v i t y .and t h i s combination of sheer financial 
necessity and confidence i n the morale-boosting value of fund-raising 
lay behind two developments at the 194? Conference. 
The f i r s t was an appeal for the then enormous sum of £1 m i l l i o n 
to provide a basic fund launched by V/oolton personally: 
' With the approval of the Area Chairmen, which I have obtained, 
and I hope with the support and approval of t h i s great 
Conference representing, as i t does, the rank and f i l e of the 
movement throughout the country, I now turn my attention to 
securing the fin a n c i a l s t a b i l i t y at the centre ... I n the past 
the Party has been shy of asking for money, and i t has 
collected for i t s Central Fund from a few hundred people. 
Well, i t i s not so easy to do that now - and I do not want to 
do i t . We are not a class party. I want the support of every 
section of society - a broad democratic response from people 
who are prepared to pay, according to t h e i r means, for their 
p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s . I therefore appeal to every Conservative 
i n the country to j o i n i n t h i s national fund .. ' 
The second move, designed to provide a more continuous source of 
income, took the form of a motion put forward by a delegate from 
Bedford: 
' This Conference considers that constituency associations should 
be asked to accept some responsibility for contributing tourards 
the Central Funds of the Party ' 
1. For the origins of t h i s practice see W B Gwyn 'Democracy and the 
Cost of P o l i t i c s i n B r i t a i n ' (Athlone; I962) pp 107-9 
2. Lord Woolton 'Memoirs' (Cassell 1959) 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 194? pp 76-77. Similar funds were launched 
by DuCann and Lord Carrington a f t e r the 1964 and I966 General 
Election defeats. 
4. NUCUA Conference Report 194? p 78 
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The principle of contributing to the Party's Central Funds was 
new and i t was clear that the onus would f a l l on the associations:-
I From now on we must r e l y more largely on our income being 
obtained from several m i l l i o n adherents to our cause. 
Obviously the Local Associations are the only possible means 
of c o l l e c t i n g that money, and i t must be the responsibility of 
each one of us to see that i n the future | certain proportion 
of our income flows through to the centre * 
The motion which was not specific i n i t s proposal was carried 
unanimously and shortly a f t e r the Conference the National Union 
Executive Committee set up a sub-committee under Henry Brooke : 
' To consider how effect can be given to the proposal that 
constituency associations should be asked to accept some 
resp o n s i b i l i t y for contributing towards the Central Funds 
of the Party, • 
Party finance and candidate selection i^ere closely connected 
issues. Prior to the Second World War MPs and candidates had often 
been expected to bear their.own election expenses and most of the day-
to-day running costs of t h e i r constituency association, A candidate's 
capacity to meet t h i s expenditure had consequently become one of the 
c r i t e r i a of selection and there were signs that associations were 
sometimes choosing candidates on the strength of t h e i r wealth rather 
than t h e i r i n t r i n s i c q u ality. 
This practice tended to perpetuate the Party's image as the 
party of wealthy classes and encouraged a complacent attit u d e i n 
constituency associations. I t had been a subject of concern as early 
as 1924 i^en Baldwin was urging constituency associations "to be less 
chary of choosing candidates who could not afford heavy subscriptions 
to Party Funds , and i n the 1930's i t became an increasingly important 
issue , culminating i n a motion passed at the 1934 Conference:-
' that every e f f o r t ought to be made to broaden the representative 
and financial basis of the Party organisations i n constituencies 
i n order that they may be able to avail themselves of the best 
and ifhere possible local candidates and that every e f f o r t ought 
to be made to avoid dependence upon the personal resources of 
members and candidates , 
The subject was of l i t t l e importance during the war but the very 
large number of new candidates required i n 19^ 5 brought i t back into 
prominence and the 19^ 7 Conference passed a resolution that:-
' This Conference reaffirms the policy of the Party i n refusing 
recognition to candidates who do not conform to the s t r i c t 
f i n a n c i a l l i m i t s l a i d down by the Central Council; warmly 
commends the large number of constituency associations which have 
e n t i r e l y relieved candidates of a l l financial obligations; urges 
other constituencies, when adopting candidates, to follow t h i s 
excellent example; and asks the Executive Committee to examine 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 194? p 78 
2. R. Blake 'The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill' (Eyre and 
Spottiswoode; 1970) p 224 
3. A Ranney 'Pathways to Parliament' (Macmillan I965) p 20 f f 
4. NUCUA Conference Minutes 1934• See also R Rhodes James 'Memoirs of a 
Conservative' (tfeidenfeld & Wicolson 1969) pp 268-269 
- 44 -
' the p o s s i b i l i t y of reducing s t i l l further the maximum c o n t r i -
bution irtiich candidates may make towards election es^enses, and 
the maximum subscriptions which^^]Ps and candidates may pay to 
t h e i r constituency associations ' 
The sequel t o ^ t h i s was that the Executive Committee set up a 
second sub-committee chaired by W Robson Browne:-
' To examine the p o s s i b i l i t y of reducing s t i l l further the maximum 
contribution idiich candidates may make towards election expenses 
and the maximum subscription which MPs and candidates may pay to 
t h e i r constituency associations. • 
At the same time a t h i r d sub-committee"^ was established under 
Arthur Colegate to tackle another pressing problem which affected the 
Party's organisation:-
' To report on the status of Agents ivithin the Party, the method 
of t h e i r appointment and the system of t h e i r employment; to make 
urgent recommendations i n consultation with a l l interested 
parties, with a view to improvements and increasing the efficiency 
of the Party organisation i n the country. ' 
In June 19^ 8 a l l three committees reported back to the National 
Executive but by that time i t had been decided that a more comprehensive 
and far-reaching assessment of the Party's entire organisational structure 
was required. 
' One regularly observed consequence of an election defeat i s to 
a t t r a c t blame on to the organisation of the losing party ' 
and the new Co-ordinating Committee set up under David Maxwell-Fyfe was 
a t y p i c a l example of a well established process which both of the major 
parties go through a f t e r an election f a i l u r e . I t s terms of reference 
were:-
' To study the reports of the Committee on Party Finance, Financial 
Arrangements f o r Candidates and Employment of Agents, and to 
suggest how t h e i r proposals can best be implemented. 
To examine the Constitution of the National Union and the 
relationships between the Constituencies, the Provincial Areas, 
the National Union and the Party as a whole. 
To report on the above matters to the Chairman of the Party 
Organisation and to the Executive Committee of the National Union 
as soon as possible. I n view of the wide range of issues 
involved, the Committee i s authorised, i f necessary, to present 
an interim report. ' 
The Committee's Interim Report^ was published shortly before the 
1948 Annual Conference. The amount of time available was very l i m i t e d , 
but the Committee was under pressure to respond to the demands at previous 
Conferences suid they were able to draw on much of the work already done by 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 1947 
2. The Sub-Committee on the Financial Arrangements of Candidates 
3. The Sub-Committee on the Employment of Agents 
4. Lord Windlesham 'The Communication of Conservative Policy 1963-64' 
( P o l i t i c a l Quarterly Vol 36 No 2 1965) PP l64-lBO 
5. R T McKenzie ' B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Parties' (Mercury 1964) pp 18O-I85 
Also S o c i a l i s t Commentary May 1967 p 19 and 'Interim Report of the 
Sub-Committee on Party Organisation' (The Wilson Committee)(Labour Party 
6. Interim Report of the Committee on Party Organisation - NUCUA 1948 ^955) 
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the Sub-Committees, The Interim Report was, however, confined solely to 
reconsidering the suggestions made by those Sub-Committees and the 
broader issues were not considered u n t i l the following year. 
The general effects of the Com^^ittee's recommendations on the Party 
have already been thoroughly analysed but the Conference discussion of* 
the proposals i s of interest because the subjects under discussion were 
wit h i n the direct prerogative of the individual associations. The 
associations are jealous of t h e i r independence , p a r t i c u l a r l y on finance, 
and the recommendations could only be enforced i f they obtained voluntary 
support from a substantial number of constituencies. Consequently i t 
provides an unusual example of constituency representatives being able to 
take decisions i n the knowledge that they would have to enforce specific 
changes i n t h e i r own organisations. 
The finance proposals were essentially that a quota system should 
be established under which every constituency would agree a contribution 
towards Central Funds with the Party Treasurer based on i t s membership and 
i t s fund-raising capacity. As a re s u l t , many wealthy constituencies would 
f i n d themselves committed to f a i r l y substantial contributions and v^ereas 
i t was one thing to raise funds for use within the constituency, raising 
additional funds which would be directed into an anonymous fund i n Smith 
Square would be much more d i f f i c u l t . 
The recommendations on financial arrangements of candidates also 
involved painful decisions f o r many constituencies with wealthy candidates 
vtio were carrying the association's expenses. Permissible contributions 
from MPs and candidates were to be dr a s t i c a l l y reduced and t h i s meant 
that some constituencies would have to take on an e n t i r e l y unaccustomed 
fund-raising function. 
The direct effects which the decisions on both questions would 
have on the day-to-day running of constituencies focussed attention on 
the r o l e of the delegates. 
The t r a d i t i o n a l role of the constituency members attending the 
Conference was that of a representative and t h e i r sole duty was to 
p a r t i c i p a t e as individuals. Inevitably they were expected to r e f l e c t 
the views of t h e i r associations up to a point but there had never been 
any question of mandating delegates and the 194? Conference i l l u s t r a t e d 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s of t r y i n g to take detailed organisational decisions when 
the Conference machinery was not r e a l l y equipped to do so. 
The Interim Report was considered at the Conference session held 
on 6 October 1948 but as i t was not published u n t i l 22 September many of 
those attending had not even had an opportunity to discuss i t informally 
with t h e i r associations and t h e i r position was put by a delegate from 
Eccles: 
' I want to make i t quite clear that I am not speaking against 
the Report at a l l ... I have had no opportunity of discussing 
t h i s matter with my Executive, my Treasurer, or other Party 
o f f i c i a l s . This document contains far-reaching matters, matters 
1. J D Hoffman 'The Conservative Party i n Opposition 1945-51' 
(MacGibbon & Kee 1964) 
2. D J Wilson 'Constituency Party Autonomy and Central Control' 
( P o l i t i c a l Studies Vol XXI 1973) PP 167-174 
M Pinto - Duschinsky 'Central Office and 'Power' i n the Conservative 
P a r t y ( P o l i t i c a l Studies Vol XX 1972) pp l - l 6 
3. Woolton was f i r m l y behind t h i s recommendation, see Lord V/oolton 
'Memoirs' (Cassell,. 1959) P 346 'This change was revolutionary and, i n 
my view, did more than any other single factor to save the Conservative 
P a r t v .. Here was Torv democracv i n a r t i n n . i 
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of paramount importance. I have no mandate to vote on t h i s matter 
from my constituency ... I therefore beg to move that t h i s 
Conference refers back the Interim Report of the Committee on 
Party Organisation for general referendum to a l l constituency 
associations, on the ground that t h i s Report was received so late 
as t o preclude any opportunity for discussion by the Executive 
Committees of constituency associations, and considers that t h i s 
Report should be brought before t h | C 
National Union at i t s next meeting .' 
Central Council of the 
' 
This view was strongly backed by the Chairman of Yorkshire Area who 
reported that his Area Executive Committee had passed the following 
resolution: 
'That t h i s Executive Committee ... strongly urges that when the 
Interim Report of the Special Committee on Party Organisation i s 
presented to the Conference, i t shall be for discussion only, 
and no decision s h a l l be taken thereon u n t i l the f i n a l report i s 
presented to the Central Council . ' 
and he brought home the d i f f i c u l t y facing the average party member 
attending the Conference: 
' I f you approve of t h i s document, you would be approving detailed 
schemes, and i t would be your entire responsibility to convince a l l your 
own constituency association executives of every d e t a i l of t h i s document.-' ' 
The reactions of rank and f i l e party workers at home were a further 
consideration. As one representative pointed out, i t might antagonise 
them i f the Conference toolf ^  decision committing them to heavy fund-
r a i s i n g without consultation . 
The opposite point of view was put pungently by Miss Pat Hornsby-
Smith:-
' I was under the impression that t h i s great Conference was 
attended by 4,000 elected delegates from the Associations, charged 
to give a lead to the Party and to pass t h e i r views on the policy 
of the Party; charged to make a positive decision and not waffle 
... may I remind you that you were the delegates who passed the 
Resolutions upon which i s based t h i s Report ... ' 
The proposals on constituency finance included an undertaking that 
there would be no sanctions against constituencies which f a i l e d to meet 
t h e i r quota, and i t was argued that t h i s meant ^ h a t even i f delegates 
approved the report, theij^ were not formally cdbiitting t h e i r constituencies 
to positive action: 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 1948, p 39 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1948, p 40 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1948, p 40 
4. For analysis of effects i n one constituency party see 
A H Birch 'Small Town P o l i t i c s ' (OUP 1959) pp 46-^ 17 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1948, p 42 
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' ... the thing I do want to emphasise, because i t deals with the 
question of how far you people are e n t i t l e d to conunit your 
constituencies, i s that there i s not one word i n that Report which 
binds any constituencies to f i n d the money which i s recommended... 
You are not committing your constituencies to anything which they 
cannot do. You are taking no obligation other than to convey to 
the Maxivell-Fyfe Committee that the constituencies are going to do 
th e i r best ... Now you people are not stooges, I hope. You are not sen 
sent here by your constituencies to s i t here £ind l i s t e n to what i s 
said, go back and get t h e i r instructions ... for heaven's sake 
take your courage i n both hands ... * 
Although t h e o r e t i c a l l y the commitment was very small, i t was quite 
clear that i f the general pr i n c i p l e of quotas was accepted, most 
constituencies would be under strong moral pressure. Henry Brooke, who 
was presenting the Report i n the absence of Maxwell-Fyfe, showed a ready 
appreciation of the problem facing delegates but t r i e d to reassure them by 
emphasising how small the real commitment was: 
' I understand completely - because I have long constituency 
experience DQrself - the doubts and hesitations of those who 
fee l they would l i k e to go back to t h e i r Executive Committees .. 
i f t h i s reference back motion i s not carried ... I shall then 
ask leave of the Chair to move that t h i s Conference approves the 
Interim Report i n p r i n c i p l e , on the understanding that no 
constituency i s committed to the quota system u n t i l i t has been 
d i r e c t l y consulted ... * 
This was enough to reassure the delegates and when a vote was taken 
separately on the reference back of each of the three main sections of 
the Report - Party Finance, Financial Arrangements of Candidates, and 
Employment of Agents - i t was defeated each time*^. The Chairman then 
proposed that the Report should be adopted as a whole and t h i s was done 
but, owing to a procedural oversight, the compromise r i d e r which Brooke 
had promised was not raided and had to be put rather hurriedly the ^  
following morning (7 October 1948) when i t was unanimously accepted . 
The reactions of delegates to the Interim Report clearly i l l u s t r a t e d 
the l i m i t a t i o n s of the "representative" system. In theory representatives 
should have been i n a position to take decisions ifithout p r i o r consultation 
with t h e i r associations but i t was apparent that although t h i s could work 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y i f general policy issues were concerned, i t was quite 
inadequate where matters d i r e c t l y affecting the day-to-day management of 
associations were involved. 
As a r e s u l t , the Conference's rather loose basis of representation 
i s probably satisfactory as long as i t confines i t s e l f to general policy 
questions on an advisory basis, but i f detailed policy or organisational 
decisions were to be taken regularly by the Conference some f a i r l y radical 
changes i n the methods of mandating delegates would probably become necessary. 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 19^8, p 4 l 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 19^8, p W 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 19^8, p kk 
4. NUCUA Conference Report 19^8, p 45 
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la some \«ays the venue of the Conference i s a t r i v i a l matter but 
i t provides some insight into the Conference's capacity to take 
decisions on matters of d e t a i l . 
Since the Second World V/ar numbers have been a major organiser's 
problem at the Conference. The Central Council's Report for 194? noted 
th a t : -
' The attendance at l a s t year's Conference was double that at 
any pre-war Conference, and the [Executiv^ Committee has given 
much thought t o the arrangements for Brighton, i n view of the 
obvious fact that increased interest and better organisation i n 
the Constituencies may result i n an even larger attendance. I t 
may well be that for the f i r s t time i n the history of the 
Conference the largest h a l l available l a l l be too small to 
accommodate the representatives. Arrangements have, therefore, 
been made to relay the proceedings to the Dolphin Theatre which 
i s close to The Dome. The Leader's speech at the Mass Meeting 
viill be relayed to the Imperial Theatre . • 
Although both Churchill and Eden went to the Imperial Theatre 
a f t e r t h e i r i n i t i a l appearances at The Dome , the escperiment of using 
several h a l l s simultaneously was not a success. Delegates i n the 
overflow h a l l s f e l t deprived of direct contact with the leaders and the 
basis f o r admission to the main h a l l ( r e s t r i c t e d to members of the 
Central Council) caused controversy^ D i f f i c u l t i e s also arose over 
voting. Most votes at Conservative Conferences are taken on a show of 
hands but the Chairman i n the main h a l l found i t hard to assess the 
results i n the other halls and the problem becaune even more complicated 
when one h a l l carried the motion but the other did not . 
A similar s i t u a t i o n i n 1952 with a show of hands giving 
c o n f l i c t i n g results i n d i f f e r e n t halls j u s t when the party' leader's 
f i n a l speech was imminent was only solved by persuading the Conference 
merely to record that i t had expressed "a divi s i o n of opinion , while 
i n 1936 the televisi o n l i n k between the halls broke dotm and as a result 
only the votes i n the main h a l l were counted . 
In 1947 the Central Council had suggested that:-
• The only alternative to using tgo halls would have been to 
reduce Constituency representation ' 
but both the Central Council and the Conference were most reluctant to 
take such a step because of deep-rooted prejudices i n favour of broad 
representation and the following year the Con^rence Arrangements Sub-
Committee decided f i r m l y i n favour of s p l i t t i n g the Conference again: 
1. WCVA Conference Report 194?, p 15 
2 . This was designed to give the delegates i n the other h a l l the feeling 
of 'personal contact' with leadership. 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 194?, p 106 
4. NUCUA Conference Report 1952, p IO5 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1956, p 76 
6. NUCUA Conference Report 1947, p 15 
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' The Committee i s f u l l y aware that i t i s unsatisfactory i f a l l 
the representatives cannot be accommodated i n one h a l l , but 
believes i t i s meeting the wishes of the Party i n not suggesting 
any reduction i n Constituency representation at any rate before 
the General Election ' 
The Committee's assessment of delegate reaction to the prospect 
of reduced numbers was correct but the s p l i t Conference was an 
unsatisfactory compromise, and no solution would f u l l y s a t i s f y the 
delegates short of larger halls - which were not available. For many 
delegates the opportunity to meet and mix with the party leaders i n the 
fles h was an important aspect of the Conference, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the 
period immediately af t e r the V/ar when television coverage did not exist. 
Accepting that a s p l i t Conference, although unpopular, was the 
lesser of two e v i l s , the Conference Arrangements Sub-Committee t r i e d to 
meet some of the complaints which had arisen i n 1947 over the allocation 
of accommodation i n the main Conference Hall. The revised arrangements 
were that 
' i n order to ensure that at every Session each Constituency i s 
represented, every Constituency should have the same number of 
admission vouchers for the main Conference Hall, with vouchers 
for the overflow:"for;<tbe'iKeibainder - the allocation to be made 
by the constituency associations. ' 
and ' instead of the members of the Central Council having seats for 
the main mass meeting as at Brighton, and the remainder having 
t i c k e t s for the overflow, the allocation of tickets between the 
main and the overflow meetings for constituency^representatives 
should be made by the constituency associations . ' 
The number of delegates actually attending the 1948 Conference 
was estimated at 4,000 , 1,500 of these were accommodated i n the overflow 
h a l l and the problems were raised a t an early stage by the Chairman of 
the Executive Committee who drew the Conference's attention to an ^ 
i n v i t a t i o n from Yorkshire Area to hold the 1949 Conference i n Scarborough 
He was quite blunt about the d i f f i c u l t i e s : -
' I submit to you tonight i n a l l seriousness that unless the 
Central Council at i t s next meeting - which i s to be held i n 
March - amends or a l t e r s the Rules i n such manner as to provide 
for greatly reduced representation, i t would be hardly p r a c t i c a l , 
and certainly imprudent, i n view of our experience here, to hold 
our Annual Conference next year at Scarborough ... I f we are to 
hold the Conference i n one building, there honestly i s no 
alternative next year but to hold i t i n London'^... ' 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 1948 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1948 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1948, p 32-33 
4. NUCUA Conference Report 1948, p 23 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1948, p 34 
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and e f f e c t i v e l y f o r e s t a l l i n g c r i t i c i s m from the f l o o r ^ he proposed that 
the Executive Committee's o r i g i n a l proposal to go to Scarborough should 
be rescinded, leaving the Committee free to arrange the 1949 Conference 
i n London, This was accepted on the basis that i t was the only feasible 
solution although London was not a popular venue as most delegates 
preferred the holiday atmosphere of the seaside resorts and a Conference 
i n London meant that contact with the Party leadership was reduced. 
Before the 1950 Conference was held the Final Report of the 
Maxwell Fyfe Committee containing a detailed analysis of tge Conference's 
size and venue problem was approved by the Central Council :-
'The present rules of the National Union provide for representation 
at the Conference of approximately 5,600. The numbers present at 
the three post-war Conferences have been approximately: 
Blackpool .... 2,900 
Brighton .... 3,360 
Llandudno .... 3,600 
To some the idea of so large an assembly i s a t t r a c t i v e . I t i s a 
demonstration of strength and enthusiasm. Many of the keenest 
Party workers are brought into contact with the most prominent 
figures i n the Party, and gather encouragement from the experience. 
Others, who desire the more intimate circumstances necessary to 
thoughtful debate, regret a Conference of t h i s magnitude. ' 
Three possible changes were considered. The Conference could 
alternate between Blackpool and London which meant that i t could be f i t t e d 
under one roof or i t could include other venues, accepting that when they 
were used the Conference would have to be s p l i t between tvro or more halls 
- opening up the p o s s i b i l i t y of running separate debates i n the di f f e r e n t 
h a l l s and allowing some degree of specialisation. 
Although possible procedural d i f f i c u l t i e s could have arisen as a 
re s u l t of hal f the Conference , committing the remainder to a policy 
without an opportunity to par t i c i p a t e , the proposal would have allowed 
more detailed discussion of policy, but the Committee did not favour i t 
on the grounds that delegates ought to have a complete view of the Party's 
proposals. 
The t h i r d alternative was to reduce constituency representation 
from seven delegates to two, bringing the Conference down to a size which 
could f i t into h a l l s i n a variety of conference centres. 
Assuming that the composition of the Conference would remain the 
same apart from the reduced constituency representation, the Committee 
estimated that the t o t a l numbers would be: 
Two representatives per constituency i n 
England, V/ales & Northern Ireland 1,108 
Constituency Agents from England, l/ales 
and Northern Ireland 53^ 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 1948, p 34 
2. 'Interim 8e Final Reports of the Committee on Party Organisation' 
(NUCUA 1949) PP 47-50 - approved on 15 July 1949 
3 . Note discrepancy i n t h figures given i n 1948 NUCUA Conference Report 
(NUCUA Conference Report) pp 32-33 
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Members of Parliament and Candidates 
(United Kingdom) 625 
Representatives of Areas, Central 
Associations and other organisations .. 320 
Ex O f f i c i o & Co-opted members 70 
Representatives from Scotland and 
Northern Ireland 43 
2,820 
After allowing for the fact that not a l l of those e n t i t l e d to 
do so would ever be able to attend the Committee estimated that the 
actual attendance would be below 2,^00 which would enable the 
Conference to f i t i n t o a wider range of h a l l s . 
After pointing out that the balance of representation from 
various party groups such as Young Conservatives, Trade Unionists 
and Women's Organisations could be affected, and emphasising the 
strength of constituency feeling and the need for careful consultation, 
the Committee avoided making a de f i n i t e recommendation but merely 
suggested that the whole problem should be discussed at the 1950 
Conference which should "make to the Executive such recommendations as 
seem good". 
The recommendation was vague and led to confusion on the 
Conference f l o o r . 
At the 1950 Conference, i n an e f f o r t to obtain a positive result 
Max\fell-Fyfe himself proposed a formal resolution on behalf of the 
Executive Committee:-
' That i n the opinion of t h i s Conference i t i s desirable that 
the Annual Conference of the Party should be held each year 
i n a di f f e r e n t Provincial Area. 
That t h i s Conference accordingly requests the Central Council 
to make such reductions i n the numbers e n t i t l e d to attend the 
Annual Conference as would make such a course possible, on the 
understanding that Constituency representation should be 
increased i n any year i n which the Conference^is held i n a 
place that could accommodate a larger number. ' 
Pointing to the increased number of delegates which was r e s t r i c t -
ing the Conference to Blackpool and London; the disadvantages of London 
as a Conference base; and the advantages of v i s i t i n g the various Areas, 
he made i t clear that i f the Conference was ^ oing to take place i n 
d i f f e r e n t areas, i t either had to s p l i t or reduce i n size. As s p l i t t i n g 
the; Conference had already proved unsatisfactory the only alternative 
was to reduce i t s size although some concession to constituency feeling. 
1. Interim and Final Reports of the Committee on Party Organisation 
(NUCUA 1949) P 50 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1950, p 72 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1950, pp 72-76 
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could be made by providing for re-enlargement of the Conference whenever 
the accommodation available permitted. After reviewing the arithmetic 
of Conference attendance a further concession was also offered. Ijhereas 
the o r i g i n a l Report had recommended a representation of the delegates 
per constituency, plus the MP or candidate and the agent, the Executive 
Committee now calculated that i n practice i t would be necessary to 
reduce the number of delegates to only four whilst retaining the 
membership of the MP/candidate and the agent. 
I n a rather confused debate the resolution was supported by the 
Chairman of the Young Conservatives but strongly opposed by a back-bench 
MP and arguments centred around claims that a large Conference was more 
representative while a reduction i n size could upset the balance between 
the various groups i n the Party. 
Although many delegates recognised the advantages of a smaller 
Conference which could v i s i t d i f f e r e n t areas, there was an underlying 
fe e l i n g that i f numbers were reduced t h i s would prevent Party supporters 
from having an opportunity to attend. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , however, l i t t l e imentioa 
was made of the effects which the Conference's size had on i t s capacity 
for e f f i c i e n t decision-making although a delegate from Leeds did make 
the point that i t was 
' ... not an e f f i c i e n t Conference. This Party i s renowned for 
e f f i c i e n t government ... I sa^ we cannot do our work properly 
with 4,500 people i n one h a l l . ' 
In the face of protests Mamrell-Fyfe's resolution was s p l i t into 
two parts to separate the question of holding the Conference a t dif f e r e n t 
venues from that of a reduction i n numbers. A ba l l o t was held on the 
f i r s t issue and the proposal to move the Conference regularly was 
defeated by the r e l a t i v e l y close margin of 1,552 votes to 1,859. This 
meant that a reduction i n numbers was unnecessary and the second proposal 
was defeated by a very large majority on a show of hands. 
This might have been a satisfactory solution i f the Conference had 
accepted the consequence of i t s decision - namely, that future Conferences 
could only be held i n London and Blackpool. The situation was, however, 
t o t a l l y confused by the fact that l a t e r i n the Conference a resolution 
was approved nominating Scarborough as the venue for the next Conference, 
despite controversy over ivhether or not the rejection of the motion to 
hold the Conference 'each year i n a dif f e r e n t Provincial Area' precluded 
the use of any venue other than London or Blackpool . 
The 1950 Conference i l l u s t r a t e d the Conference's i n a b i l i t y to take 
detailed p r a c t i c a l decisions on even quite minor matters. This was 
highlighted by the fact that at one stage the Chairman had to threaten 
that the decision would be taken out of the Conference's hands altogether 
and s e t t l e d by the Central Council i f i t could not make up i t s mind . I t 
proved quite unable to decide between deep-rooted c o n f l i c t i n g interests. 
On the one hand delegates were determined to maintain maximum opportunity 
f o r Party supporters to attend, but at the same time they were equally 
determined not to accept the natural consequences i^hich v/ere that the 
Conference would have to alternate between London and Blackpool. 
1. This \iras based on the knowledge that although there was heavy pressure 
for Conference places i n some constituencies, there were always others 
which did not take up t h e i r f u l l quota of places. 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1950, p 75 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1950, pp 8I-83 
4. NUCUA Conference Report 1950, p 83 
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The overall s i t u a t i o n was well summed up by Woolton i n some good 
natured avuncular chaff i n his closing speech:-
' I gather that you a l l l i k e d one another so much that you 
insisted that ... the more we are together the merrier we 
w i l l be. So you decided to remain just the same size i n 
the future as you are now, and you also decided that you 
would go around the country regardless of whether there were 
places to accommodate you or not. ' 
I n 1951 the Conference i«as cancelled because of the General 
Election, but i n 1952 the issue insnediately arose again. The Conference 
waprheld ajb Scanbonough - the venue o r i g i n a l l y approved by the I95O 
Conference,with the effec t that i t was automatically s p l i t between three 
h a l l s . Although the disadvantages were freely recognised by the 
Chairman as soon as the Conference began, the venue was the Conference's 
own choice and i t did not have much room for rational complaint. There 
was, however, very strong delegate feeling about an Executive Committee 
recommegdation that the following year's Conference should be held i n 
Margate which would again mean a s p l i t . On the other hand, the only 
real a l t e r n a t i v e , reducing the size of the Conference, was even more 
unpopular. Sir Eric Brrington, the Chairman of the Executive Committee, 
explained the problems:-
' A resolution was moved at Blackpool two years ago suggesting 
that owing to the d i f f i c u l t y of accommodation there should be 
a reduction i n numbers of the representatives from each 
constituency coming to t h i s Conference. Now, to put i t quite 
b l u n t l y , that was turned down f l a t . I n those circumstances 
the Executive thought i t proper to revert_to the position that 
existed before that resolution was moved. ' 
Normally a strong lead from the Executive such as t h i s would have 
carried the Conference quite easily and the matter would have dropped. 
I t i s therefore an indication of the strength of feeling that a delegate 
not only objected to the Executive's recommendation but actually 
succeeded i n moving the reference back of the relevant section of the 
Executive's report: 
• I would p a r t i c u l a r l y draw your attention to the decisions 
made at the Blackpool Conference two years ago. I t was decided 
that i n future the Conference v/ould be held under one roof ... ' 
i n the process voicing the feelings of those who objected so strongly to 
the idea of a s p l i t Conference! 
' I know we are faced with a most d i f f i c u l t problem but we 
should, i f we are to organise our Conference successfully, 
a l l be together so that we can have everyone under one roof, 
knowing exactly what i s happening and not feeling they are 
cut o f f from the main body of the Conference and that they 
are something temporarily l e f t over . 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 1950, p 104 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1952, p 21 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1952, p 27 
4. NUCUA Conference Report 1952, p 28 
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After the 1952 Conference had put such strong emphasis on the 
importance of staying under one roof, i t was to be expected that the 
Executive would move the 1953 Conference to one of the venues which 
could provide t h i s f a c i l i t y - London or Blackpool. I t i s a l l the more 
remarkable, therefore that the 1953 Conference met at Margate as 
o r i g i n a l l y proposed but by now the somewhat frustrated Executive 
Committee offered a f u l l explanation i n i t s Annual Report: 
• Following the reference back for further consideration of 
i t s recommendations made to the Scarborough Conference, the 
Executive Committee decided a f t e r the f u l l e s t consideration 
that the 1953 Conference should be held at Margate. 
The Committee, however, f u l l y appreciated that there were 
divergent opinions on the general question of where Conferences 
should be heiEd aiid. .'therefore circulated a referendum to obtain 
the views of Central and Constituency Associations. 
As the replies, a summary of which ivas circulated to 
associations, were of such a character that action could not 
be taken on them, the Committee has decided that a decision 
shall be reached by b a l l o t of the Conference representatives ^ 
to determine the venue of the Conference i n the following year. ' 
The solution f i n a l l y adopted by the Executive i/as the only 
p r a c t i c a l one under the circumstances - i t avoided asking the Conference 
to formulate a general proposition and instead, simply provided a l l 
delegates with a b a l l o t s l i p l i s t i n g the available venues, including 
both those which could accommodate a l l delegates under one roof and 
those which ivould involve more than one h a l l . 
This step was at l a s t effective i n achieving a clear answer and 
Errington was able to announce that there was a substantial majority i n 
favour of holding the 1954 Conference at Blackpool. 
This might well have been the s t a r t of an annual bal l o t to decide 
the venue of the following year's Conference, but towards the end of the 
1953 Conference the East Midlands Area proposed that the choice of venue 
be l e f t e n t i r e l y i n the hands of the Executive. 
The confused s i t u a t i o n which the Conference had b u i l t up was put 
succinctly: 
' Me have discussed t h i s matter, as you know, ad nauseam at 
every Party Conference since the war, and we have got l i t e r a l l y 
nowhere ... F i r s t l y , there was an overwhelming majority against 
any reduction i n the size of t h i s Conferencie. There was an 
equally overwhelming majority that t h i s Conference be held i n 
one h a l l ; and unfortunately there was a substantial majority 
i n favour of t h i s Conference going about the country from plage 
to place ... points two and three are completely incompatible ' 
In effe c t the motion was an open admission that the Conference 
was not equipped to take detailed decisions and should revert to 
accepting the Executive's recommendation automatically on the basis that 
i t could not do any better i t s e l f . 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 1953. P 15 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1953. P 94-95 
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The resolution was carried 'by a very large majority'^and 
thereafter the issue was for a l l practical purposes closed. Since 
then the Executive has invariably specified the venue of the next 
Conference without question. Although i n practice the decision has 
always been to keep the Conference large and under one roof even i f 
i t involves a r e s t r i c t e d choice of venue. 
The question was raised again b r i e f l y i n the Selvsryn Lloyd Report 
i n 1963 which dealt tersely with suggestions that the size of the 
Conference should be reduced: 
• I recommend Jhat the size of the Conference should be l e f t 
as at present. ' 
While the Maxwell Fyte reforms and the venue question were 
comparatively inconsequential i n t h e i r own r i g h t , the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
escperienced by the Conference i n handling them gives some indication 
of i t s inadequacy as a machinery fo r taking detailed policy decisions. 
On the one hand the Conference's size precluded i t from thorough, 
analysis of competing options and t h e i r consequences whilst on the other 
hand the nebulous character of the delegate's responsibility to his 
association made i t d i f f i c u l t to be sure that Conference decisions 
represented the s c i e n t i f i c a l l y determined views of even the Party 
a c t i v i s t s f a r less thenmass of Conservative voters. 
I n view of t h i s i t i s perhaps inevitable that the Conference's 
role i n r e l a t i o n to policy should be one of commenting on and i n f l u -
encing i t rather than actually deciding specific policy objectives. 
1. HUCUA Conference Report 1953, P 96 
2 . Selwyn Lloyd Report (NUCUA 1963) P 10 
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5. THE CONFERENCE AND PARTY POLICY 
The determination of party policy i s clearly a key area i n any 
p o l i t i c a l party's a c t i v i t i e s and although there i s some evidence that 
the mass media have enhanced the importance of the leader's image i n 
influencing voting behaviour, the party's^policies remain an important 
factor i n determining i t s electoral image . 
Furthermore, there can be a considerable divergence between the 
powers which a party th e o r e t i c a l l y assigns to Conferences under i t s 
constitution and the amount of influence which they i n fact exercise. 
The Labour Party's e3q)erience i s a good i l l u s t r a t i o n . The constitution 
unequivocally puts the Conference i n control of the Party:-
' ... The Party Conference shall decide from time to time what 
specific proposals of l e g i s l a t i v e , financial or administrative 
reform shall be included i n the Party Progi?arame. No proposal 
shall be included i n the Party Programme unless i t has been 
adopted by a majority o j not less than two thirds of the votes 
recorded on a card vote ... ' 
I n practice, however, the relationship has been more elastic. 
Although during the Laski episode Attlee implied that there were some 
de f i n i t e l i m i t a t i o n s on the freedom of the Parliamentary Party:-
'' Within the Programme adopted by the annual Party Conference 
the Parliamentary Labour Party has complete discretion i n i t s 
conduct of Parliamentary business and i n the atti t u d e i t should 
adopt to l e g i s l a t i o n tabled by other parties'^ ... ' 
The Parliamentary Party, p a r t i c u l a r l y when i n power, has been 
able to go well beyond those l i m i t s . The doctrine of parliamentary 
p r i v i l e g e and the 'conscience clause' have tended to blur the precise 
d i v i s i o n of responsibility between the Parliamentary Party and the 
grass roots on policy formulation and, as a res u l t , the2^Parliamentary 
Party has acquired a f a i r l y high degree of independence .which has i n 
turn generated f r i c t i o n and disputes about alleged attempts by one 
section or the other to exceed i t s proper role*^. 
I n the Conservative Party the relationship between the 
parliamentary party and the grass roots on policy was clearly established 
before the turn of the century with the former firmly i n command. The 
present day position i s l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t to that set out by Maxwell-Fyfe 
i n 1949:-
' Policy i s the basis upon which practice and programme are 
founded. I t relates Conservative principles to the national 
and international problems of the day, usually i n general terms. 
1. D Butler & D Stokes ' P o l i t i c a l Change i n B r i t a i n ' (Penguin 1971) 
p 448-467 
2. Labour Party Constitution 1966, Clause V(l ) 
3. Times, 3 July 1945 
4. See for example - H Wilson 'The Relevance of B r i t i s h Socialism' 
(V/eidenfeld & Nicholson; 1964) p 4-5. Also S Rose 'Policy Decision 
i n Opposition' ( P o l i t i c a l Studies Vol IV 1956) p 128-I38 
5 . See The Times, 23 July 1973 for a summary of some of the more recent 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . Also a r t i c l e by A V/edgwood Benn 'Labour Weekly' 
15 October 1971. For e a r l i e r period see f o r example S Rose 'Policy 
- Decision i n Opposition' ( P o l i t i c a l Studies Vol 17 No2 1956) pp 12&-138 
and L D Epstein ' P o l i t i c a l Parties i n Western Democracies' ( F a l l Hall 
1967) pp 294-305 
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The specific plans for the application of policy are contained 
i n the party programme. Endorsements and pronouncements on 
party policy are the prerogative and responsibility of the 
leader, who i s served by various policy committees. These i n 
turn are influenced by the views of the party a| revealed i n 
the various resolutions at the Party Conference ... ' 
The absence of formal powers to impose policy on the leadership 
can be seen as symptomatic of a complete lack of real power on the part 
of the Conference and the Parliamentary Party's persistent refusal to 
implement reform of the House of Lords, despite a series of Conference 
demands to do so has, for example, been cited as evidence of t h i s . 
This does not, however, t£ike f u l l account of the Conference's 
informal influence on policy-making. 
After the Second World War the party leadership made a conscious 
e f f o r t to develop the Conference's role i n the party organisation. 
I n i t i a l l y Churchill was lukewarm about such developments. He had 
regarded the suspension of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y during the war as almost 
complete and was reluctant to accept the fact that concensus p o l i t i c s 
were not applicable i n a peace time si t u a t i o n ^ . At the 1945 Conference 
he made no secret of his preference for an a l l - p a r t y government^ and his 
reluctance to get involved i n inter-party r i v a l r y reflected i n a general 
unwillingness to spell out party policy i n d e t a i l which iiras reinforced 
by the somewhat au t o c r a t i ^ style of decision making which he had 
developed during war time . 
As 'a r e s u l t , Churchill's a t t i t u d e towards the Conference immedia-
t e l y a f t e r the war was one of studied correctness emphasising the mutual 
independence which had characterised relations between the Nation 
Union and the Parliamentary Party before the ivar. The Executive 
Committee's annual reports recorded f a i t h f u l l y how the previous year's 
resolutions had been relayed to the leader, together with his sometimes 
almost patronising comments, but the leadership made l i t t l e conscious 
e f f o r t to 'manage' or participate i n the Conference. The main point of 
contact was the leader's t r a d i t i o n a l speech to the mass r a l l y after the 
Conference o f f i c i a l l y ended and at the 1947 Conference, for example, 
only 9 of the 20 motions debated received a front bench reply. 
1. Pinal Report of the Committee on Party Organisation (NUCUA 1949) 
2. See L D Epstein ' B r i t i s h Mass Parties i n Comparison with American 
Parties' ( P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly Vol 71, 1956) p 106 and 
R T McKenzie ' B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Parties' (Mercury 1964) p 226 
3. H Macmillan 'Memoirs - Tides of Fortune' Vol I I I (Macmillan I969) 
4. NUCUA Conference Minutes 1945 - Also R B McCallum & A Headman 'The 
B r i t i s h General Election of 1945' (OUP 1947) p 5-l4; 
NUCUA Conference Minutes 1943; 
R A Butler 'The Art of the Possible' (Hamilton 1971) p 132-133; 
The Observer, 12 August 1973; 
H G Nicholas 'The B r i t i s h General Election of I95O' (Macmillan 1951) 
P 70 f f ; 
R Blake 'The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill' (Eyre & 
Spottiswood© 1970) p 258 
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Although t h i s relationship was congenial to Churchill, there was 
a large number of new faces i n the party immediately after the ivar who 
were much more sceptical about the t r a d i t i o n a l d i v i s i o n of functions 
between the mass party (which got out the vote) and the parliamentary 
party (which decided and implemented p o l i c y ) . As a result there was 
increasing pressure for a more integrated party structure which would 
involve the grass roots i n policy formulation and orientate the ^ 
parliamentary party towards the aspirations of the electorate at large . 
Inevi t a b l y there were also demands for new p o l i c i e s which would stress 
the difference between the parties. This pressure reflected p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n a resolution at the 19|6 Conference c a l l i n g for a comprehensive 
statement of party policy . 
The leadership's some«4iat hesitant response\as to produce the 
I n d u s t r i a l Charter, drawn up under Butler's supervision and i t was 
quickly followed by demands for a series of charters covering other 
policy f i e l d s . The Conference's increased militancy also showed at the 
1947 Conference i n demands that the party leadership should commit 
i t s e l f to implementing Conference c a l l s for a 'Charter of Liberties', 
a c r i t i c a l amendment on the party's economic policy, and vociferous 
pressure for an unscheduled debate on subversive a c t i v i t i e s . 
V/hile Churchill was reluctant to come to terms with such pressures, 
both Butler and Woolton encouraged party members to think that they were 
being a c t i v e l y consulted i n the policy making process''. The culmination 
of t h i s trend was the Conference's success i n forcing the leadership 
to accept a 300,000 houses a year target at the 1950 Conference, but 
once the party got back into power i n 195I there was a gradual rundown 
i n the party's e f f o r t s to involve the grass roots i n policy formulation 
u n t i l the party l o s t power again i n 1964. 
After 1964 a major e f f o r t was made to reorientate the party back 
to the grass roots and a series of measures were taken, many of them 
very similar to those^of the 1945-51 period, to involve party workers 
i n policy formulation . This reflected i n renewed emphasis on the 
Conference which was highlighted by Heath's decision to attend the whole 
of the 1965 Conference .and the sharp increase i n the number of 
Conference ballots after 1967. 
1. GDM Block 'About the Conservative Party' (CPC 1965) p 29 
2. S H Beer 'Modern B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s ' (Faber 1965) p 3 l4-3 l6 
3. Lord Kilmuir ' P o l i t i c a l Kdventure' (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1964) 
p 157-164. Also S Neumann (ed) 'Modern P o l i t i c a l parties' 
(Chicago UP 1956) p 32 
4. NUCUA Conference Report 1947, p 37. 61, 69 and 92 
5. J D Hoffman 'Conservative Policy i n Opposition 1945-51' (MacGibbon 
& Kee 1964) I965 
6. See NUCUA Conference Report/p 11, I 3 , 24 and 133. Also D E Butler 
8e M Pinto - Ouschinsky 'The B r i t i s h General Election of 1970' 
(Macmillan 1971) P 94-110; DE Butler & A King 'The B r i t i s h General 
Election of I966' (Macmillan I966) , p 44-73 and R Rhodes James 
'Ambitions and Realities. B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s 1964-1970' (Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson 1972) p 98-145 
7. NUCUA Conference Report I965. PP 23 and l 4 0 . See also 'Ecooomist' 
11 March 1967 
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I t i s debatable whether the leadership ever seriously wished to 
give the rank and f i l e any decisive role i n policy formulation but i t 
was c l e a r l y important to morale that party workers should think that 
they were involved and the success of t h e i r e f f o r t s can be seen from 
the fact that 80% of the Northern Area delegates interviewed i n 1967 
were s a t i s f i e d that the Conference had a d e f i n i t e effect on party 
policy . 
Agenda Selection 
Conference resolutions usually originate at branch level and are 
then taken to a meeting of the constituency association's Executive 
Committee where they are introduced by the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of 
the branch concerned; voted on i f necessary; and forwarded by the 
constituency agent to area or national headquarters. There i s no l i m i t ^ 
on the number of resolutions which can be submitted by each constituency . 
I n theory t h i s sounds l i k e a careful democratic procedure 
r e f l e c t i n g the deep-felt views of many party members and i n some cases 
t h i s can be so. I t i s important, however, to remember how small the 
nucleus of a c t i v i s t s i n many constituencies r e a l l y i s . Furthermore, 
resolutions may represent the strongly-held views of only one or two 
individuals backed by l i t t l e more than the i n e r t i a of the remaining 
members. Thus, for example, two of the resolutions from Northern Area 
constituencies v^ich were debated at the 1967 Conference covering defence 
and drugs respectively were direct personal interests of important 
individuals i n the constituencies concerned - a r e t i r e d brigadier and a 
doctor respectively - but support from within t h e i r associations took 
the form of acquiescence rather than active interest . As a result 
resolutions can sometimes be rather eccentric and after emphasiang the 
importance of the Conference as 
' a great opportunity for showing to the nation what the Party 
i s thinking and doing. For these reasons i t i s of the utmost 
importance that the Conference Agenda should be of the highest 
q u a l i t y . ^ ' 
the Maxwell-Fyfe Committee suggested that some 'vetting' should be carried 
out at Area level to t r y and improve dr a f t i n g . This was not compulsory 
and constituencies " r e t a i n the unfettered r i g h t to submit resolutions 
direct to the General Purposes Sub-Committee" but motions which had been 
cleared i n t h i s way were supposed to receive p r i o r i t y when the Agenda was 
drawn up and i n practice most resolutions appear to be submitted 
through areas. I n 1966 for example, the Northern Area vetted 18 of the 
23 motions submitted by local associations. 
1. c f M Parkinson 'Central - Local Relations i n B r i t i s h Parties - A 
Local View' ( P o l i t i c a l Studies Vol XIX No 4 1971) p 440-446. 
Also NUCUA Conference Report 1957, p 31 
2. For discussion of the significance of t h i s see J Blondel 'Voters, 
Parties & Leaders' (Penguin 1966) p 104-106 
3. M Benney, AP Gray, RH Pear 'How People Vote' (Routledge Kegan Paul 
1956) p 38V-63. Also F Bealey, J Blondel, W P McCann 
•Constituency P o l i t i e s ' (Faber 1965) p 106-122 
4. For low level of interest i n policy as d i s t i n c t from organisation i n 
some constituencies see RT Holt and JE Turner ' P o l i t i c a l Parties 
i n Action' (The Free Press; 1968). Also TEM McKitterick 'The 
Membership of the Party' ( P o l i t i c a l Quarterly Vol 31 1960) for 
similar experience i n the Labour Party. 
5. Final Report of the Committee on Party Organisation (NUCUA 1949) p 48 
6. Final Report of the Committee on Party Organisation (NUCUA 1949) p 48-50 
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Motions forwarded to area level are nominally considered by a 
sub-committee of the Area Executive Committee but they are often dealt 
with informally by the Area Chairman, his agent and one or two of the 
more important members of the Committee. Changes at t h i s stage are 
generally designed to eliminate ambiguity as attempts to water down 
hosti l e resolutions would antagonise constituencies and i n any case, 
control over the f i n a l agenda i s so complete that e f f o r t s to a l t e r 
resolutions at area level are unnecessary. 
Agents do not appear to t r y and encourage resolutions or lobby 
to ensure that t h e i r constituencies' resolutions are chosen for the 
f i n a l agenda, but they do seem to make some e f f o r t to ensur^ that 
t h e i r constituencies do not submit embarrassing resolutions . 
I n addition to vetting constituency resolutions Areas sometimes 
originate resolutions themselves although there are rarely more than 
two or three a year from each Area, p a r t l y because lack of time prevents 
detailed policy discussions at Area meetings. Organisations such as 
the Young Conservatives are also e n t i t l e d to submit resolutions. 
Once resolutions have been forwarded to the National Union the 
Conference agenda i s chosen by the General Purposes Committee iirhich 
carries out what has been described as "delicate preliminary work on 
the selection of motions" to ensure that they are "both acceptable to 
the Government and capable of^gathering a l l l i k e l y variations of 
opinion into the same c o r r a l " . 
The membership of the Committee i s largely dominated by major 
party o f f i c i a l s and consists of:-
(a) The Officers of the National Union including the immediate past 
President. 
(b) The Chairman, Deputy Chairman, Vice-Chairman of the Party 
Organisation ( i . e . Central Office) and the Treasurers of the 
Party. 
(c) The Chief W^iip i n each House. 
(d) The Chairman of the Party Advisory Committee on Policy. 
(e) The Senior Officers of the Organisation and Publicity Departments 
of Central Office. 
( f ) The Chairman of each of the National Advisory Committees. 
(g) The Chairman of each Area Council. 
(h) Three Men, three Women, three Young Conservatives and three Trade 
Unionists elected by the Executive Committee. 
( i ) The Chairmaui of the 1922 Committee. 
( j ) The Chairman of the Association of Conservative Clubs. 
(k) The President and Chairman of the Scottish Conservative and 
Unionist Party. 
(1) One Representative of the Ulster Unionist Council, 
(m) Up to f i v e coopted members. 
I n practice the detailed work i s usually done by a sub-committee 
which then presents the results to the main Committee for approval^. 
1. A. Roth "Heath and the Heathmen" (Routledge Kegan Paul; 1972) p 75 
2. Economist October-December 1958, Vol l89 p 211 
3. W J Bilfiften "Party Conferences and Party Policy" ( P o l i t i c a l Quarterly 
1961) p 257-266 
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The composition of the Committee in v i t e s allegations that i t 
ca r e f u l l y avoids choosing c r i t i c a l or controversial motions and there 
has been extensive c r i t i c i s m of the agenda make-up within the party -
p a r t i c u l a r l y from Young Conservatives . 
While most of the agenda i s settled by the General Purposes 
Committee, a certain number of motions are chosen by b a l l o t . This 
practice started shortly a f t e r the Second World War. At the March 
1948 Central Council meeting i t was proposed that: 
' The Agenda fo r at least one session of the Conference should 
consist of resolutions, not selected by the Agenda Committee, 
but included i n the supplementary l i s t , receiving the greatest 
number of votes i n a ba l l o t of representatives e n t i t l e d to 
attend. ' 
and ever since that year part of the agenda has been chosen by b a l l o t . 
The number of balloted resolutions has altered periodically but has 
averaged about three at each Conference. 
This method of selecting part of the agenda i s one of the party 
managers' apparent concessions to party 'democracy'-^. I t i s not 
without some risks because not only i s i t possible that an embarrassing 
motion may be chosen but the party managers also have no control over 
the q u a l i t y of the speaker who w i l l propose the resolution. 
The introduction of balloted resolutions was a response to 
delegate demands but only^a quarter of the delegates at the 1948 Conference 
actually bothered to vote , suggesting that the demands were more 
vociferous than they were widespread. 
National Union o f f i c i a l s refuse to reveal the results of ballots 
at present-day Conferences but the survey of Northern Area delegates 
i n 1967 showed that j u s t over So% participated. Of the delegates 
interviewed, only 10% reported that motions for which they had voted were 
in fact chosen for debate but as there were 167 motions to choose from 
and each delegate had three votes, a broad dispersion of votes was 
possible. Most of the delegates who did not take part i n the bal l o t 
simply "did not get round to i t " although i n a sign i f i c a n t number of 
cases delegates were only chosen at the l a s t minute and did not have time 
to send i n the b a l l o t papers. This suggests that the r i g h t to participate 
i n agenda selection, although valued, i s clearly not regarded as v i t a l . 
1. NUCUA Conference Report I962, p 134 
NUCUA Conference Report I965, P 31; Conservative P o l i t i c a l Centre 
Monthly Report (November I967) and 
'An open l e t t e r to the Chairman of the Conservative Party' (Bow 
Group 1967). See also recommendations of 'The Macleod Report' 
(Conservative Central Office I965) i n r e l a t i o n to more controversial 
agenda at Young Conservative Conference. 
2. Central Council Minutes, March 1948 
3. NUCUA Conference Report I967, P H 
4. NUCUA Conference Report, 1948, p 32 
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Trad i t i o n a l l y the Conference motions are debated as submitted 
and no arrangements exist for compositing resoliitions as at the Labour 
Conference. The mechanics of producing an agenda for so large a 
conference involve a f a i r l y long time scale and the Fuel and Power 
debate i n 1952 i l l u s t r a t e d one of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i^en the motion 
o r i g i n a l l y selected f o r debate was found to demand a policy which had 
i n f a c t been adopted by the Government by the time the Conference 
assembled with the result that the proposer had to hast i l y replace i t 
with one congratulating the Government on i t s new policy . 
Although resolutions have to come from constituencies, areas or 
some organised national body such as the Young Conservatives - any 
individual delegate can enter an amendment. These only have to be 
submitted shortly before the Conference opens and the amendments chosen 
for discussion are not announced u n t i l the Conference opens. The 
Standing Orders give the Chairman unfettered discretion to select 
amendments for debate and the number called has varied quite considerably 
over the years. During the early post-war debates, amendments were 
called regularly. I n 1947, for example, amendments were debated for 10 
out of the t o t a l of 20 motions covered at the Conference. As the 
leadership's control over the Conference has extended the number of 
amendments taken has tended to decrease and emphasis has been placed on 
a wide-ranging debate around a single broadly framed resolution. 
Most amendments are comparatively minor and parliamentary-type 
amendments which are so t o t a l that they convert a hostile resolution 
into a f r i e n d l y one are rare although there have been isolated examples 
such as^an amendment to the Presentation of Government Policy resolution 
i n 1952 . As a re s u l t , most amendments are either accepted by the 
proposer of the substantive resolution or merely r a t i f i e d by the 
Conference, and there i s l i t t l e serious e f f o r t to define detailed policy 
through a systematic amendment process. 
Although the d r a f t i n g and submission of resolutions i s largely i n 
the hands of constituency associations the powers vested i n the General 
Purposes Committee and i t s composition ensure that the leadership has 
effec t i v e control over the choice of items to be debated. As a res u l t , 
even i f the leadership i s s l i g h t l y embarrassed by the number of hostile 
resolutions submitted f o r inclusion i n the agenda, i t can ensure that 
none of the more awkward ones are chosen for debate. 
In theory the balloted resolutions remove some of t h i s control 
but i n practice a l l resolutions are grouped together under subject 
headings and the b a l l o t i s confined to those subject groups not already 
covered by the agenda items selected by the General Purposes Committee. 
As most hostile motions f a l l into the same subject headings covered by 
the General Purposes Committee's agenda, such items are effec t i v e l y 
excluded from the b a l l o t . Furthermore, the Executive Committee has the 
r i g h t to put forward emergency motions and as they usually displace 
balloted resolutions t h i s procedure could i f necessary be used to exclude 
a p a r t i c u l a r l y embarrassing balloted motion 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 1952, p 96 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1952, p 75-80 
3. See 'Final Report of the Conmiittee on Party Organisation' 
(NUCUA 1949) for c r i t i c i s m of t h i s . 
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V/hile control over the agenda i s a useful asset for the 
leadership, i t does not necessarily ensure that the Conference w i l l 
be docile as the 1950 housing debate showed. 
Clearly i t i s not possible to examine every aspect of Conference 
policy but analysis of a few selected areas can show how the Conference 
has approached a range of d i f f e r e n t issues during the period since the 
l a s t War. 
Taxation^ 
2 
Reduced taxation - p a r t i c u l a r l y aimed at the middle classes -
has been the most persistent theme running through the economic policy 
debates since the V/ar. 
The philosophical j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s policy i s that high 
taxation i s inconsistent with basic Conservative objectives of encouraging 
individual enterprise and self-reliance. Although the Party accepts that 
some services such as defence and foreign a f f a i r s must be provided by the 
State through taxation, i t s general atti t u d e has been that a larger share 
of national expenditure should be transferred to the individual. 
The obvious electoral advantage of a policy which would put more 
money i n the voter's pocket was reinforced i n the eyes of many party 
workers by the fact that i t simultaneously highlighted the high cost of 
the Labour Party's extensive social programme.. Immediately after the 
V/ar the pressure to cut taxes was also associated with a v/idespread demand 
for reduced government controls and the reintroduction of a free economy. 
Although the Conferences have often called for reduced taxation, 
they have been reluctant to face up to the d i f f i c u l t i e s . Speakers often 
c a l l f o r tax cuts on the basis that they w i l l generate so much extra 
productivity that the increased y i e l d w i l l eliminate any need to reduce 
government expenditure and the Conference has often been reluctant to 
accept that lower taxes w i l l require reduced public expenditure. 
Generally speaking, Ministers have encouraged the Conference to pursue 
the general aim of reducing taxes whilst u t t e r i n g warnings about the 
d i f f i c u l t y of achieving i t . A notable exception was Enoch Powell, then 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, i n a hard hi]tting speech at the 1957 
Conference:-
1. For general works on post-war economy and Conservative policy, see: 
JCR Dow 'The Management of the B r i t i s h Economy 19^5-1960' (CUP 1964) 
GDN Worswick (ed) 'The B r i t i s h Economy 19^5-1950' (OUP 1952) 
GDN '.Jorswick & PH Ady (eds) 'The B r i t i s h Economy i n the Nineteen 
F i f t i e s ' (OUP I962) 
A Shonfield ' B r i t i s h Economic Policy Since the War' (Penguin 1958) 
S B r i t t a n 'TheTreasury under the Tories' (Penguin 196^) 
2. SH Beer 'Modern B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s ' (Faber 1965) p 373-574; 
NUCmConference Report 1957, P 34 and kO 
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* There are two ways, and only tvo, i n which a Government can 
reduce taxation - by borrowing more or by spending less. More 
people than you would suppose, and more people that are aware 
that they are doing so, advocate the former plan, namely to 
increase the National Debt and hang the consequences, though 
they usually do not put i t so crudely ... To vote ourselves 
remissions of taxation by running up debts i s easy and, i n the 
short run, pleasant, but l i k e most easy and pleasant courses i n 
public finance, i t has to be paid f o r , and the penalty i s heavy. 
So I leave i t there and turn to what i s the only true means of 
reducing taxation - to spend less. 
Some people imagine that that too, i s easy - that nothing could 
be more pleasant or simple than the reduction of public 
expenditure by 5 per cent, 10 per cent or any figure you l i k e 
to choose. Truly the capacity of mankind for self-deception i s 
unlimited. I n r e a l i t y , so hard a discipline i s i t for a country 
to reduce i t s public outlay substantially that, iidthout a clear 
comprehension of v^at i s involved and steady and determined 
support on the part of those wide sections of the public of 
which t h i s Conference i s the sounding board, I would venture to 
describe i t as impossible. 
A l l Government esipenditure i s a payment to somebody. I n every 
branch of Government expenditure there i s a vested interest. 
Every form of Government e3q>enditure has i t s devotees and i t s 
defenders. Incidentally on the order paper of t h i s Conference 
there are no fewer than 80 resolutions asking for extra 
Government expenditure. The minority, whom a l i m i t a t i o n of 
expenditure a f f e c t s , are always more vocal than the majority 
who w i l l ultimately benefit. Hence i t comes about that economy 
i s popular i n the abstract but has few defenders i n the concrete 
• • • 
Many of the. resolutions on the order paper and many of those who 
have spoken i n t h i s debate, have mentioned specific directions 
i n which r e l i e f i s specially desirable. They are a wide 
selection covering p r a c t i c a l l y the ivhole range of taxation, 
di r e c t and i n d i r e c t - Income Tax, Estate Duty, Petrol Duty, 
Purchase Tax and the rest. In almost every instance the arguments 
Jtha.t can be adduced i n favour are weighty. Indeed, a Chancellor 
seldom lacks for advice and help on choosing what taxes to remit 
... but that i s the easy part; the hard part i s to win the r i g h t 
to make remissions by me^ns which w i l l strengthen instead of 
damaging the economy ... * 
Tax cuts are always easier to advocate when i n opposition. The 
r u l i n g party may ask how cuts would be financed but the opposition can 
usually be vague about the overall effects of i t s proposals on the 
grounds that detailed decisions must wait u n t i l i t has f u l l access to 
budgetary data. Simultaneously the party i n power finds i t harder to 
promise tax cuts because i t i s more sharply aware of the effects of reduced 
public e:!q)enditure cUid when~!an. electionjisSpending promises to'reduce^taxes 
i n the future beg the question why i t did not implement them e a r l i e r . 
1 . NUCUA Conference Report 1957. P ^ 
2 . S Hogg 'Election 1970' (Economist; 1970) p 9 
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As a result the Conference's c a l l s for tax cuts have been loudest 
when the party has been out of o f f i c e . Once i n power, the leadership's 
policy lias usually been to carry out unpopular public expenditure cuts 
early and at the same time announce tax reductions although the real 
e f f e c t of both usually come long af t e r the announcements. 
Thereafter the Conference has continued to press demands for 
reduced taxation but the party leadership has found that once i t had 
been i n power for some time i t i s committed to existing levels of public 
expenditure and electoral prudence has discouraged i t from implementing 
unpopular economies except at the s t a r t of a new period of o f f i c e . As a 
r e s u l t , Conference c a l l s for tax cuts during the period 1951-1964 were 
often met by government assurances that although the leadership agreed 
with and had already done much to achieve the overall objective, there 
were serious p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n finding new areas i n which suitable 
economies could be made. 
The Conference's enthusiasm for tax cuts was often matched by a 
reluctance to urge specific cuts i n public e]q)enditure and Powell's 
c r i t i c i s m that economy was popular i n the abstract but rarely i n the 
concrete was generally borne out whilst such economies as the Conference 
did support were i n peripheral areas such as the number of c i v i l servants 
or the efficiency of the nationalised industries. 
After the loss of o f f i c e i n 1964, however, the Conference made a 
more serious e f f o r t to i d e n t i f y specific savings, p a r t i c u l a r l y through 
s e l e c t i v i t y i n social services. Although the Labour Party was divided 
over the issue, the Conservatives committed themselves to s e l e c t i v i t y 
at an early stage on the grounds that those who were able to pay for 
social services should do so. The principle was .^applied amongst other 
things to subsidies f o r council housing, the National Health scheme and 
pensions . 
A major j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r tax cuts advanced at Conferences was 
the stimulus which additional disposable income should give to savings, 
Simultaneously encouraging economic growth and the Party's objective of 
a property owning democracy. I n d u s t r i a l shareholding was p a r t i c u l a r l y 
favoured as a form of saving and the Conference t r i e d several times to 
persuade the party leadership to^encourage share purchase - usually by 
reducing stamp duty on transfers . The response was rather cautious but 
the post-1970 Government eventually abolished slamp duty on small 
transactions. 
The cost of l i v i n g was also debated regularly at Conferences and 
the Conference supported a variety of d i f f e r e n t schemes put forward by 
both Macmillan's government and Heath's Opposition team to t r y and 
control i n f l a t i o n . Conference support for price controls reflected a 
t r a d i t i o n a l sympathy for those on fixed incomes which i s partly based 
on the composition of the Conference i t s e l f and i t i s therefore rather 
surprising that the Conference so strongly supported more emphasis on 
i n d i r e c t taxation^ and disregarded the effects which a tax l i k e VAT would 
have on the fixed incomes groups. . 
1. For evidence of support for Conservative view see P o l i t i c a l Index No 90 
(Gallup Poll October I967) P 162 
2. See also 'Everyman a Cap i t a l i s t ' (CPC 1959) and 'Owning Capital' (CPC 
1963) 
3. See also 'Britain's Taxes' (Conservative Research Department 1967) 
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The Conference's value to the party leadership as a useful 
platform to publicise i t s tax proposals was i l l u s t r a t e d by SET. SET 
was condemned by the Conservative parliamentary leadership as soon 
as i t was announced In May I966 and t h e i r pledge to abolish i t was a 
major feature at every conference u n t i l the party got back into power. 
Simil a r l y , the Conference was used to ventilate the leadership's 
VAT proposals. The Conference was very c r i t i c a l of purchase^tax and a 
number of used the Conference to publicise i t s anomalies . Pressure 
to replace i t with a more broadly based tax on e3q}enditure increased as 
the prospects of EEC entry grew stronger and the I962 Conference showed 
considerable support for a value added tax although the leadership 
hesitated as long as the party was i n power. Once i n opposition, i t 
decided that a value added tax ivas probably inevitable and the Conferences 
beti/een 1964 and 1970 were used to f l o a t the idea - i n i t i a l l y i n general 
terms, but subsequently i n d e t a i l including references to the sort of 
a c t i v i t i e s which would be exempted . Although the leadership was careful 
to avoid f i r m commitments to introduce VAT the Conferences provided a 
useful opportunity to s e l l the idea and by the time the decision to 
introduce the tax was announced the Conference was s u f f i c i e n t l y attuned 
to the idea to actually pass a resolution welcoming i t . 
The party leadership also used the Conference to publicise plans 
for a number of other tax changes such as the repeal of the Labour Party's 
l e g i s l a t i o n on close companies, alterations to the tax l i a b i l i t y of 
working wives and the reorganisation of the personal tax system by 
introducing an amalgamated income and surtax with a lower maximum rate. 
The Conferences have included many suggestions for specific tax 
cuts but there i s l i t t l e evidence that conference pressure has had much 
direct e f f e c t on the party's policy. Although i t s views have formed one 
of the considerations and pressures taken into account by the leadership, 
the leadership has more often used the Conference as an opportunity to 
s e l l i t s .own views. 
There are at least three areas however where the Conference may 
have had a more immediate effec t on the party's policy and although i n 
each case the issue was comparatively minor, i t does i l l u s t r a t e that 
under certain circumstances the Conference's influence can be f a i r l y 
d i r e c t . 
Special increases i n income tax were levied between 194l and 19^6 
to finance the war e f f o r t and by 19^6 about l 4 m i l l i o n people held post-
war credits of about £730 m i l l i o n . Although the maximum individual 
holding was about £325 i n practice the average individual holding was 
about £ 5 5 - 6 0 . I t had o r i g i n a l l y been intended that the credits would be 
repaid a f t e r the war to provide extra purchasing power but i n practice 
the post-war economy suffered from too much purchasing power £Uid 
immediate repayment would have been highly i n f l a t i o n a r y . 
1 . NUCUA Conference Report 19^9, p 110-111 
2 . NUCUA Conference Report I 9 6 1 , p 94. See also GF I/hitman 'The Reform 
of Purchase Tax' (CPC 1959) 
3. D McKie & C Cook 'The Decade of D i s i l l u s i o n - B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s i n 
the Sixties' (Macmillan; 1972) p 63 
4 . NUCUA Conference Report 1972, p 80-84 
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As a result the post-war governments delayed repayments, withholding 
money to which the holders f e l t e n t i t l e d as of r i g h t . This generated 
considerable resentment which reflected at the party conferences. The 
1953 Conference narrowly passed a resolution c a l l i n g for a reduction i n 
the repayment age despite the e f f o r t s of the Government spokesman and 
the Government subsequently introduced some measures to speed up repay-
ments. They did not f u l l y meet the Conference's wishes and two years l a t e r , 
whilist acknowledging the improvements wh^ch had taken place the 
Conference urged s t i l l faster repayments . Probably appreciating the 
strength of Conference fe e l i n g the Government avoided a direct confronta-
t i o n and did not produce a front-bench speaker. 
In 1958 a balloted resolution again urged faster repayments but 
the f r o n t bench speaker was able to persuade the Conference that the cost 
of the repayments ivould.exceed the Government's financial capacity and 
the motion was defeated . Although further debates were not held 
s p e c i f i c a l l y on the subject subsequent conferences included references 
to the £ issue and i n 1959 the Government lowered the qualifying ages. 
I n 1962 they were reduced s t i l l further - to the levels asked for at the 
1955 Conference and i n I962 the Government agreed to pay interest on 
outstanding repayments and as lat e as the 1972 Conference the issue was 
s t i l l of s u f f i c i e n t importance for the Chancellor to feel i t w^s worth 
boasting that the vast majority of the credits had been repaid . 
In the nineteen f i f t i e s Schedule A Tax was heavily c r i t i c i s e d by 
the Conference as discriminating u n f a i r l y against property owners. This 
culminated i n a resolution at the 1961 Conference c a l l i n g on the 
Government to repeal the tax despite advice from the Financial Secretary 
to the Treasury. I n the following year's Budget a broad decision to 
eliminate the tax was announced and i t was abolished for owner-occupied 
property i n I963 and for rented property i n 1965. 
At the 1969 Conference a recently-widowed delegate made a personal 
plea f o r the exclusion of m&trimonial homes from estate duty on the 
grounds that the appreciated value_of a house could not be realised by 
the widow without s e l l i n g her home . I n his reply Macleodggave a• 
general indication that he was sympathetic to the problem . 
Two years l a t e r the same delegate spoke again and pointed out that 
although some help had been given to younger widows and the exemption 
l i m i t f o r estate.duty had been raised s l i g h t l y the matrimonial home was 
s t i l l not exempt'. I n his reply the new Chancellor Mr Barber, gave an 
assurance that he would consider the problem very seriously between the 
Conference and the next budget and at the 1972 Conference he x*as able 
to announce with some satis f a c t i o n that the estate duty burden on widows 
had indeed been eased at the Budget. 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 1953» P 103-106. For press support of Conference 
view see Times, 12 Oct 1953. 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1955, p 111-115. See also 1954 Budget 
HC Deb 7 A p r i l 1954 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1958, p l4l- l45 
4. NUCUA Conference Report 1972, p 55 
5. NUCUA Conference Report I969, P 61 
6. NUCUA Conference Report 1969, p 69. For a similar incident involving 
public service pensioners at the 1965 Conference see NUCUA Conference 
Report 1965, p 117-119 
7. NUCUA Conference Report 1971, 8)50-51 
8. NUCUA Conference Report 1971, p 54 
9. NUCUA Conference Report 1972, p 55 
- 68 -
The influence of the Conference appears to have been di f f e r e n t 
i n each case. On post-war credits the Government s p e c i f i c a l l y denied 
that the Conference had any effect on i t s decision to ease the repayment 
c r i t e r i a i n 1954 and i t has even been suggested that the question 
i l l u s t r a t e s the leadership's independence of the Conference . On the 
other hand the Conference was clearly instrumental i n constantly 
reminding the Government of public feeling on the issue and although i t 
may not have stimulated any specific Government action, i t may well 
have played some part i n ensuring that the Government did eventually 
act rather than bury the issue, although the Government's choice of 
timing was probably not affected by the Conference. 
In the case of Schedule 'A' Taxation the effect was more direct 
and although the Government . ' did not feel obliged to meet the 
Conference's wishes i t c l e a r l y thought that i t would be prudent to meet 
public pressure on the issue, of which the Conference formed a part. 
On the estate duty issue the Conference's influence was even 
more d i r e c t . Clearly i t can be argued that the party leadership might 
have intended to implement the changes anyway, and certainly i t i s 
true to say that the leadership gave way because i t wished to do so 
and not because i t f e l t i t s e l f subject to i r r e s i s t i b l e pressure, but at 
the same time there i s every evidence that the leadership might have 
taken no action at a l l had i t not been for the p u b l i c i t y given to the 
issue at the Conference. 
lAM AND ORDER 
Law and order has been a subject on which the Conference's views 
have d i f f e r e d sharply from those of the leadership. 
caricatured as 
The Conference i s o f t e n / f u l l of l i t t l e old ladies urging the 
reintroduction of the birch and hanging^but although some extreme 
individual views have . •. ^ been expressed, the record of the 
Conference as a whole has i n fact been comparatively moderate. 
Prior to the mid-1950s the issue was hardly ever considered and 
during the period 1950-1954 the number of indictable offences i n England 
and V/ales actually f e l l . Subsequently, however, the figures began to 
r i s e sharply and by I968 they had almost trebled. As t h i s upward trend 
became apparent a number of Conservative supporters were disturbed by a 
campaign i n Parliament to abolish capital punishment. In 1956 the 
Death Penalty (Abolition) B i l l was passed on a free vote i n the Commons 
but rejected by the Lords shortly before Parliament rose for the summer 
recess^. 
The issue was widely publicised and drew a large number of 
resolutions for the 1956 Conference . The one selected for debate 
accepted that some modification of the death penalty was desirable but 
strongly opposed i t s a b o l i t i o n . Emotional views were expressed i n the 
1. 526 H C Deb 218-20 (6 A p r i l 1954) 
2. L D Epstein ' B r i t i s h Man Parties i n Comparison with American Parties' 
( P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly Vol 7 I , I956) p 97 
3. See. for example - Economist Oct-Dec 1958, Vol 189 ; p 211 
4. See J B Christoph 'Capital Punishment and B r i t i s h P o l i t i e s ' 
(Allen & Unwin; 1962) 
5. See also resolution passed at Conservative V/omen's Conference, 
12 June 1956. 
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debate and one of the speakers opposing the motion was heavily barracked. 
I n his reply to the debate the Home Secretary made i t clear that although 
he personally favoured retention of the death penalty, i n view of the 
s p l i t i n Parliament he hoped that some compromise might be found between 
t o t a l a b o l i t i o n and t ^ t a l retention. The motion was carried by an 
overifhelming majority and l a t e r i n the same Conference a motion c a l l i n g 
f o r much heavier penalties f o r cruelty to children was also carried 
although by a much smaller majority . 
The compromise mentioned by the Home Secretary f i n a l l y tool^ the 
form of the 1957 Homicide Act which introduced a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
ca p i t a l and non-capital murder, reserving the death penalty for certain 
'premeditated' murders although abolishing i t i n other cases and closely 
coincided with the Conference's views although i t i s most unlikely that 
the Conference influenced the f i n a l outcome. 
By 1958 the general r i s e i n the level of crime was increasing.' 
This reflected i n a conference motion c r i t i c i s i n g the increase i n crime 
and c a l l i n g for research into i t s causes. Although the origi n a l motion 
mainly reflected the.establishment of a Home Office Research Unit and 
demands for more effective counter-measures against crime generally, six 
of the eight f l o o r speakers took the opportunity to advocate the re-
introduction of corporal punishment as a means of dealing with juvenile 
crime. I n his reply, however, Butler made i t quite clear that although 
he supported the motion as framed he could not support such a step and 
the Conference broadly accepted his views. 
Juvenile crime and corporal punishment were issues again i n 196O. 
The Conference took place against the background of a V/hite Paper -
"Penal Practice i n a Changing Society" published i n the previous year 
and a major enquiry into_the effectiveness of the police which had been 
set up i n December 1959 . New detention methods for young offenders 
and methods of improving the effectiveness of the police eonsequently 
featured prominently i n the debate, but there were also persistent ca l l s 
for corporal punishment. The delegates itrere hov/ever sat i s f i e d by 
Government assurancgs that a Home Office Committee had been set up to 
review the question . Although Butler had loade i t quite clear to the 
1958 Conference that he was not prepared to reintroduce corporal 
pun/sKment, he had i n fact referred the question to the Home Office's 
Advisory Committee on the Treatment of Offenders for re-examination. 
Their report,.published shortly a f t e r the 1960 Conference reinforced 
his decision ' but many conference delegates were not s a t i s f i e d and the 
motion debated at the 196I Conference unequivocally called for both the 
reintroduction of corporal punishment and the extension of capital 
punishment to cover almost a l l types of murder. An amendment iiras 
introduced which deleted a l l mention of capital and corporal punishment 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 1956, pp 92-97 
2. NUCUA Conference Report I956, pp I I 6 - I I 8 
3 . See D Price 'Crime and Punishment' (CPC I961) 
4. NUCUA Conference Report I958, pp 95-102 
5. Royal Commission on the Police - set up 16 Dec 1959; Interim Report 
CCaind; 1222) Nov 196O; Final Report (CCmnd 1728) May I962 
6. NUCUA Conference Report I960, pp 45-47 
7. iCmid; 1213 Nov 1960 
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and instead called for implementation of the prison building programme, 
s t r i c t e r enforcement of sentences and the introduction of a scheme for 
compensating victims of violent crime. In his reply Butler again made 
i t quite clear that he v/ould not support the reintroduction of corporal 
punishment or any modification to the principles of the 1957 Homicide 
Act although he was prepared to review i t s operation. The Conference 
endorsed^Butler's view and the amendment was passed by a very large 
majority . 
Although Butler's views on penal practice were fixed, i t seems 
more l i k e l y that he was ^ nfluenced by the Conference on compensation for 
victims of violent crime . The subject was raised at the I960 Conference 
and i n June I961 the Government published a V/hite Paper outlining two 
possible schemeafor compensating victims-^ which were reviewed by an 
internal party committee set up by Butler after further discussion at 
the 1961 Conference. The^^Committee reported i n mid-1962 advocating a 
Common Law damages system and at the 1962 and 1963 Conferences the 
Government came under heavy pressure to implement a scheme.c.^Fihally-at the 1963 
Conference Brooke, the new Home Secretary, gave a firm commitment that i t 
would go ahead, l e g i s l a t i v e proposals were included i n the Queen's Speech 
on 12th November 1965gand the f i n a l scheme was put to Parliament for 
approval i n June 1964* 
The capital and corporal punishment issues were dormant between 1961 
and 1966. The 1962 Conference, i n addition to pressing for compensation 
for victims, concentrated on the need for quick implementation of the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Police which was met through 
the 1963 Police Act. 
The problems of young offenders caused increasing concern and the 
1962 Conference included numerous references to the need for more detention 
centres while the 1965 debate ^as almost e n t i r e l y concentrated on methods 
of dealing with juvenile crime . Although a motion c a l l i n g for corporal 
punishment was s p e c i f i c a l l y raised at the I963 Conference, i t was soundly 
defeated and the capital punishment issue also remained quiet apart from 
an isolated outburst at the I965 Conference^^. 
1. NUCUA Conference Report I961, pp 64-77. See also R A Butler 'The Art 
of the Possible' (Hamilton 1971) p 201 
2. For other internal party pressures see for example D Price, MP 'Crime 
and Punishment' (CPC I961) 
3. 'Compensation f o r Victims of Crimes of Violence' (Cmnd l4o6; 1961) 
4. 'Victims of Violence' (CPC; 1962) 
5. NUCUA Conference Report I963, p 126 
6. See Cond 2323 (1964) f o r deta i l s 
7. NUCUA Conference Report I962, pp 8I-87. Also B P Cooper & G Nicholas 
'Crime i n the Sixties' (Bow Group; I963) 
8. NUCUA Conference Report I965, pp 119-123 
9. NUCUA Conference Report 1963, pp 121-128 
10. NUCUA Conference Report I965, p 125. See also 'Law Liberty and 
ticence.-' (CPC 1964), pp 26-27 
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Shortly a f t e r the I965 Conference, however, Sidney Silverman's 
Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) B i l l was passed and as a result the 
issue came back into prominence at the 1966 Conference. 
The main resolution was moderate, c a l l i n g for "a practical 
programme of stern and resoIu:^e action to maintain law and order and 
to bring criminals to jus t i c e but an amendment, introduced with high-
powered support from two former ministers - Deedes and Duncan Sandys, 
called f o r capital punishment i n cases involving the murder of police 
and prison o f f i c e r s . 
Hogg, the Shadow Chancellor, was i n a stronger position than 
Butler because although he opposed the amendment i t was known that he 
was personally sympathetic towards capital punishment and had i n fact 
voted against Silverman's B i l l . The Conference follov/ed his advice 
and rejected |he amendment5 and during I967 and I968 the issue became 
dormant again . The 1967 debate was the f i r s t indication of the 
Conference's awareness of the drug problem^and i n I968 rgsolutions were 
passed on the need for both stronger deterrent sentences and firmer 
control of student demonstrations' - the l a t t e r being a reaction to a 
series of violent student demonstrations during the previous year but 
i n 1969 capital punishment again came up at the conference. The Murder 
(Abo l i t i o n of Death Penalty) Set 1965 had abolished capital punishment 
for only f i v e years unless extended by a Parliamentary resolution. A 
review of the position was therefore imminent i n 1970. The origina l 
motion was on broad law and order questions but i t was debated i n 
conjunction with an amendment s p e c i f i c a l l y asking for the reintroduction 
of the death penalty. Sir Peter Rawlinson's front-bench reply was non-
committal but Heath made i t clear elsewhere during the conference that he 
personally favoured a b o l i t i o n although he f e l t that a f i n a l decision 
should be made only a f t e r a further review of the whole problem. I n the 
event the amendment went to a ba l l o t and was carriedgby a very narrow 
majority, committing the conference to such a policy f o r the f i r s t time 
since i t had cropped up i n 1956. Despite t h i s , i n December that year 
Parliament decided to make a b o l i t i o n permanent on a free vote and although 
the Conservatives were highly c r i t i c a l of the s t a t i s t i c s provided by the 
Labour Government^the timing of the decision(which should r e a l l y have 
been taken the following year/ many of them supported the move. 
1. NUCUA Conference Report I966, p 74 
2. For support for t h i s view from the Young Conservatiges see "Law, 
Liberty & Licence" (CPC 1964) p 26 
3. NUCUA Conference Report I966, pp 74-8l 
4. E f f o r t s were however made by a group headed by Duncan Sandys, a 
former front-bencher, to bring up the issue at the 1967 Conference 
through a series of l e t t e r s sent to the press on 20 October I967 
5. NUCUA Conference Report I967, pp 102-108 
6. NUCUA Conference Report 1968, pp 110-115 
7. NUCUA Conference Report 1968, pp 115-121 
8. NUCUA Conference Report 1969, pp 71-79 
9. HC Deb 16 December I969 
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This temporarily closed the issue and the 197O debate centred 
on the need fo r firmer law enforcement - p a r t i c u l a r l y to suppress 
vandalism but the following year the cold-blooded murder of a Blackpool 
police o f f i c e r brought a renewed c a l l for the introduction of the death 
penalty f o r k i l l i n g police and prison o f f i c e r s and an amendment to that 
e f f e c t was passed despite a firm statement from the Home Secretary that 
he saw no hope of changing the position . 
Against the broad range of national issues i t may seem surprising 
that the conference has devoted so much attention to law and order and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y to capital and corporal punishment. Although t h i s could 
confirm impressions that the conference i s dominated by reactionary 
m i l i t a n t s , there i s considerable evidence that the conference delegates 
reflected a majority of public opinion and t h e i r persistent c a l l s for 
strong measures to deal with crime generally showed a sharp awareness 
of public opinion. 
This i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the fact that surveys carried out i n I963 
and 1966 showed that 71?o and 77^ of those questioned favoured the 
retention of capital punishment . 
As a result i t may well be that on t h i s issue at least the c o n f l i c t 
was r e a l l y between the conference (which reflected the views of the 
majority of the electorate) and the parliamentary party (whose l i b e r a l 
views were well ahead of those of the electorate). Generally the 
parliamentary party persuaded the conference to respect i t s views but on 
a few occasions i t was unsuccessful. The divisions of opinion both i n 
the Conference and i n Parliament make i t quite clear however that the 
c o n f l i c t was not between a fi r m l y committed parliamentary party and the 
grass roots party but between an i n t e r n a l l y divided parliamentary party 
and a grass roots party which included a substantial element which was 
w i l l i n g to allow the parliamentary party to exercise i t s discretion as i t 
saw f i t . 
Nevertheless, i t i s more sig n i f i c a n t that despite strong pressure 
from the conference the parliamentary party remained f u l l y i n control of 
policy and although i t s outlook may have been conditioned by attitudes 
expressed at the conference i t never f e l t under any obligation to accede 
to the conference's demands. 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 1971, PP 11-19 
2. D Butler & D Stokes ' P o l i t i c a l Change i n B r i t a i n ' (Penguin I971) 
PP 560; 597 
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ELECTORAL REFORM 
Electoral reform policy has reflected the Conference's tendency 
to hold strong vietvs on issues within the immediate experience of 
delegates. 
The major aspects were election transport and postal votes. 
Section 88 of the Representation of the People Act 1949 imposed s t r i c t 
l i m i t s on the use of cars to carry electors to the polls but i n practice 
evasion was quite widespread - pa r t i c u l a r l y i n r u r a l ar^as - and 
although the number of prosecutions was extremely small , most 
Conservative party workers f e l t that the law was out-dated and did not 
r e f l e c t increased car-ownership. A series of resolutions advocating 
changes i n the law were passed at the conferences i n 1948, 1952, 1955 
and 1956, culminated i n a resolution at the 1958 Conference which was 
highly c r i t i c a l of the government's f a i l u r e to implement the decisions 
of previous conferences . Although the party leadership argued throughout 
that a l l - p a r t y support for constitutional changes was desirable i t 
eventually met the Conference's vieifs. Butler gave the I958 Conference 
a broad hint that the necessary l e g i s l a t i o n woul^ be introduced and the 
Representation of the People (Amendment)Act 1958 was introduced shortly 
afterwards despite opposition from the Labour Party. 
Almost as soon as the Government had s a t i s f i e d the Conference on 
cars, postal votes became an issue. Delegates f e l t strongly that they 
should be more freely available and motions urging that they should be 
given to voters away on holiday or business were debated i n 196O and 1961. 
The strength of delegate f e e l i n g was undoubtedly influenced by the fact 
that the Conservatives were t r a d i t i o n a l l y more successful i n collecting 
postal votes but on t h i s issue the Government was less f l e x i b l e . I t 
opposed unrestricted postal votes on the grounds of cost and the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s of devising an enforceable means of distinguishing between 
voters on holiday and those who were too lazy to vote i n person. The 
issue was temporarily k i l l e d i n I961 when the front-bench reply to the 
Conference debate made i t quite clear that.the Government was not 
prepared to accommodate the conference'^ but i t was resurrected i n 1970. 
The new Government again made i t clear that there was no prospect 
of change ang t h i s view was accepted by the Conference a l b e i t rather 
r e l u c t a n t l y . 
The way i n which the leadership handled both issues i l l u s t r a t e s 
the difference between the Conference's power and i t s influence. The 
Government did not fee l strongly about election transport and although 
changes might antagonise the Opposition no Exchequer costs were involved. 
As a r e s u l t the party' leadership was prepared to give way to the Conference. 
On postal voting, on the other hand, the Government held firm views and 
the Conference's i n a b i l i t y to force a change of policy i n such circumstances 
i s s i g n i f i c a n t . 
1. H C Deb - 5 November I958 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1958, p I39 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1958, p l 4 l 
4. Second Reading - 5 November 1958 
5. NUCUA Conference Report I961, p 100/101 
6. NUCUA Conference Report 1970, p 24 
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EDUCATION 
Another areaawhere the dir e c t experience of delegates influenced 
the a t t i t u d e of the Conference was education. 
• 
I t i s often a key issue i n local p o l i t i c s and as i t d i r e c t l y or 
i n d i r e c t l y affects almost every voter, government actions have a direct 
tangible eff e c t on individual welfare. 
I t i s also one of the areas where the party can continue to 
exercise influence even when out of power. The educational structure 
puts a high level of control i n the hands of local authorities which 
may s t i l l be Conservative-controlled when the national party i s i n 
opposition and the significance of t h i s was clearly shoim at the 1968 
Conference when an i n f l u e n t i a l Conservative MP used the Conference as 
an opportunity to openly encourage ConservatiYe-controlled councils to 
defy the Labour Government's education policy . 
In view of t h i s and the far-reaching and controversial changes 
introduced by Butler's 1944 Education Act, i t i s possibly surprising 
that Conferences immediately a f t e r the V/ar did not devote much time to 
education but a debate was introduced i n 1950 and has featured on the 
agenda at every subsequent conference. Discussion has tended to centre 
around four main themes - teachers, technical/higher education, primary 
education and comprehensive schools. 
The debates during the early 1950s concentrated on the teacher 
problem r e f l e c t i n g post-war shortages and the effects of the b i r t h - r a t e 
bulge on demand for schooling. Improved pay was generally seen as the 
best way of a t t r a c t i n g more teachers and comparatively l i t t l e attention 
was devoted to other aspects of 'status' such as the three-year trai n i n g 
college course or the d e s i r a b i l i t y of t r y i n g to achieve an all-graduate 
profession. 
I n the 1960s, however, as the inadequacy of the Burnham Committee 
machinery became more apparent and teachers became more m i l i t a n t , the 
Conference moved towards a harder l i n e . Criticism of the teachers 
beceune more common and the I96I Conference was used by the Education 
Minister as a sympathetic platform to publicise his reasons for r r ^ j e c t i n g 
the Burnhag Committee's recommendations and imposing a new pay structure 
by statute . 
Technical and higher education caused increasing concern after the 
mid-1950s as the Conferences frequently called for expansion of technical 
colleges and the un i v e r s i t i e s . Delegates f e l t that B r i t a i n was behind 
the major powers i n technology and t h i s was heightened by the heavy 
p u b l i c i t y given to the space race And the 'brain drain'-'. Policy also 
began to r e f l e c t the effects of two i n f l u e n t i a l reports by the University 
Grants Committee (1950) and the National Advisory Committee on Sc i e n t i f i c 
Policy (1954) and t h i s culminated i n an important V/hite Paper 'Technical 
Education' (Grand 97O3) i n February 1956. On higher education the 
Conference strongly backed expansion^and i n some cases went beyond the 
1. NUCUA Conference Report I968, p 42 
2. [^ CUA Conference Report I96I, pp 102-109 
3. See for example - Q Hogg 'The Brain Drain' (CPC I967) and 
P HaskeU 'Technical Education' (CPC 1956) 
4. See also Lord Boyle i n 'The Politics of Education' (Penguin 1971) pp89-90 
This work also includiss comparatively rare dir e c t evidence of a fomer 
Minister's reaction to Conference pressures. 
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Government. I n 196O a resolution ivas passed urging implementation of 
the Anderson Report despite M i n i s t e r i a l qualms over the expense of 
removing the means ^est and the possible implications for other areas 
of higher education . The Government's response ivas to implement some 
of the Report's recommendations but i t only amended the means test for 
student grants. 
After 1960 the Conference began to c r i t i c i s e the inadequacy of 
primary (and l a t t e r l y , nursery) education. The following year Boyle 
only managed to dissuade thcgdelegates from passing a c r i t i c a l motion 
on t h i s with some d i f f i c u l t y and i n I963 he gave a specific commitment 
that a f t e r 1964 the Government„would s t a r t to allocate money for the 
replacement of primary schools . During the l a t t e r half of the I96OS 
when the party was out of power t h i s became an increasingly important 
issue and the Conference frequently c r i t i c i s e d the Labour Government for 
devoting inadequate resources to developing primary education. Once the 
party returned to o f f i c e i n 197O increased emphasis was put on primary 
education and i n I97I the Conference passed a resolution endorsing the^ 
Government's decision to give primary schools a high level 'of p r i o r i t y . 
Comprehensive schooling and the related issue of the independent 
schools were l i v e issues during the entire post-V/ar period. The Labour 
Party had coiranitted i t s e l f at an early stage to comprehensive schooling 
and a b o l i t i o n of the independent schools i n order to provide equality 
of educational opportunity for a l l children''. Many Conservative 
supporters were strongly attached both to the old-established direct 
grant and grammag schools which were often associated with their middle . 
class background and to the principle of freedom of choice i n education . 
Local autonomy was also involved because Local Authorities had wide powers 
under the 1944 Education Act to decide the educational systems i n their 
areas and many Conservative supporters opposed e f f o r t s by the Central 
Government to erode t h i s . 
Quite apart from the social and moral aspects many Conservatives 
regarded comprehensive schools as an important electoral issue. Their 
views were summarised by Angus Maude at the I968 Conference:-
1. NUCUA Conference Report I96O, pp 28-36. See also 'The Rising Tide' 
(CPC 1961) 
2. NUCUA Conference Report I961, pp 102-109 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1963» pp 12- 20 
4. NUCUA Conference Report 1971, pp 64- 72 
5. R Barker 'Education & P o l i t i c s 1900-1951. A Study of the Labour 
Party' (OUP 1972) pp 8I-98. Also W 0 Lester Smith 'Government of 
Education' (Penguin 1965) 
6. W 0 Lester Smith 'Government of Education' (Penguin I965) pp 8-9. 
See also NUCUA Conference Report I965, pp 51-57 
7. NUCUA Conference Report I956, pp 98-101. See also T Raison 'V/hy 
I Conservative' (Penguin 1964) p 102 
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• There are no Socialist or f l o a t i n g votes to be won by 
destroying grammar schools, ^here are a l o t of Conservative 
and f l o a t i n g votes to be l o s t ... ' 
Although there was unanimity over the general principle of 
choice, the Conference and the front-bench often had d i f f e r e n t vieu'S 
on d e t a i l s . V/hen the party was i n power the problem was not serious. 
The Conference contented i t s e l f with urging the Government to restrain 
Labour-controlled Local Authorities which were t r y i n g to introduce 
comprehensive schemes i n the face of local opposition, l / h i l s t the 
Government took the view that some experimentation was desirable but 
i t should not involve dismemberment of the established secondary 
school system. 
I n opposition, however, the problem became more acute. The 
Labour Government actively t r i e d to press Local Authorities into going 
comprehensive. I n i t i a l e f f o r t s to do t h i s by administrative means ^ere 
c r i t i c i s e d by the Conference and when a b i l l was introduced i n 1969 
to coerce the Local Authorities the Conference strongly opposed i t . 
Throughout, however, the Conference suspected that the party's front 
bench spokesman Sir Edward Boyle was more sympathetic to comprehensive 
schools than he was prepared to admit publicly. Generally delegates 
were s a t i s f i e d with assurances that a Conservative Government would 
reverse attempts to force local Authorities to go comprehensive but 
t h i s did not meet the demands of some who thought that Local Authorities 
should be expressly forbidden to introduce comprehensive schemes and 
the 1968 Conference passed a resolution unequivocally opposing compre-
hensive schools which was tantamount to a defeat for the front bench's 
policy of leaving the decision to the Local Authorities. 
Although the Conference defeat and the party rank and f i l e ' s 
antipathy to his views clearly were not the only factors i n Sir Edward 
Boyle's subsequent withdrawal from p o l i t i c s , they must have been a 
si g n i f i c a n t factor i n his decision and the leadership's awareness of 
the strong feeling within the Conference certainly appears to have been 
a factor i n persuading ^ t to take a tougher l i n e on comprehensive 
schooling subsequently. 
Like capital punishment education i s an area where i t has been 
suggested that the reactionary m i l i t a n t s of the Conference have been 
at odds with the more enlightened views of t h e i r own front bench. The 
blat a n t l y e l i t i s t arguments put forward by some delegates were clearly 
embarrassing to the party but there was strong support from many voters 
for the retention of grammar schools'' and i t seems l i k e l y that the 
Conference was representative of at least a broad cross-section of 
public opinion i f not a majority of i t . 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 1968, p 42 
2. Education B i l l - 2nd Reading, 12 Feb 1970 
3. A Alexander & A Ifatkins 'The Making of the Prime Minister I97O' 
(Macdonald I97O) p 97* M Pinto-Duschinsky 'Power i n the Conservative 
Party' ( P o l i t i c a l Studies Vol XX 1972) p I5 
4. G K Roberts ' P o l i t i c a l Parties and Pressure Groups i n Br i t a i n * 
(V/eidenfeld & Nicholson; 1970) pp 52-55 
5. J J B Dempster 'Selection for Secondary Education' (Hethuen 195^) 
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NATIONALISATION 
Nationalisation was one of the major areas of c o n f l i c t between 
the parties during the post-War period and as a result i t featured at 
numerous conferences, p a r t i c u l a r l y as most Conservatives ;<rere confident 
that they had public support on the issue and were therefore determined 
•to exploit i t as far as possible. 
After the war Conference c r i t i c i s m of Labour's nationalisation 
programme centred on the inefficiency and over-centralisation of state 
industry linked with general Conservative attacks on excessive post-l/ar 
bureaucracy and controls . The Conference also t r i e d to use n a t i o n a l i -
sation as part of a general e f f o r t to associate the Labour Party with 
Communists i n the public mind and even front-bench speakers such as 
Oliver L y t t l e t o n used something close to smear t a c t i c s : -
' these are the steps down the road to the State oimership of 
a l l the means of production, d i s t r i b u t i o n and exchange, and 
these are the measures by which the Socialist Government and-
Socialis t Ministers are preparing the seed bed for Communism .. ' 
The issue was vigorously exploited by the Conservatives during the 
period immediately a f t e r the War and the 1949 Conference for example 
contained three debates on d i f f e r e n t aspects of nationalisation - one on 
the general issue and two on^specific Labour Party proposals covering 
insurance and iron and steel . 
Once the party was i n o f f i c e , however, the emphasis inevitably 
changed. I n i t i a l l y the party's denationalisation measures were stressed 
and the f i r s t conference af t e r the:1951 election strongly supported the 
new Government's plans to return the road transport and iron and steel 
industries to private ownership but i t accepted somewhat reluctantly 
that there was r e a l l y no alternative to keeping the railways and the 
domestic u t i l i t i e s i n public ownership. 
Once the main election promises of the new Government had been 
f u l f i l l e d the issue lay dormant u n t i l the mid-1950s when the Conference 
began to show increasing concern about the low level of efficiency and 
the need f o r more e f f i c i e n t control gver capital expenditure i n those 
industries s t i l l i n public oumership . 
1. See E E Barry .; - 'Nationalisation i n B r i t i s h Polities'(Cape'-1965) 
R Kelf-Cohen 'Nationalisation i n Britain'(Macaillan 1958) 
V/ A Robson 'Nationalised Industry & Public Ownership'(Allen;& Unwin 
2. See also 'A New Approach' (Conservative P o l i t i c a l Centre 1951) 1960) 
3. NUCUA Conference 1949, pp 51/52. See also NUCUA Conference Report 
1957, P 32 
4. NUCUA Conference 1949, pp 45/52 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1952, pp 69/74 and 96/99 
6. NUCUA Conference Report 1955, PP 100/103. See also 'Change i a Our 
A l l y ' (CPC 1954) 
NUCUA Conference Report 1956, pp 118/120 
NUCUA Conference Report 1957, PP 32/ 39 
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There was i n fact some reaction to t h i s pressure. I n a well 
publicised speech to the Conservative P o l i t i c a l Centre meeting at 
the 1956 Conference Butler promised to review the accountability of 
the nationalised industries and subsequently the Government^made some 
e f f o r t s to .introduce more commercial management techniques . 
The party's view of nationalisation as a major vote-catching 
issue was again i l l u s t r a t e d i n the I96OS. As soon as the party l o s t 
power i n 1964 nationalisation v^ h^ich had become a f a i r l y dormant issue 
i n the la t e 1950g, featured i n major conference debates i n four 
successive years , yet once the party returned to power i n 1970 i t 
p r a c t i c a l l y vanished again. Opinion polls taken during t h i s period^ 
show that the Conference had a shrewd awareness of public opinion on 
the issue as the following results i l l u s t r a t e : -
1965 1964 1966 Table 5.1 
A l o t more industries should lOJi 
be nationalised 
i9i 
b. Only a few more industries l¥j, 17% 17% 
such as steel should be 
nationalised 
c. No more industries should be 565^  k% k2F/o 
nationalised, but the 
industries that are nationalised 
now should stay nationalised 
d. Some of the industries that are 26% lS% 1% 
nationalised now should be 
denationalised 
e. No opinion/don't know l8% 12}i l4?i 
1. Times - 12 October 1956. Also NUCUA Conference Report 1956, 
pp 118 and 121 
2. NUCUA Conference Report I965, PP 64-68 
NUCUA Conference Report 1966, pp 44-46 
NUCUA Conference Report I967, pp 117-121 
NUCUA Conference Report I968, pp 95 -101 
3. D Butler & D Stokes ' P o l i t i c a l Change i n B r i t a i n ' (Penguin 1971) 
pp 560, 580 and 596 
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Over 6(y/o of those interviewed were opposed to further n a t i o n a l i -
sation and although the public did not share the Conference's 
enthusiasm for denationalisation the Conference was clearly i n tune 
with public opinion i n stressing the party's opposition to proposals 
for taking further industries into public ownership. 
IMGRATION 
Although the entry of alien inmigrants from foreign countries 
had been controlled ever since 1905 the controls were not applied to 
Commonwealth immigrants. Under the B r i t i s h Nationality Act 19^ 8 
Commonwealth citizens were ' B r i t i s h subjects' and did not f a l l under 
the d e f i n i t i o n of aliens. 
During the l a t e 1950s a combination of cheap a i r t r a v e l , high 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of jobs i n B r i t a i n and high unemployment i n some 
Commonwealth countries was responsible for a rapid r i s e i n the 
number of Commonwealth immigrants and immigration became a p o l i t i c a l 
issue . T h i | was reflected i n the 1958 Party Conference which passed 
a resolution urging t i g h ^ r immigration controls. Although the 
resolution averred that such controls should operate irrespective of 
race, the immigration question inevitably acquired strong r a c i a l under-
tones because a high proportion of the immigrants came from the V/est 
Indies, India and Pakistan. The 1958 Conference also reflected strong 
fe e l i n g within the party that there should be powers to deport aliens 
who were convicted of criminal offences. Butler, as Home Secretary, 
was anxaious to avoid antagonising Commonwealth Governments and although 
he hinted that the Government would take deportation powers for 
criminals he insisted that voluntary co-operation between governments 
would control numbers better than a quota system. 
By 1961, however, the issue had become more serious. Pressure 
increased from delegates representing areas ivhich had absorbed large 
numbers of immigrants with resulting social problems and over 40 
resolutions c a l l i n g for immigration control were on the agenda. The 
resolution chosen for debate repeated the 1958 demands for control of 
a l l immigrants, irrespective of race,but Butler stressed the Government's 
reluctance to impose statutory controls,enumerating the disadvantages 
of each type of r e s t r i c t i o n . 
Although the Government was strongly committed to voluntary 
controls i t became increasingly apparent that they were ineffective and 
l a t e r i n the same year Butler introduced the Commonwealth Immigrants 
B i l l , imposing an annual quota of employment c e r t i f i c a t e s . There i s no 
evidence that the Party Conference was d i r e c t l y responsible for the 
decision^ but i t must have been one of the influences on the Government 
sind the Conference's demands were largely met although the I965 
Conference passed a resolution urging higher r e s t r i c t i o n s on new entrants, 
matched by additional f i n a n c i a l help for areas with high immigrant 
concentrations . 
1. See for example P Foot 'Immigration & Race i n B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s ' 
(Penguin 1965) and D McKie & C Cook (ed) 'The Decade of 
D i s i l l u s i o n ' (Macmillan; St Martin's Press 1972) pp 182-I96 f o r 
a r t i c l e by Ray Hattersley on Immigration Policy 
2. See also references at 1956 Conference - NUCUA Conference Report 
1956, pp 107-108 
3. See also 'Immigration & The Commonwealth' (PEST; I965) and C Brocklebank-
Fowler, C Bland & T Farmer 'Commonwealth Iimnigration' (Bow Group I965) 
Lord Vfiodlesfaam 'Coonminlcation & P o l i t i c a l Power' (Cape 1966} p 256 
suggests tiiat constituency pressure was instrumental i n -Qie decision 
to introduce the 1962 Inmigrants Act. 
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In 1967, however, while Labour was in poxrer a serious gap i n the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act became apparent. A Court of Appeal decision 
ruled that people holding passports showing them as 'citizens of the UK 
and Colonies' were not subject to the controls of the 1962 Act. This 
coincided with a campaign by ihe 'Sea.ysji (xovemment to drive out non-
Kenyans and a growing number of Kenyan Asians arrived i n B r i t a i n . I n 
February 1968 the Labour Government introduced a second Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act but the Conservatives did not regard i t as tough enough and • • 
the 1968 Conference's reaction was to pass a resolution supporting Heath's 
policy of i n s i s t i n g on finner c m t r o l s which would match the rate of 
immigration to available f a c i l i t i e s and social conditions. The Conference 
was notable however f o r a speech by Poviell emphasising his view that even 
i f immigration were severely r e s t r i c t e d there would s t i l l be major 
problems which could cnly be solved by a programme of repatriation and 
resettlement. Repatriation i n i t s e l f was not very drastic and indeed \as 
o f f i c i a l party policy but i t s presentation carried strong overtones of 
harrying immigrants i n order to force them out of the country and the 
extremism of sane delegate support f o r Potvell's view was embarrassing f o r 
the party's image. 
The strength of delegate feeling shoo^ again i n 1969 when the Conference 
backed the party leadership's policy but only after a b a l l o t i n l i i i c h the 
vote - 1,394 to 954 - showed that Powell's t o u ^ rep a t r i a t i o n policy had 
considerable support. 
Once the party was back i n power thegig?! Immigration Act was passed 
and the issue remained quiescent u n t i l 1972 when i t was brought back into 
the l i m e l i g h t by General Amin's expulsion of large numbers c£ Ugandan 
Asians and although the Conference again endorsed the Government's policy 
the ballot,revealed another embarrassing minority which opposed Hhe 
leadership . 
Like education and capital punishment, immigration was a f i e l d 
where the Conference consistently took a less l i b e r a l view than the leader-
ship and t r i e d to pressurise the parliamentary party i n t o more drastic 
action. Surveys carried out during the period. 1963-66 show that there was 
strong public support f o r immigration control :-
Table 5.2 
1963 1964 1966 
83^ 81| 815S 
12J^  139^  
3% 6% 5% 
Too many immigrants 
Ifot too many immigrants 
Don't know 
and although the only differences bettfeen the leadership and the Conference 
were over the degree of control i t seems l i k e l y that the Conference v/as 
closer t o public opinion than the leadership. 
'1. See ' A c t i o n Not Words (Conservative C e n t r a l O f f i c e 1966) 
2. H Rose 'The liiimigration Act 1971 : A case study i n the Work of 
Parliament' (Parliamentary A f f a i r s 1972/73 Vol XXVI No.l) pp 69-91 
3. The vote vras 1,721 to 736 
4. D Butler & D Stokes ' P o l i t i c a l Change i n B r i t a i n ' (Penguin 197l) 
pp 56a, 581, 598. See also ' P o l i t i c a l Index' No.90 (Gallup P o l l ; 
October 1967) f o r s i m i l a r information f o r 1967 
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Despite t h i s i t i s u n l i k e l y that the Conference had any very direct 
e f f e c t on the leadership's policies and indeed i t i s possible that 
because of Powell's association with the issue the leadership actually 
continued t o take a more l i b e r a l l i n e than i t might otherwise have done. 
Nevertheless, the Conference vas probably instrumental i n reinforcing the 
leadership's existing views. 
AGRICUIffURE 
Although there i s some doubt about ilie real value of the agriculs 
t u r a l vote the Party has always taken a strcaig i n t e r e s t i n agriculture . 
As Blake points out: 
' The party retained a vaguely landed outlook even i n the 1950s. 
Conservative managers continued to pay a degree of attention to 
the a g r i c u l t u r a l vote scarcely warranted by i t s strength ... ' 
and t h i s sort of vievr was i l l u s t r a t e d by a speaker at the 1947 Conference 
vrho, a f t e r pointing to the party's loss of 8 seats i n East Anglia, 
proceeded to state his f i r m belief that:-
' vie cannot win a General Election unless we haye the whole 
support of the a g r i c u l t u r a l community behind us ... • 
This deep-rooted commitment to the value of the a g r i c u l t u r a l vote 
has been p a r t l y responsible f o r the very close relationship between the 
Conservative party and the a g r i c u l t u r a l industry. 
In the years immediately a f t e r the Second World War, ag r i c u l t u r a l 
policy was mostly concerned with the problems of increasing production. 
During the War major e f f o r t s had been put i n t o increasing production but 
once i t VHS over increased production remained equally essential because 
normal suppliers abroad were not available and because of the foreign 
exchange shortage d i s t r i b u t i o n problems remained comparatively 
unimportant as long as the Government vias s t i l l buying a l l produce at 
f i x e d prices through the M n i s t r y of Supply, As a result, the 1947 
Conference at Brighton was dominated by a production orientated approach 
to agriculture and issues such as Ihe shortages of machinery and spares 
and the need to increase home production of animal feedstuffs to keep dom 
the foreign exchange cost of imports i«regconsidered important enough to 
feature i n Eden's speech as Deputy Leader . 
1. R W Howarth 'The P o l i t i c a l Strength of B r i t i s h Agriculture' 
( P o l i t i c a l Studies Vol X7II No 4 1 969) PP 458-469 
2. See V H Beynon & J E Harrison 'The P o l i t i c a l Significance of the 
B r i t i s h A g r i c u l t u r a l Vote' (University of Exeter 1962) 
J R Pfennock 'The P o l i t i c a l Power of B r i t i s h Agriculture• 
( P o n t i c a l Studies October 1959) 
J Morgan 'The Parmer's Lot i s Not a Happy One' (Crossbow Oct/Dec 1967) 
pp 27-29 
3. NDCUA Conference Report 1947, pp 71-74. See also NUCHA Conference 
Report 1967, P 49 
4. NUCUA Conference Report 1947» p 74 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1947, pp 41, 74 
6. NUCUA Conference Report 1947, PP 71-74; 41 
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An important factor i n h i b i t i n g increased production was lack of 
suitable a g r i c u l t u r a l labour. During the War many former a g r i c u l t u r a l 
workers changed t h e i r work patterns as a result of service i n the 
forces and never returned to the land, accentuating the long term d r i f t 
from r u r a l t o urban employment. The vathdrawal of the P 0 W Labour and 
the r e l a t i v e l y slow pace of demobilisation exacerbated the situation. 
The unwillingness of labour t o enter agriculture vas attributed 
by ihe Conservatives largely t o the lack of amenities i n r u r a l areas and 
demands for improved f a c i l i t i e s featured s t r m g l y at post-War Conferences 
xdth ccnsiderable stress on the need f o r improved r u r a l housing, 
e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n , transport and roads . 
Against t h i s background of ccntinuing emphasis on increased 
production there was some fee l i n g amongst farmers that i h ^ were not 
receiving the share of national resources required t o achieve ihe level 
of production being asked f o r , and Eden's concept that i t was 'not.fair t o 
ask farmers to produce the goods unless they were given the tools' found 
ready support. The Agriculture Act passed by the Labour Government i n 
the autumn of 1947 was designed to meet this demand and provided the main 
l e g i s l a t i v e framevrork f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l support for over a decade. 
Although the B i l l was l i t t l e mentioned at the 1947 Conference i t 
had a f a i r degree of Conservative support. I t folloi-red lines l a i d dovm by 
the Coalitibn Government and was similar to many proposals i n ihe 1945 
Conservative Manifesto; A major feature of the 1947 Act was i t s 
acceptance of price support as an essential feature of B r i t i s h agriculture. 
The war-time system of annual price reviews, fix e d prices, and a wide 
range of production subsidies was i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d as the general pattern 
of a g r i c u l t u r a l support. At the same time the Ministry of Agriculture 
retained wide pov/ers of control and i n cases where the standard of 
production vas unsatisfactory, i t could, even take over land and administer 
i t d i r e c t l y . 
Such wide povrers were inevitably c r i t i s e d by ttie Conservatives^ 
who also opposed the absence of e x p l i c i t preference f o r home and 
Commonwealth producers and measures to improve r u r a l amenities. Another, 
less v a l i d c r i t i c i s m was the absence of quantitative targets f o r the 
industry . 
1. NUCUA.Conference Report 1947, p 71 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1958, p 88 
3. See also P Bremridge & E Briggs 'Agriculture and P o l i t i e s ' 
(CPC 1955) and R Bennett 'The Paim Vfoiker' (CPC 1957) 
4. IfUCUA Conference Report 1947, p 41, 73-75 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1947, p 72 
6. For detailed criticisms see f o r example 'Campaign Guide' 
(Conservative Central Office 1950) pp 213-214 
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Probably the most persistent demand however was f o r a long-term 
policy which vrould assure stable markets fo r a g r i c u l t u r a l produce. In the 
period a f t e r the V/ar this was closely associated with the general 
f e e l i n g that c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the party's policy was required and there 
were calls at ihe 1947 Conference f o r an a g r i c u l t u r a l version of the 
i n d u s t r i a l Charter . 
The demand f o r long-term planning stemmed from the character of 
the industry. The scale of investment, i t s concentration on the 
individual farmer, and;:the time-lag betvreen ihe decisions t o change a 
product and i t s maturity meant that farmers wanted to be sure ihat i f 
they decided to concentrate say on milk, they would have an assured 
market when ihe f u l l level of production was achieved several years l a t e r . 
Furthermore, during the War farmers had bee one used to guaranteed markets 
and had been able t o s e l l everything they could produce a t guarantfied 
prices. The Agricultural Charter, published at the 1948 Conference was 
the Conservative Party's reply to the 1947 Act and the debate at the Con-
ference v/as largely devoted to i t . I n commongWith other, policies of the 
period, i t ms strongly production orientated setting specific 50^ 
increase i n production targets and guaranteeing prices and markets f o r 
a l l food up to that l e v e l . I t also proposed extending the guaranteed 
price system to wool and oats, reduced death duties on a g r i c u l t u r a l land 
and withdrawal of direct subsidies on animal feedstuffs on the basis that 
they would be incorporated i n the guaranteed price fixed at the Annual 
Review. An important i n d i c a t i o n of future policy was the promise to 
restore a free market by discontinuing the Ministry of Pood's central 
buying machinery. Other features were promises t o support horticulture 
through import controls, an Agricul t u r a l Worker's Charter mainly covering 
improved r u r a l amenities,and promises to r e s t r i c t ihe povrer of the County 
Agri c u l t u r a l Executive Committees. The Labour Party's land nationalisa-
t i o n plans were heavily c r i t i c i s e d i n l i n e wiih ihe Conservative Party's 
general anti-nationalisation campaign. 
The Conference reception f o r the Charter was generally favourable 
and although there was some c r i t i c i s m of the absence of reference to f e r t i -
l i s e r subsidies^ and the inadequate treatment of h i l l fanning , a 
number of delegates went out of t h e i r way to defend the 50^ production 
target which had been subject to press c r i t i c i s m . 
1. For an analysis of the demands f o r policy c l a r i f i c a t i o n around th i s 
period, see J D Hoffman 'The Conservative Party i n Opposition' 
(MacGibbon & Kee 1964) p 140 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1948, p 46 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1948, p 49 
4. NUGUA Conference Report 1948, pp 47-49, 52. Butler promised the 
Conference a policy on h i l l farming and i t has been siggested 
that 'The Right Road f o r B r i t a i n ' published i n July 1949 'shows 
d e f i n i t e influence of ihe suggestions made at the 1948 Conference' 
( j D Hoffman - 'The Conservative Pariy i n Opposition 1945-51 ' 
MacGibbon & Bee 1964, P 178) 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1948, pp 46-47 
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The Charter xvas supposedly the product of the Two Way Movement^ 
but i t s acceptance w i t h i n the party probably stemmed less from grass roots 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n than the fact ihat i t made a f i n n attempt to meet demands 
fo r a clear-cut policy at a time when the scent of viotory was i n the a i r 
and although V/oolton's determination t o make the party rank and f i l e f e e l 
involved i n policy making was i l l u s t r a t e d ty his ccmments on the Charter 
at the end of the Conference;-
• You have r a t i f i e d the Agricultural Charter ... I beg yon to 
see that t h i s Charter i s talked2about. See that the faim 
workers know what our policy i s . ' 
•. The suggestion that the Conference had ' r a t i f i e d ' the 
Charter c l e a r l y had no foundation i n fact- Subsequent conferences continued 
to emphasise production. The o r i g i n a l motion at the 1949 Conference, 
concerned solely wLth r u r a l amenities, was subject to no less than three 
amendments, a l l of which were accepted, two of ihese were s p e c i f i c a l l y 
concerned with production. 
One delegate sounded a warning note;-
' I think there i s a danger of our goLag i n for wi l d schemes 
f o r increased production. During the War nothing mattered so 
long as vie got the food. The cost did not matter; but :^ e 
shall i n future years have t o have seme r e l a t i o n t o cost • 
but most of the speakers stressed iiie need fo r increased production 
irrespective of demand and Dugdale i n his M i n i s t e r i a l reply f i i m l y echoed 
the thoughts of most delegates vdien he said that:-
' I n the future our programme as a parly must stress the maximum 
production i n every section of the industry, so that we can 
feed from the s o i l of . B r i t a i n the greatest number of people that 
i t i s possible to do ' 
By 1950 the food shortage was beginning to ease and although 
agriculture s t i l l remained a seller's market , farmers were worried about 
the marketing and p r i c i n g mechanism. The price support system established 
under the 1947 Agriculture Act gave farmers a guaranteed return based on 
the price l e v e l i n the previous year so normal demand and supply behaviour 
affected prices up to a point and as imported supplies increased, 
producers gave increasing thought to marketing problems. 
1. J D Hoffman 'The Conservative Party i n Opposition 1945-51' (HacGibbon 
& ifee 1964) p 153. Also NUCUA Conference Report 1948, p 52. 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1948, p 144 
3. NHCUA Conference Report 1949, p 73 
4. NUCUA Conference Report 1949, p 74 
5. Shortages s t i l l remained acute. Thus, Food Subsidies featured i n 61^ 
of Conservative and 65^ of Labour Manifestoes analysed by 
H G Nicholas 'The B r i t i s h General Election 1950' (Macmillan 1951) 
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Many Conservative famers advocated more producer-controlled 
marketing boards to i r o n out inconsistencies of supply and ensure 
stable market prices with a guaranteed level of return. The advan-
tages of such boards were widely canvassed at the 1950 Conference and 
influenced ihe thinking of the party pamphlet on 'Agricultural 
Marketing' published the following year viiich claimed ihat:-
' ... Experience has shown that these boards can make a 
valuable contribution t6 improving commodities concerned. 
With the e x i s t i n g statutory safeguards the consumer's 
in t e r e s t i s adequately protected and the responsibility for 
improving marketing i s placed vxhere i t m t u i a l l y belongs -
on ihe shoulders of the producers, who have a natural 
incentive t o bring about improvement ' 
Once i n power iiie party leadership responded to the pressure, 
although not immediately, and i n 1954 a comprehensive marketing 
structure based on producer bosirds was eventually established . 
Two other major thanes of the 1950 agriculture debate were 
closely t i e d to the party's broader General Election platfoim. One 
Tnaa the land nationalisation issue; 14ie other was c r i t i c i s m of bulk 
buying and the a g r i c u l t u r a l bureaucracy inherited from ifae war sears 
x^iich had been i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d under the 1947 Agriculture Act . 
In both cases the Conference was convinced that the Labour Government's 
policies involved excessive direct interference vdth the management of 
the economy and that the scale of government intervention was d i r e c t l y 
responsible f o r serious i n e f f i c i e n c i e s and waste. 
The 1950 Conference was also influenced by the^Torquay Conference 
and the depressed state of the h o r t i c u l t u r a l industry vrhich stimulated 
a successful amendment to thocAgriculture Motion c a l l i n g f o r t a r i f f s to 
protect h o r t i c u l t u r a l produce . As a result the party leadership was 
somewhat embarrassed when i t got in t o power the following year because 
the Conference resolution was s t r i c t l y speaking only a re-affirmation 
of established Conservative policy set out i n the Agricultural Charter 
but i n practice the new Government found that international trading 
agreements made i t extremely d i f f i c u l t to introduce protective t a r i f f s . 
The marketing problems of the industry became more pronounced 
a f t e r the Conservatives took o f f i c e i n 1951. They vrere committed to 
removing controls of a l l kinds and p a r t i c u l a r l y those on food. The 
commitment to discontinue bulk buying through the Ministry of Pood m.a 
largely inevitable as iJie economy vrould not go on accepting war-time 
re s t r a i n t s and the unavoidable inefficiencies of the system and th i s 
meant that a new system of subsidies would have to be brought into 
operation. 
The new support system took the form of deficiency payments 
covering the difference between prevailing market prices and guaranteed 
price levels negotiated between the Government and ag r i c u l t u r a l industry 
representatives. Although the guaranteed return ranained, the new 
system meant a change i n emphasis for farmers because a l l produce had to 
be disposed of through normal marketing channels direct to the consumer. 
This focussed even more attention on the problems of managing supply and 
1. G R H Nugent MP 'Agricultural Marketing' (CKJ Sept 195l). For arguments 
against the Marketing Boards see Times 8 Oct 1953 
2. Cmnd 9104 March 1954. See also 'United f o r Peace & Progress' 
(Conservative Central Office A p r i l 1955) 
3. IfUCUA Conference Report 1950, pp 69 and 71 
4. CffiH Nugent MP 'Agricultural Marketing' tCCPC-Sept-1951) ' - ' : . '^ . 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1950, p 70 
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demand and although the 1952 Conference s t i l l emphasised expanded production, 
increasingly the real stress lay on the need f o r an orj^erly marketing 
system managed by producer controlled marketing boards , 
The main a l t e r n a t i v e , import control, was a controversial issue. 
Britain's membership of G A T T imposed certain l i m i t s on Lnperial 
Preference which were strongly opposed by an i n f l u e n t i a l section of the 
party. As a result there were acrimonious debates on the subject at both 
the 1952 and the 1953 Conferences-'. Although the Government's d e f i n i t i v e 
White Paper f i n a l l y decontrolling agriculture was not published u n t i l after 
the 1953 Conference i t s intentions were clear well before hand and although 
many farmers supported freedom i n the abstract the prospect of losing 
guaranteed state price levels caused increasing worries. The 1953 
Conference paid r i t u a l t r i b u t e to the va l i a n t efforts of farmers during the 
War and the need f o r even greater production. But i t was generally 
realised that ihe canf ortable guaranteed markets of the War years were 
disappearing and there were growing c a l l s for Government steps to ensure 
a stable return on ca p i t a l through control of the market. 
One of the problems of the guaranteed price system was that farmers 
s t i l l had l i t t l e incentive t o ensure that they were meeting a demand. Large 
quantities of certain foods, such as milk were produced, even though 
demand xms l i m i t e d and the r e s u l t i n g d i s p a r i t y between market price and 
guaranteed price imposed heavy costs on the Exchequer which constantly 
pressed the Govemmenb t o reduce the level of guaranteed priceg . As a 
re s u l t the mood of the famers waa 'restive and apprehensive' at the 
1953 Annual Conference and there was sharp c r i t i c i s m even from MPs:-
' Our Government owes i t to the eigricultural community to make i t 
clear once and f o r a l l that„our concentration on agriculture i s 
not a temporary expediency ' 
The world supply s i t u a t i o n had moved from deficiency into surplus -
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n cereals, andpthe Government^ refusal to grant the HPU a 
Speciaiii>rice.Reyiew.V*fas.".heavily c r i t i c i s e d as wag the delay i n 
establishing producer controlled marketing boards. 
1. NDCUA Conference Report 1952, p 87 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1952, pp 50-55 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1953, pp 63 
4. 'Decontrol of Pood & Marketing of Agricultural Produce' (Cmnd 8989; 
1953) 
5. Times - 19 Oct 1953 
6. Times - 8 Oct 1953 
7. NUCUA Conference Report 1953, P 81. See also pp ®-65 
8. NUCUA Conference Report 1953, P 81. 
9. NUCUA Conference Report 1953, PP 83-84 . See also D E Butler 'The 
B r i t i s h General Election of 1955' (Miacmillan 1955) P 11 
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The h o r t i c u l t u r a l industry vias another d i f f i c u l t topic. I t was 
outside the scope of the 1947 Agriculture Act and r e l i e d on protective 
t a r i f f s and quotas f o r price support but Britain's membership of G A T T 
prevented the Government from raising t a r i f f s unless a corresponding 
increase was applied to Commonwealth produce. This.situation was 
strongly c r i t i c i s e d at the Conference by L S Amery, the party's main 
Commonxiealth advocate, and i t has been suggested that this was 
d i r e c t l y responsible for the Board of Trade's decision to apply to 
G A T T l a t e r ihat year f o r s p e c i a l permission to raise t a r i f f s against 
non-Commonwealth countries only . 
The Minister of Agridulture faced much of the c r i t i c i s m squarely. 
He advised the Conference to accept a c r i t i c a l amendment to ihe 
resolution, probably i n order to avoid the embarrassment of defeat, but 
st o u t l y defended the slovmess i n setting up the marketing boards 
explaining ihe need to consult w i t h the parties involved and ensure 
that there are adequate safeguards f o r consumers. . 
The party's election manifesto, published i n A p r i l 1955^, promised 
to uphold ihe principles of ihe 1947 Act, encourage marketing boards, and 
improve r u r a l amenities and by ihe time the Conference met agsdn i n 1955 
the party had won a new General Election. 
The 1955 Conference again stressed the problems of the h o r t i c u l t u r a l 
industry asking the Government 'to take a l l possible measures to provide 
greater s t a b i l i t y i n the future ' and although cost increases absorbed by 
growers featured prominently i n the debate t h e i r main demands were fo r a 
stable market vhich viould provide guaranteed returns. The Government, 
however, categorically refused to of f e r d i r e c t price support and 
continued to i n s i s t that t a r i f f s were the best way to protect ihe 
industry. 
Marketing problems were a major issue the follovang year. The 
Conference re-emphasised ihe need f o r long term planning although i t 
expressed confidence i n the genera 1^framev/ork of the 1947 Agriculture Act 
and the A g r i c u l t u r a l Marketing Acts . Waile the Government's refusal to 
grant a Special Price Review to meet ag r i c u l t u r a l workers' wage increases 
was s t r o i g l y c r i t i c i s e d the 1956 Conference also provided a good example 
of hovr a c a r e f u l l y timed Government announcement could e f f e c t i v e l y 
f o r e s t a l l conference c r i t i c i s m when the Ministry of Agriculture announced 
on the day before the debate that i t vjould renegotiate the agreed price 
f o r f a t c a t t l e with the HPU. 
The Govemmenb began t o respond to pressure for long-term planning 
and although the ItLnister of Agriculture promised no drastic alterations 
i n the price support system he expressed i n t e r e s t i n replacing the annual 
price reviews iri.th a more long-term approach:-
1 . NUCUA Conference Report 1953, P 63 
2 . S Beer i n 'Legislative Behaviour' ( j C Wahlke & H Eulan (eds) (Glencoe 1959) 
3. 'United for Pgace & Progress' (Conservative Central Office 1955) 
4 . lUCUA Conference Report 1955, P 83 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1956, p 86 
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' One word about longer-term assurances. Since I have been 
M n i s t e r I have become more and more conscious that the 
annual price review as provided f o r i n the Agriculture Acts 
has defects ... Everyone viants a long-term policy, but there 
i s very l i t t l e unanimity as to vdiat people want me to put 
i n t o that long-term policy. I can only say ihat V7ith goodwill 
I f e e l confident that something v;orthwhile i s going t o come 
out of ihese discussions ' 
Although delegates s t i l l wanted a long-term policy they were 
increasingly disillusioned by the producer controlled marketing boswds 
v^hich had proved too bureaucratic f o r producers and too expensive f o r 
consumers and references by the Minister to ihe Egg Marketing Board xiiich ^  
was then being set up were met with noisy cries of dissent from the f l o o r . 
The outcane of the demands f o r long-term-guarantees was the V/hite 
Paper 'Longer Term Assurances fo r Agriculture' subsequently implemented 
aS the 1957 Agriculture Act. The new Act did not a l t e r the essential 
pattern of a g r i c u l t u r a l price support established under ihe 1947 Act -and 
guaranteed prices and deficiency payments remained the basis of the 
system. The Government did, hoxiever, commit i t s e l f to l i m i t reductions i n 
guaranteed prices so that a f t e r allowing for any cost increases or 
decreases the level for the industry generally would not drop below 97?^ 
of the previous year's f i g u r e while adjustments for individual conmodities 
would be l i m i t e d to ensure that ihey vrould not f a l l below 96^ of the 
previous year's figure. Production subsidies - pa r t i c u l a r l y for buildings 
and fixed equipment Trere also extended to t r y and make farms more 
e f f i c i e n t and a Pig Industry Development Association vas established to 
improve the quality of pork and bacon and combat competition from Danish 
producers. 
The 1957 Act vras partly responsible f o r a more optimistic atmosphere 
at the 1957 Conference x^iich congratulated ihe Government on the success of 
i t s a g r i c u l t u r a l expansion policy. The demands f o r a long-term policy were 
la r g e l y met but delegates vere increasingly aware that B r i t i s h a g r i c u l t u r a l 
p r o d uctivity was being matched abroad where costs were often lower than at 
home vrhere subsidies tiere keeping large areas of marginal land i n 
c u l t i v a t i o n . As competition from abroad loomed larger and the Conference 
showed a cl e a r l y discernable tendency to look t o overt protectionism to 
control i t . 
Imports aggravated ihe marketing problem but i t became cleeo' that 
the domestic industry's increasing productivity was bringing problems of 
i t s own. About 1 956 the industry had exceeded the 50^ target set i n the 
A g r i c u l t u r a l Charter and i t was becoming even more apparent that increased 
production was no longer an.; end i n i t s e l f . 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 1956, p 91 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1956, p 90. See also Economist Vol 181 
Oct-Dec 1956, p 211 
3. Cmnd 23 (l956) 
4 . NUCUA Conference Report 1957, PP 51-52 
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Wasn over-production had developed i n certain areas, the 
producers had looked f i r s t l y t o producer controlled marketing boards 
and subsequently to import controls as a solution but throughout 
ag r i c u l i n i r a l management expertise lay i n techniques for increasing 
production. The success of new production methods and the recovery 
of a g r i c u l t u r a l production abroad now began t o place more emphasis on 
expertise i n predicting and meeting market requirements - both i n 
terms of product and quality. A delegate to the 1961 Conference put 
the problem succinctly:-
• I t w i l l have to be custcmer orientated marketing. I f the 
housewife v/ants an 8 inch cabbage or a brown egg we w i l l 
have to supply i t , i f not, somebody across the Channel w i l l ' 
While the industry was coning to terms with the changing s i t u a t i o n 
the Government began to question the farmers' assumption that the 
industry should expect to enjoy the same grovrth as the private sector 
of industry i n terms of income and return on c a p i i a l . I t took ihe view 
that ihe st a b i l i i g r given by the 1S57 Act was tantamount to providing a 
guaranteed revenue and i n return ihe industry would have t o accept a lower 
rate of return on cap i t a l than the rest of private industry. As a result 
the Government was not very sympathetic to demands at the 1957 Conference 
f o r steps t o improve the industry's overall return on capital. 
Another problem which figured a t the 1957 Conference vfas the small 
farmer and EPTA. Small fanners enjoyed considerable sympathy amongst 
Conference delegates who regarded them as an important source of electoral 
support and as a good example of entrepreneurial e f f o r t . Although 
conference pressure for measures to help small fazmers got a sympathetic 
hearing from the Government there was no premise of positive action and 
i t became a major issue at the 1958 Conference. 
The effects of EPTA entry were not much discussed by delegates 
except i n the general context of imports but the Minister of AgridulturS 
used the opportunity t o make a categorical statement that the Government 
would not j o i n EFTA i f free trade i n foodstuffs was a pre-condition of 
entry. This was designed to reassure the h o r t i c u l t u r a l industry, f o r 
which continued t a r i f f protection was promised, a i ^ also to meet ihe 
objections of the party's Commonwealth enthusiasts . 
The 1958 Conference debate centred on small fazmers and a nimiber 
of speakers stressed the very capital intensive operations which were 
necessary to make small farms viable. The Government clearly shared the 
Conference's view that increased capital ms needed f o r small farms, 
promising more assistance Tidiich was detailed i n a V/hite Paper published 
s h o r t l y a f t e r the Conference^ended, but emphasised that the objective should 
be to make small fazmers independent vrithin a few years - helping them i n 
the interim by r e d i s t r i b u t i n g resources rather than increasing the overall 
l e v e l of a g r i c u l t u r a l support . The debate was also remarkable f o r a rare 
attempt By a delegate t o f o r c e f u l l y oppose the mainstream of Conference 
opinion by arguing that small fazmers were i n e f f i c i e n t and should be 
discouraged rather than supported . Predictably he drew a noisy reaction 
from ihe crowd. 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 1961, p 34 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1957, P 56 
3. 'Assistance to Small Farmers' (Cmnd 553; 30 Oct 1958 - implemented i n 
Agriculture (Small Farmers) Act 1959) 
4. Economist Oct-Dec 1958, Vol 189, p 215 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1958, p 86 
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Surprisingly the 1958 agriculture debate contained no reference 
to the 1958 Agriculture Act, which curbed ihe powers of the County 
A g r i c u l t u r a l Executive Committees''. On the recommendations of the 
Franks Report^ vbloh had c r i t i c i s e d t l i e i r powers to act as 'detective, 
judge and j u r t y ' . 
Another surprising omission was the absence cf any reference to 
the 1958 Price Review^ vjhich had considerably reduced price support, 
although viLthin ihe l i m i t s of ihe 1957 Agriculture Act, 
Tlie 'return, on c a p i t a l ' issue was a major feature of the 1960 
Agriculture Debate . Although by 1960 Exchequer support for a g r i c u l -
ture was running at around 5^ of the national budget, many farmers 
were i r r i t a t e d by ihe fact that produce i n ihe shops was casting the 
consumer more while Government control appeared to keep the farmer's 
return s t a t i c : -
' V/e do not want continental prices here, but i f the Government 
are going t o settle our wages and the prices we have to pay, 
they must see that we have the support we need i n exchange^. ' 
Despite the 1957 Agriculture Act many farraera suspected that the 
Government was 'shaving' the subsidies^ whilst at the same time allowing 
wage a\/ards for a g r i c u l t u r a l workere and substantial increases i n animal 
feedstuffs. 
These problems highlighted the disadvantages of the deficiency 
payments system. Although i t was intended o r i g i n a l l y to cushion farmers 
against fluctuations i n the market, leaving normal market prices above 
the guaranteed price, i n practice, the market price f o r many commodities 
was usually well below the guaranteed price and as a result the Annual 
Price Review was the only way i n which farmers could recover increased 
costs. 
The debate at the 1960 Conference included the f i r a t significant 
references to the effects of EEC entry' on agriculture. Pew delegates 
appreciated i t s Importance and i t i s significant that i t was MPs and the 
Minister rather than ordinary delegates xfho dealt with the question but 
by the follovang Conference delegates had grasped the extent t o which 
EEC entry^ could a f f e c t the industry aid the agriculture debate was 
almost e n t i r e l y devoted t o the issue. Entry would involve removal of 
1. For Conference c r i t i c i s m of these committees as far back as 1948. See 
NUCUA Conference Report 1948, p 48 
2. Cmnd 218 (l958) 
3. Cmnd 390 (1958) 
4. See also 'Agriculture and the Nation' (CPC; 1959) 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1960, p 108 
6. NUCUA Conference Report 1960, p 109 
7. NUCUA Conference Report 1960, p 109 
8. The Government's decision to apply f o r entry had been announced i n 
the House of Commons on 31 July 1961. 
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Government price support and many producers were uneasy about being 
exposed to open competition. At the same time producers had 
experienced several minor crises as a result of sudden gluts caused 
by imports and the i r mood was strongly protectionist^. In his reply 
the Minister pointed out that production surpluses throughout thie 
developed countries made some 'dumping' unavoidable but he made i t 
clesir that the Government generally did not favour t a r i f f protection 
as a solution and considered that the existing Anti-Dumping Act^was 
adequate although i t accepted that i t s operation could be rather slow. 
On the broader aspects of EEC entry Soames hastened to assure farmers that 
the enlarged market provided by the EEC would compensate f o r reductions 
i n Government support :-
' Let me assure you that the broad case presented t o the Six 
by the Lord Privy Seal yesterday on behalf of the Government 
i s such as would i n our view give the industry equal 
opportunities to those now open to i t . ^ ' 
and the existing support system would continue u n t i l the EEC entry 
question was set t l e d . 
Although the 1962 Conference continued to stress ihe need fo r Govern-
ment help, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r the small and middle sized farmer^, the 
effects of competition frcm imported produce were cl e a r l y worrying 
delegates most. The Conference revealed a marked turn toirards protec-
tionism and a strongly worded amendment-' advocating direct import 
controls was introduced and accepted. The increased support for impart 
controls from producers was largely based on a desire f o r higher market 
prices which were becoming much more a t t r a c t i v e than the modest but 
guaranteed returns of the deficiency payments system. 
This change i n emphasis was aicouraged by the Government which 
was becoming seriously concerned about the increasing cost of deficiency 
payments as the gap between guaranteed and market prices widened", and 
Soames i n his reply to the debate made i t clear ihat irrespective of EEC 
entry the support system would have t o be overhauled:-
' While the industry i s earnizg a net inccme of around £400 
m i l l i o n , £300 m i l l i o n and more - about £330 m i l l i o n this year -
i s money being provided by the Exchequer. This s i t u a t i o n Is 
bound to make many people, and, surely, many farmers themselves, 
wonder idiether t h i s system which suited us so well i n the middle 
f i f t i e s i s s t i l l the r i g h t one i n the circumstances of to-day.*^ • 
1. For de t a i l s of Conservative Party attitudes to EEC entry and agriculture 
see M Camps 'Bri t a i n and the European Community 1955-1963'? " 
(Princeton UP 1964) p 462 f f 
2. Customs Duties (Dumping and Subsidies Act) 1957 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1961, p -38 
4.. NUCUA Conference Report 1962, p 75 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1962, p 76 
6. M Butterwick & E Neville-Rolfe 'Agricultural Marketing and the EEO" 
(Hutchinson; 1971) p 21 
7. NUCUA Conference Report 1962, p 79 
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By 1965 the Conservatives vrere i n opposition. One of the main 
developments was a firm decision that ihe party v/ould go over to a 
system of import levies. The factors which contributed to the decision 
were numerous but some of the more important ones were:-
(a) the Common Market - under EEC regulations deficiency payments 
vrere not permitted and as the pariy vas f i r m l y committed t o 
negotiating entry i n t o the EEC i t was inevitable that the old 
system would have to be discarded 
(b) the cost of Exchequer support, and 
(c) pressure from farmers who were convinced that higher market 
prices would benefit them more than subsidies. 
The main problem with the change i n policy would be the inevitable 
r i s e i n ihe cost of food which, although representing an increase i n 
income f o r the producers, was unli k e l y to appeal t o the housewife. As a 
result a series of debates i n 1965, 1966, 1967, 1969, 1970 and 1972 were 
almosft. e n t i r e l y devoted to expounding the advantages of import levies to 
farmers vdiilst at the same time reassuring housewives that the t r a n s i t i o n 
would be very gradual vri.th only a small effe c t on the price of food^. 
One other s i g n i f i c a n t development during this period was the 
decision not to hold agriculture debates i n 1968, 1971 and 1973. I t i s 
not clear ndiether t h i s reflected a reassessment of the importance of the 
a g r i c u l t u r a l vote or the declining importance of agriculture as part of 
the national economy but there may have been an element of both. The 
agriculture debate had alvra,y3 attracted a somevrhat specialised interest 
group as i t s audience and the small numbers attending the debates, 
together vdth the sanev^hat blatant s e l f - i n t e r e s t of many of ihe agricul-
t u r a l apeakers may well have been instrumental i n persuading the leader-
ship t o stop holding a regular annual debate. 
PARTY ORGANISATION 
The part played by the Conference i n discussing party domestic 
matters aruch as organisation and propaganda i s surprisingly small i n 
view of the direct interest which most delegates have i n such matters. 
Although c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y the Conference has no more "power to 
se t t l e organisational questions than policy i t s pov;er to influence them 
i s p o t e n t i a l l y considerable both because the membership of the 
Conference and the Council overlap and because many organisational decisions 
depend on constituency action f o r implementation. 
NUCUA Conference Report 1965, PP 42-50 
NUCUA Conference Report 1966, pp 104-110 
NDCUA Conference Report 1967, PP 49- 55 
NUCUA Conference Report 1969, PP 128-133 
NUCUA Conference Report 1970, pp 87- 93 
NUCUA Conference Report 1972, pp 55- 58 
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Generally speaking, however, the Conference has not devoted a 
great deal of attention to this area. Conservatives are conscious 
that too much public discussion of the mechanism of pariy p o l i t i c s 
might damage t h e i r image and are reluctant to appear as a party which 
i s more concerned with the tact i c s than the strategy of p o l i t i c s . 
The Conference has, hov/ever, on occasions provided a forum vrhere party 
worfcere can t e l l the leaderehip about i h e i r viev/s on such issues. 
Party workers often blame t h e i r party's poor electoral 
performance on f a i l u r e to communicate policy successfully - p a r t i c u l a r l y 
through f a i l u r e to preduce the r i g h t sort of l i t e r a t u r e or use ihe mass 
media correctly , These attitudes have frequently reflected i n 
Conference debates:-
' No annual conference would be considered complete without 
the r i t u a l of an attack upon ihe chairman or the deputy 
chairman for l e t t i n g the party's case go by default f o r ^ 
putting pen to paper and sending the scr i p t to the printer .. ' 
and emphasis on the party's communications problems has alvrays tended 
to increase when the pariy i s i n d i f f i c u l t y . I t i s inevitable that:-
' During a d i f f i c u l t time f o r a party i t s organisation is 
bound to come under f i r e ... ' 
and these problems became increasingly acute as the party's tenure i n 
o f f i c e iengthened:-
• For a party vdiich has been i n o f f i c e for over eleven years 
there are bound t o be d i f f i c u l t i e s over the presentation of 
par t i c u l a r Government policies and actions. Our p o l i t i c a l 
opponents natura l l y c r i t i c i s e everything; f o r the commentators 
and j o u r n a l i s t s , attack is obviously more fun than defence. I n 
spite of the large improvements i n the standards of l i v i n g of 
most people i n the country, the Administration cannot avoid 
from time to time offending particular interests or sections of 
the community^... ' 
Immediately a f t e r the War the conference concentrated on what i t re-
garded as unreasonable r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed by ihe Labour Government on 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y of newsprint f o r the press and although discussion 
ostensibly centred on ihe l i m i t s which this placed on freedom of speech 
generally, as most of the press was Conservative, i t carried strong 
implications that the r e s t r i c t i o n s vrere intended to prevent ihe pariy 
putting i t s policy over to ihe electorate^. At the 1948 Conference a motion 
s p e c i f i c a l l y on party propaganda reflected dissatisfaction with Churehill's 
reluctance to get involved i n party p o l i t i c s ^ and the following year 
resolutions were passed urging the party leadership to exploit p o l i t i c a l 
broadcasts e f f e c t i v e l y - r a l l y the natiop, with a 'People's Call t o Ihe 
Conservative V[ay of L i f e ' , and make i t clear to the electorate that the 
party rejected class rnrfare.^ 
1. The Selwyn Lloyd Report (Conservative Central Office 1963) pp 4-5 
2. Times - 25 September 1958 
3. The Selwyn Lloyd Report (Conservative Central Office 1963) pp 30-32 
4. NUCUA Conference Report 1947, pp 99-103 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1948, pp 123-126 
6. NUCUA Conference Report 1949, pp 104-108 & 112-113 
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By 1952 the Conservatives had been i n power f o r over a year. 
The euphoria of victory had worn o f f , party vjorkers f e l t that ihe 
party's increasing electoral d i f f i c u l t i e s vrere due to failures i n 
explaining party policy to the electorate and the Conference passed 
a resolution urging the Government t o time unpopular announcements carefully 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e l a t i o n to local government elections whilst reference 
was made again to effective use of ihe media. The leadership recognised 
the problem and by the time the Conference met Lord Swinton had been 
appointed to co-ordinate Government public relations^. 
This malaise was largely reduced by Eden's appointment as leader 
and the party's 1955 e l e c t i o n victory and although there was some 
c r i t i c i s m of Government public r e l a t i o n at the 1956 Conference i t vas 
confined to ihe presentation of B r i t a i n to overseas countries^. 
By 1957 however the party's electoral position was again causing 
concern and the Conference called f o r clearer and simpler policy explana-
tions aimed at the ordinary voter. Delegates f e l t that Government 
Ministers were becoming bogged dovm i n administrative d e t a i l , losing 
touch vdth the grass roots and f a i l u r e to appreciate the importance of 
frequent appearances to explain Government policy. Particular complaints 
were raised over the Government's f a i l u r e to counter criticisms of the 
new Rent Act3. 
The following year a similar motion VBS carried urging the Central 
Office to come up vrith an imaginative public i t y prcgramne s e l l i n g ihe 
Government's achievements to ihe electorate^- but the 1959 election success 
reduced the pressure u n t i l 1962 v:hen electoral d i f f i c u l t i e s were again 
responsible f o r a resolution urging the Government t o provide a simple 
explanation of i t s policies although i t s c r i t i c a l tone v/as dulled by an 
amendment emphasising the obligation of party vrorkers to play t h e i r part 
i n spreading the message. 
One of the continuing problems throughout t h i s period referred to 
by both Lord Swinton i n 1952 and Deedes i n 1962 l a y i n distinguishing 
the Government's general obligation to infom the country from s t r a i ^ t -
forward p o l i t i c a l propaganda - most party workers f e l t that the two were 
essentially the same thing and that the Government's o f f i c i a l public 
relations machinery should be used to explain party policy, while the 
Government, anxious t o avoid reprisals i f i t l o s t o f f i c e , vas much more 
cautious. 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 1952, pp 75-81 and 85-87 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1956, pp 112-114 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1957, PP 56- 63 
4. NUCUA Conference Report 1958, pp 133-139 
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A f t e r 1964 th i s problem was removed bat the party's e lec t ion f a i l u r e 
was i nev i t ab ly a t t r ibu ted to inadequate communication of the par ty 's 
po l ic ies and achievements. The 1966 Conference urged the party to attack 
the Labour Government ru th less ly and welcomed the overhaul of Central 
O f f i c e V 7 h i l e c r i t i c i s m of the leadership was balanced by stressing the 
importance of overhauling loca l constituency associations^. The fo l lowing 
year resolutions were also passed backing Lord Carrington's fund-ra is ing 
dr ive and urging greater e f f o r t s to put the par ty 's message over to the 
publ ic^ . 
The 1968 Conference passed a f a i r l y rout ine resolut ion asking f o r 
a more f o r t h r i g h t declarat ion of party pol icy but i t also debated a motion 
urging constituencies t o adopt a primary e lec t ion system f o r choosing 
parliamentary candidates which was eventually defeated a f t e r a somevxhat 
non-commdtlbal r ep ly from the vice-chairman of fee party organisation i n 
charge of candidates^ and i n 1969 the debate vras calculated to bui ld up 
Heath's 'honest' p o l i t i c i a n image by urging the leadership to ' r e -
es tabl ish the i n t e g r i t y of and respect f o r democratic government.' 
His tory repeated i t s e l f a f t e r ihe par ty 's election v i c t o r y i n 1970. 
I n i t i a l l y the Conference was not much concerned about organisation and 
propaganda but by 1972 the par ty ' s e lec tora l pos i t ion vias again causing 
concern and the Conference vias urging the party to modernise i t s image and 
a t t r a c t young voters^, 
V/hile such debates have provided party workers with a useful 
opportunity to express t h e i r views there i s l i t t l e evidence that they 
have had any very marked e f f e c t on the way i n v;hich the party organisation 
has i n f a c t been managed. 
The post war period can be seen as f a l l i n g in to three d i s t i n c t 
phases as f a r as party organisation i s concerned. 1945-51 was a period 
when tiie organisation iras being b u i l t up under Woolton and Butler ; 
1951-1964 was a period of gradual decline during which the leadership 
became increasingly insensi t ive to the grass roots6; and 1964-1970 was 
a f u r t h e r period of r ebu i ld ing . Closely fo l lowing the pattern of 1945-511 
supervised by du Cann and Barber. 
Throughout the two innovative periods, 1945-51 and 1964-70 the 
impetus came almost e n t i r e l y from the top of the party lAi i l s t during the 
middle period the leadership appears t o have become progressively less 
interested i n organisational questions and the party chairmanship tended 
to become a cross to be carr ied by a member of the f r o n t bench rather 
than a key pos i t ion of influence w i t h i n the party. 
1. ITUCUA Conference Report 1966, pp 27-57 and 67-74 
2 . ITOUA Conference Report 1967, pp 36-38 and 121-127 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1968, pp 18-27 and 73-78 
4 . NUGUA Conference Report 1969, pp 105-111 
5. NOCtJA Conference Report 1972, pp 34-39 
6. See Lord V/indlesham 'Communication and P o l i t i c a l Power' (johathan 
Cape; 1966) 
- 96 -
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
Although domestic pol ipy Ms dominated the post-V/ar Conferences 
the Conservati-ves have t r a d i t i o n a l l y devoted a s ihs t an t i a l part of the 
proceedings t o discussing fore ign a f f a i r s . The table below i l l u s t r a t e s 
the number of resolutions on overseas a f f a i r s and defence xvhich have 
been debated since 1947:-
Year Number of resolutions on Total 
f o r e ign affa i rs /defence resolutions 
1947 1 20 
1948 3 28 
194 9 3 19 
1950 3 21 
1952 4 20 
1953 2 16 
1954 3 17 
1955 1 18 
1956 3 20 
1957 3 15 
1958 3 20 
1960 4 18 
1961 3 14+ 
1962 3 15+ 
1963 3 15+ 
1965 3 17 
1966 3 18 
1967 3 17 
1968 2 16 
1969 2 16 
1970 4 16 
1971 2 13 
1972 2 15 
+ = plus questions 
The s l i ^ t drop i n the number of resolutions since 1967 par t ly 
r e f l e c t s the decl in ing number of resolutions being debated overal l but 
i t may also r e f l e c t a dec l in ing preoccupation vj i th fo re ign a f f a i r s as 
an issue. To sane extent t h i s may have been associated with Heath's 
in teres ts but i t seems more l i k e l y tha t national p o l i t i c s generally 
became more preoccupied m.th domestic issues. 
I n the period immediately a f t e r the War, Churchil l was as anxious 
to avoid spec i f i c pol icy commitments on fo re ign a f f a i r s as on domestic 
issues, and conference debates consisted mainly of gsieral ised iadtionson 
the importance of the Empire and the At lan t ic All iance although the 1946 
Conference came out c lear ly i n favour of Indian independence subject to 
adeq.uate protect ion f o r minor i t i e s . 
As a r e s u l t a highly c r i t i c a l motion was submitted to the 1948 
Conference c r i t i c i s i n g the leadership for f a i l u r e to spel l out the 
par ty ' s pos i t ion c l ea r ly and c a l l i n g f o r an equivalent of fee 'Charters' 
i n fore ign a f f a i r s . The resolut ion vias successful i n i t s object and 
Eden used ihe Conference to make a major fo re ign policy statement and 
the reso lu t ion vras then withdrawn without a vote. Throughout, ;the 
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importance of relat ionships between the US, Europe and the Commonwealth 
were stressed. 
The Conference's a t t i t ude towards the United States was 
general ly sympathetic and there were frequent references to American help -
both during ihe V/ar i t s e l f and during the reconstruction. There were 
however occasional examples of h o s t i l i t y from delegates mostly occasioned 
by suspicion that America was helping to restructure world trade i n order 
to improve i t s oim trade a t the expense of B r i t a i n ' s Empire preference 
and i t was generally recognised that Empire re la t ions were of paramount 
importance. 
Much of the value of the Empire p r i o r t o the Second World War lay 
i n i t s economic strength based on protectionism and iOaperial Preference 
had been an important Conference issue i n 1928^. Although a f t e r the War 
there were constant e f f o r t s , of ten re f lec ted a t the Conference, to j u s t i f y 
the Empire's value i n philosophical terms as a p o l i t i c a l grouping 
transcending creed and colour, most Conference delegates saw i t s main 
value i n economic terms , reinforced by the defence aspect - the Empire's 
war cont r ibu t ion was f requent ly quoted. 
As a r e s u l t , much discussion centred on ihe need to bui ld up the 
Empire economicaUy. So long as the debates revolved around t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
acceptable pol ic ies such as the provision of technical and f i n a n c i a l 
assistance there was l i t t l e controversy but i t became increasingly 
apparent that B r i t a i n ' s posi t ion as an in te rna t iona l trading poorer could 
c o n f l i c t w i th Imperial Preference. 
The pre-War p ro tec t ion i s t system established under the Ottawa 
Agreement iras incompatible wi th ihe new in te rna t iona l trade arrangements 
which irere developed a f t e r the War, largely under the influence of fee 
United States. The s tructure established through ihe 1944 Bretton Woods 
Conference and developed through the Geneva Trade Conference's General 
Agreement on Trade and T a r i f f s and the Havana Charter was designed to 
remove p ro tec t ion i s t barriers v;herever possible. Although B r i t a i n t r i e d 
to safeguard the pos i t ion of Empire producers, pa r t i cu la r ly through 
reservations to fee GATT iigreement. Imperial Preference was fundamentally 
counter to the general trend of in te rna t iona l trade arranganents. 
While thev ^phasised feat fee Commonwealth was more than a trade 
preference system many Conservative supporters f e l t that fee new 
arrangements betrayed the Empire's and hence B r i t a i n ' s own in te res t s . As 
a r e s u l t there vjas strong pressure a t a series of conferences shor t ly 
a f t e r the VJar to amend the GATT Agreement4. 
1. L S Amery 'My P o l i t i c a l L i f e ' (Hutchinson 1955) P 496-497. See also 
•Conservatives and the Colonies' (CPC 1952) 
2 . I M Drummond ' B r i t i s h Economic Pol icy and the Empire' (Al len & Unwin 
1972); Times - 23 September 1952 and L D Epstein ' B r i t i s h Po l i t i c s 
i n the Suez C r i s i s ' (Pa l l MaU 1964) pp 11-20 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1962, p 67 
4 . See F Boyd ' B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s i n Transi t ion 1945-63' (Praeget 1964) 
pp 168-170 
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The 1946 Conference only pressed i n a general sort of way f o r the 
re ten t ion of Imperial Preference but the Conference the followLng year 
took place during the GATT ta lks at Geneva and passed a resolution strongly 
opposing any arrangements vMch would weaken Imperial Preference. The 
reservations made to protect the Empire d id not s a t i s f y delegates and 
the 1948 Conference passed a resolut ion c a l l i n g f o r the denunciation of 
the Geneva Trade Treaty and the Havana Charter t o the extent that they 
l i m i t e d Imperial Preference and while the fo l lowing year's resolut ion was 
more restrained i t r e i t e ra ted the Conference's be l i e f that Imperial Pre-
ference should not be modif ied . 
By 1952 the pos i t ion had a l tered s i g n i f i c a n t l y because the 
Conference was no longer urging the po l i cy on the Labour Party but upon 
i t s own Government. There continued to be strong pressure wi th in the 
par ty , l a r g e l y led by L S Amery, f o r changes to GATT^  and the conferences 
i n 1952, 1953 and 1^4 a l l carr ied resolutions urging the new Government 
t o amend those parts of the GATT Agreement which l imi t ed Imperial 
Preference. V/hen the party had been i n opposition the leadership had 
backed the demands fjar amendments to GATT. Once they were i n power, 
however, they appreciated t i iat modi f ica t ion of the Agreement might 
improve trade vrith the Commonwealth a t the expense of disastrous e f fec t s 
on the res t of B r i t a i n ' s in ternat ional trade re la t ions . As a result the 
Government's policy i n the face of 12ie Conference was to agree 1hat 
changes would be desirable but would be d i f f i c u l t to achieve and could 
not be introduced u n i l a t e r a l l y . 
Although the Crovernment's decision to apjply to GATT i n 1953 f o r 
permission to raise t a r i f f s against non-Commonwealth countries may have 
been influenced by Conference pressure i t took no steps to achieve 
general modi f ica t ion of B r i t a i n ' s GATT obligations and by 1955 the 
Conference, l ed by Peter Walker, was highly c r i t i c a l of the lack of any 
resu l t s^ . Nevertheless the Government continued to f o l l o w i t s _ 
established pol icy and although there, was f u r t h e r c r i t i c i s m i n 1956 i t 
began t o d ie out as the Conference's a t ten t ion turned to the e f fec t s of 
EEC entry on the Qommonwealth^. 
As Europe recovered from the War and a new European p o l i t i c a l 
s t ructure evolved i t vas inevi tab le that c o n f l i c t between B r i t a i n ' s role 
i n the Commonvrealth and her ro le i n Europe would grow. The Conference's 
pos i t ion had been established as early as 1949 i n a resolut ion proposed 
by Duncan Sandys!-
' t h i s Conference welcomes the creation of the Council of Europe 
and promises i t s support f o r a l l p rac t i ca l measures to promote 
closer European u n i t y , consistent with the f u l l maintenance of 
the uni ty of the B r i t i s h Empire^ ' 
1. Times - 23 September 1952 
2 . NUCTJA Conference Report 1955, PP 27-33 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1956, p 75 
4 . But see 'Expanding Obligation* (CPC 196l) 'The Expanding Commonwealth' 
(CPC 1956) UWind of Change (CPC 1960) 
5. mJCJJA Conference Report 1949, P 60 
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Although Oliver Stanley i n his reply to the same debate, 
stressed feat the Empire would have to be very d i f fe ren t i n a posij-
War environment both the Government and the Conference were as 
re luctant to back European u n i t y at the expense of the Commonwealth 
as they were to accept t h a t . B r i t a i n ' s fu tu re role was un l ike ly to be 
that of a major world povrer . 
By the mid-nineteen f i f t i e s i t was beconing inc reas i i^ ly 
apparent that B r i t a i n had missed out i n f a i l i n g t o become a founder 
member of the EEC and active consideration had t o be given to fee 
a l t e rna t ives . The 1957 Conference vjelcomed the in t roduct ion of the 
P a r t i a l European Free Trade Area and an amendment reaf f i rming- the 
importance of Commonwealth l inks and the need to keep agr icul ture 
outside the scope of the Area was defeated on Government advice 
although i t received considerable support. 
The Conference remained deeply committed to fee Commonwealth 
and the fo l lovf ing year i t congratulated the Government on i t s e f f o r t s 
at the Montreal Conference t o develop i t s economic importance, but by 
1960 i t was becoming increasingly clear that an error of judgement 
had been made i n deciding to stay outside the EEC. The Conference vrelcomed 
closer connections between EFTA and the EEC and the fo l lowing year i t 
again passed a resolut ion urging the Government to forge closer l inks with 
the EEC. By 1962 appl ica t ion fo r entry had been made and the Conference 
was welcoming the progress made i n iiie negotiations^. Throughout, much 
debate centred on the e f fec t s of EEC entry on B r i t a i n ' s relationships w i t h 
the Commonwealth and p a r t i c u l a r l y on Commonwealth produce and although the 
Conference l o y a l l y supported fee Government's vievfs there was a stroiig 
current of f ee l i ng amongst party supporters that EEC entry would damage 
B r i t i s h agr icu l tu re and Commomrealth traded. 
Once the Labour Government was i n power i n 1964 the main aspect of 
f o r e i g n pol icy v^hich had implications both f o r the Commonwealth and f o r 
B r i t a i n ' s ro l e as a vrorld power vns the East of Suez question. Both 
fac tors vreighed heavily m.th fee Conference and featured strongly i n the 
arguments i n favour of r e t a in ing an East of Suez policy at the 1965 and 
1966 ConfereiKjes, 
I n 1969 the Common Market question was resurrected as a result of 
the Labour. Government's decision to apply f o r entry. The leadership 
remained f i r m l y committed to EEC entry but found that opposition vdthin 
the j a r t y had hardened since the early nineteen-s ixt ies : -
' The Conservative leadership, thoroughly committed to the European 
idea, was embarrassed by fee facts that the public at large had 
l o s t in te res t i n fee subject, that many Tories, including Enoch 
Povrell - had reneged on t h e i r former f a i t h , and.that the Soc ia l i s t 
Government had also espoi;ised fee European cause 2 
1. For Conservative Government a t t i tude to EEC over th is period see speech 
by S i r Anthony Eden at the 1952 Conference - NUCUA Conference Report 
1952, p 3 6 
2. See also ' B r i t a i n i n to Europe' (Bow Group; 1962) 
3 . See 'A_Europe of Nations' (Monday Club 1965) 
4 . K Young 'S i r Aiec-Douglas-Home • ( j M Dent iS: Sons; 1970) p 253 
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and the Conference only endorsed EEC entry a f t e r a b a l l o t . Although 
vociferous opponents remained, the issue subsequently became less 
heated and both the 1969 and 1970 Conferences backed entry. 
The Conference's sympathy vdth the United States came t o an 
abrupt end i n 1956 wi th the Suez c r i s i s ^ The 1956 fore ign a f f a i r s 
debate was almost e n t i r e l y devoted to Suez and c lear ly showed the 
Conference's disenchantment wi th both the United States and the 
United illations which oppojed what the Conference considered to be 
B r i t a i n ' s v i t a l interests . The same debate vias also notable f o r a 
s t rongly c r i t i c a l speech from a fore ign a f f a i r s expert, V/illiam Yates 
MP, v/ho p u b l i c l y attacked the Government's Suez and Cyprus policies^ 
and two years later Cyprus was also the subject of a major fore ign 
a f f a i r s ' g a f f e ' a t the Conference viien Lennox-Boyd inadvertently 
re fe r red t o Cyprus as 'Turkey's off -shore i s l and ' and i n f u r i a t e d the 
Greeks^-. 
A f t e r Suez nuclear weapons po l i cy became an important issue. 
This was la rgely a response to the Labour Party's own in ternal 
d i f f i c u l t i e s over u n i l a t e r a l disarmament which the Conservatiyes t r i e d 
to e x p l o i t by reeemphasising the i r policy of re ta in ing a nuclear 
deterrent although at the same time the Conference had i t s ovra 
pronounced vi&ia on the need f o r an adequate conventional weapons 
c a p a b i l i t y . Despite i n i t i a l chagrine the Conference's a t t i tude 
towards the US and the United Nations mellowed rapidly once the Suez 
confronta t ion vras over while the Conference's view of B r i t a i n as a 
major world power vras sustained by Macmillan's roles i n connection 
wi th the Disarmament and Summit Conferences. B r i t a i n ' s place i n world 
a f f a i r s became a major issue once the Labour Party took o f f i c e \Jith. a 
much^more r e s t r i c t e d concept of B r i t a i n ' s r o l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y East of 
Suez-'. 
Powell shared the view that B r i t a i n should l i m i t her ccmmitments 
and at i l ie 1965 Conference he made a speech ^Mch implied that B r i t a i n 
should reconsider her. pos i t ion . I n f a c t liie Shadow Cabinet took a 
d i f f e r e n t view and there i s sane evidence thatgthis ms a s ign i f i can t 
fac tor i n the estrangement of Heath and Ponvell . I n any event PovTell's 
remarks were promptly disowned by Heath although once back i n o f f i c e the 
party had t o accept a f a i r l y l imi t ed ro l e east of Suez. 
1. See P Goodhart 'The Moderate Al l i ance ' (CPC 1957) 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1956, pp 29-38 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1956, pp 29-38. See also LD Epstein ' B r i t i s h 
P o l i t i c s i n ihe Suez C r i s i s ' (Pa l l I f e l l 1964) 
4. Economist Oct-Dec 1958, Vol 189, p 2l6 
5. See f o r example E G r i f f i t h s , D Kurd, P Tapsell , D Walters 'The Middle 
East and B r i t a i n ' (CPC 1967) 
6. A Alexander and A Watkins 'The Miaking of ifae Prime Minister 1970' 
(Macdonald 1970) p 8 1 . Also A Roth 'Heath and the Heathmen' 
(Routledge Kegan Paul 1972), p 2Q5 
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Another major fo re ign issue vras Rhodesia whidi presented a 
number of d i f f i c u l t problems f o r the leadership involv ing both the 
i n t e r n a l uni ty of the party and i t s e lectoral image. 
There was strong support w i t h i n fee party for the white Rhodesian 
se t t l e r s and although the party had ra re ly been over t ly r a c i a l i s t many 
party workers sympathised vdth the i r predicament. Furthermore, many 
party supporters had fami ly and business t ies wi th Rhodesia or f e l t debts 
of grat i tude f o r Rhodesia's war-time help t o B r i t a i n . 
V/hile recognising th is formidable body of opinion w i t h i n the 
party the leadership had to be extremely care fu l of i t s public image both 
because of the convention that fore ign policy is l a r g l y conducted on a 
non-party basis and because the b la tan t ly unconsti tut ional character of 
UDI l e f t the party open to allegations that i t vias condoning i l l e g a l 
a c t i v i t i e s . On fee other hand i t was also essential that the party should 
appear to have an independent and posi t ive view on t i iat ought to be dene 
on such a major issue . 
The f i r s t conference debate on Rhodesia was i n 1965 when fee 
Rhodesian Government was known to be ac t ive ly considering UDI although 
no f i r m decision had been taken. Seltiyn L l < ^ , on behalf of the 
Executive Committee, proposed a resolu t ion expressing fee hope that there 
wiauld be no UDI and a reso lu t ion could be found which would incorporate the 
Five Pr incip les , using the 1951 Constitution and a phased educational 
programme as i t s basis. 
Lord Salisbury and Patr ick V/all MP vrere the leaders of a 
subs tan t ia l body of opinion which favoured taking a ' s o f t ' l i n e vdth 
Rhodesia. They proposed an amendmentdeploring a,ny imposition of sanctions 
and although ihe warding i n i t s e l f would probably have been acceptable 
t o the party leadership (and i n f a c t a s i m i l a r l y worded resolut ion was 
supported by fee leadership at a subsequent conference) the at t i tudes 
imderlying i t vrere no t . Rei tera t ing h i s b e l i e f i n a negotiated settlement 
based on fee 1961 Const i tu t ion S i r Alec Douglas-Home argued feat a vote 
against sanctions vrould be misxmderstood as overt support f o r the Rhodesians 
and recommended successfully that the Conference should not vote on the 
amendment at a l l ^ . Even so the Conference's decision ms c i ted by some 
Labour MPs as one of the factors which encouraged the Rhodesians to declare 
UDI^. He vras however l a rge ly successful i n ensuring that the c o n f l i c t w i th in 
the party was temporarily patched up although fundamentally d i f f e r e n t 
approaches t o the issue vrere apparent*. 
1. See a r t i c l e extracted from H V/ilscn's Memoirs published i n Sunday Times 
25 A p r i l 1971 f o r a summary of the party 's dilemma as seen from fee 
Labour view poin t . 
2 . NUCUA Conference Report 1965, PP 123-132 
3. K Young ' S i r Alec Douglas-Home' ( j M Dent & Sons ; 1970) p 236 
4 . See also J Bi^s-Davison 'Pacing fee Pacts on Rhodesia' (Monday Club 
1965) and 'Rhodesia - A Minori ty View' (Monday Club 1966) 
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During the fo l lovj ing year UDI was declared and at ihe 1966 
Conference the Executive Committee proposed another resolution 
supporting a negotiated solut ion based on the Five Principles but 
qu i te s p e c i f i c a l l y opposing any involvement by the United Nations 
on the grounds that the dispute vjas a domestic matter between B r i t a i n ' 
and Rhodesia^. LoidSalisbviiy again submitted an amendment unequivocally 
opposing sanctions which was not chosen f o r debate but he was given 
the chance t o speak strongly against sanctions. The leadership did not 
consider that sanctions would be e f f ec t ive but i t was unwi l l ing to 
ca tegor ica l ly oppose them and secured the Conference's support f o r the 
p o l i c y put foiv^ard by Heath ea r l i e r i n the Conference lased on a 
negotiated settlement incorporating the Five Principles . 
By 1967 mandatory sanctions had been imposed. The balloted 
motion chosen f o r debate urged t h e i r removal and negotiation of a 
settlement based on the Five Principles although i t was vague about the 
exact t iming o f the removal of sanctions. TMs time Lord Salisbury 
advocated the immediate l i f t i n g of sanctions as a prelude to negotiations. 
Heath r e p l i e d to the debate personally and made i t clear that v4iile he 
was t o t a l l y opposed t o the use of f o r c e , sanctions or the imposition of 
d i r ec t r u l e , he was not prepared to commit himself to remove sanctions 
before negotiations begeui. His main theme continued hoviever to be the 
importance of achieving a negotiated settlement and he re i tera ted the 
suggestion Tihich he had made ten days ea r l i e r at Bradford that the 'T iger ' 
cons t i t u t i on should be used as a basis f o r negptiations^. The Conference 
again supported the leadership as i t did the f o l l o i r i j j g year. 
, The 1968 Conference coincided viith the opening of the 'Fearless' 
round of negotiations and as Home was anxious to avoid anything which 
might appear to prejudice the talks the Conference was persuaded to cancel 
the debate and subst i tu te a general statement of po l icy from Sir Alec 
who continued to emphasise the need f o r a negotiated settlement whi l s t 
taking some c red i t f o r his own part i n ge t t ing the 'Fearless' ta lks ^ 
s tar ted although he vras extremely cautious about forecast ing their outcome . 
U n t i l the 1970 Conference the party was i n the comparatively happy 
pos i t i on of being able to propose i t s solutions to the Rhodesia problem 
without having to,implement them although i n some respects i t found the 
impotence irksome 9 but once the party was i n power the posi t ion was 
d i f f e r e n t . The leadership was under pressure to implanent i t s polipy 
r ap id ly and the Rhodesian issue at the 1970 Conference provided a good 
example of i n t e r n a l pressure group p o l i t i c s . 
1 . For same theme see also NUCUA Conference Report 1966, p i l l 
2 . NUCUA Conference Report 1966, pp 81-88 and 35 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1967, pp 82-88 
4 . There were suggestions that the t iming T«as i n f ac t c a r e fu l l y planned 
by Wilson - see A Alexander and A Watkins 'The Miaking of the Prime 
Minis ter 1970' (Macdonald 1970) pp 50-51 but th i s was denied by 
both Home i n h i s speech and by Wilson - see Sunday Times 25 A p r i l 
1971 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1968, pp 82-84 
6. NUCUA Conference Report 1966, pp 86 
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No motion on Rhodesia was included i n the or ig ina l agenda 
prepared by the General Purposes Committee but a motion was selected 
by b a l l o t ; • I t was apparently f a i r l y innocuous : -
' That t h i s Conference cal ls f a r the immediate withdravral 
of sanctions against Rhodesia and supports the pol icy of 
Her Majesty's Government of negotiating vdth the Rhodesian 
regime t o normalise re la t ions . ' 
but i t would have obliged the Government t o discontinue sanctions before 
reopening negotiations and the proposer of the motion. Councillor 
George Pole of South Kensington was also Chairman of the Monday Club. 
The Club lobbied ac t ive ly f o r the resolu t ion and released a pamphlet on 
the issue by one of t h e i r members, Mr Tim Keigwin, a former prospective 
candidate, which vras sharply c r i t i c a l of 'the Five P r inc ip l e s . ' 
The Bow Group on fee other hand, campaigned equally a c t i v e l y to see 
the motion defeated. They ran a pa r a l l e l ccnference outside the 
Conference Hal l urging the Government not to s e l l arms to South A f r i c a 
and made strenuous e f f o r t s to persuade the conference del^ates that 
Rhodesian sanctions should not be withdrawn unless a sa t is factory s e t t l e -
ment on the basis of the 'Five Pr inc ip les ' could be negotiated. 
I n his reply to the debate S i r Alec Douglas-Home made i t clear 
that the Government's pol icy would be to l i f t sanctions at fee end of 
successful negotiat ions. He did however use the opportunity to announce 
the l i f t i n g of seme minor but irksome aspects of fee sanctions involving 
postal surcharges and the recognit ion of divorce proceedings. E f fo r t s to 
persuade delegates to wifedraw the c r i t i c a l motion were unsuccessful but 
the Conference followed his advice i n re jec t i i ig the motion by an over-
whelming major i ty^ . 
Although he had avoided being too spec i f i c at fee 1970 Conference, 
S i r Alec had dropped a broad h i n t that fee Government would re-open 
negotiations shor t ly and these led eventually to fee d r a f t settlement 
which was put to the Rhodesian people by fee Pearce Commission who found 
that i t was not generally acceptable. Although a settlement was not 
achieved much of the heat v^ as taken ou1;'of fee issue as most party"vrorkers 
f e l t that the Government had made a genuine attempt to achieve one. 
Although the agenda f o r the 1972 Conference included 36 motionSgadvocating 
removal of sanctions or implementation of the Pearce settlement no debate 
was held while at fee 1973 Conference a motion c a l l i n g f o r immediate 
removal of sanctions was again ccmfortably defeated^. 
On f o r e i g n a f f a i r s fee Conference's overal l record has been one of 
strong support f o r the leadership r e f l e c t i n g the delegates' deferent ia l 
a t t i tudes toi-rards the leadership i n an area outside feeir ovm immediate 
experience. I t is s i g n i f i c a n t therefore that fee four issues over vfhich 
there was sharp controversy at the Conference - GATT, Suez, the Common 
Market, and Rhodesia, were a l l ones where feere xrere sharp d ivis ions wi th in 
the parliamentary party and to a large extent the controversy a t the 
Conferences was generated by members of fee parliamentary party \iiO were 
1 . NUCUA Conference Report 1970, pp 61-66 
2 . NUCUA Conference Agenda 1972, pp 158-163 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1973, PP ® - 8 8 
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c lea r ly hoping to en l i s t grass roots support i n the i r e f f o r t s to apply 
pressure to tiie leadership. Equally s i g n i f i c a n t l y , however, i n every 
case'the Conference's l o y a l t y t o the leadership was s u f f i c i e n t l y strong 
t o prevent i t defeating the leadership's pol icy although the substantial 
minor i ty which opposed some pol ic ies was s u f f i c i e n t t o embarrass the 
leaders. 
I 
General 
\inaile the Conference's broad record on a l l issues has been one 
of strong support f o r the leadership i t w i l l be apparent that the 
Conference has of ten held strong viem of i t s am - pa r t i cu l a r ly on 
domestic matters w i t h i n iJie d i rec t experience of delegates - and 
althjough suggestions that the Conference's views should be binding on 
the parliamentary party have been rare , the p o s s i b i l i t y of defeat or 
evenj o f narrow v i c t o r y , can be s u f f i c i e n t l y embarrassing to ensure that 
the leadership goes out of i t s way to be conc i l i a to ry . 
I 
I I n such circumstances one common expedient i s fo r a Minister t o 
put his ovm in t e rp re t a t i on on a resolut ion and then accept the resolution 
i n the l i g h t of that i n t e rp re t a t i on . One example of this was the motion 
on the health service at the 1960 Conference;-
' That t h i s Conference is not s a t i s f i e d iri.th the Government's 
; assurance that the cost o f al lowing fore ign v i s i t o r s to p a r t i -
} cipate i n the benefits of the Na t ioml Health Service i s 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t ; that i t i s acutely conscious of the i n ju s t i c e 
of a system under which medical services are available free of 
charge to foreign v i s i t o r s , vfao cane here from countries with 
no reciprocal arrangements f o r B r i t i s h t ou r i s t s , and who nake 
no contr ibut ion idiatsoever towards paying for these services, 
e i ther by way of National -Insurance or Taxation, v i i i l e B r i t i s h 
! taxpayers who choose to consult the i r doctors pr iva te ly are 
I denied the benef i t of National Health prescriptions. I t ,urges 
' tile I4inister to put an end to this inequitable s i tua t ion ' 
The tone of the reso lu t ion and the accompanying speeches c lear ly 
advocated l e g i s l a t i o n to prevent fo re ign v i s i t o r s fj?om benef i t ing under 
the [National Health Service but the Minister merely took the opportunity 
to emphasise the Government's pos i t ion vfhich was based on extending 
reciprocal arrangements x f i th other countries and then concluded that ^ 
' I sha l l gladly accept th is r eso lu t ion as an i n v i t a t i o n to make progress ' 
i Replying t o the resolut ion on e lec tora l reform at the same 
conference the Minister made i t quite clear that he would give no under-
taking to leg is la te but concluded t h a t : -
' I f the wish of the mover of the Resolution i s that we should 
review the machinery of the e lectoral law with par t icular _ 
reference to those f i v e points , I g ladly accept the resolution » 
and the Chairman made i t clear that the M n i s t e r 'accepted the s p i r i t of 
the r e so lu t ion so long as i t did not r e s t r i c t the Government t o l e g i s l a t i o n 
on those points but embraced a whole review of the e lec tora l law . . . ' 
1 . NUCUA Conference Report 1960, p 130 
2 . NUCUA Conference Report 1960, p 130 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1960, p 139 
4 . NUCUA Conference Report 1960, p 139 
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S i m i l a r l y i n 1963 i n accepting a hos t i l e motion on pensions 
and alloviances the Minister q u a l i f i e d his acceptance by saying:-
' I would urge the Conference to accept feis motion and, i n 
doing so, I would suggest that the Conference i s accepting 
the s p i r i t and p r inc ip le o f the motion rather , perhaps, 
than the ac tual v/ording^ ' 
Although the leadership may avoid d i rec t confrontat ion with the 
Conference through such devices an increasing number of issues have 
gone to a b a l l o t i n recent years. 
Unlike the Labour Conference v/here the block voting arrangements have 
come under considerable c r i t i c i s m the Conservative conference has placed 
l i t t l e emphasis on formal votes and i t s arrangements f o r them have even 
been described as so pr imi t ive as t o cast doubt on vfhether they are 
ser iously intended t o be used^. The major i ty one way or the other i s 
usual ly so overv7helming that most questions can be decided easi ly on a 
show of hands and speakers ca l l i ng f o r a formal ba l lo t of ten f e e l obliged 
t o apologise to fee Conference f o r causing inconvenience*. 
U n t i l 1 971 the standing orders provided that a l l decisions would 
be reached on a sbox-i o f hands and a vote would only be taken i f 100 delegates 
cal led f o r one5 or the Chairman decided itgwas necessary. Up to 1967 there 
had only been one ba l l o t on a pol icy issue but thereafter the number of 
formal votes increased sharply. Even so, only eight motions were decided 
by b a l l o t between 1946 and 1973. The motions on which votes took place 
varied considerably:-
(a) 1953: a resolu t ion urging more rapid repayment of Post-VJar 
Credits was carried by 945 votes to 913 
(b) 1967: a resolut ion on education vas carr ied by 1,302 votes 
to 816 
(c ) 1969: three resolutions ended i n votes. The f i r s t was on 
c a p i t a l punishment and an amendment ca l l i ng f o r i t s 
re in t rodnot ion vras carried by 1,117 votes to 958. The 
second was on ihe Common Market and a resolut ion 
endorsing entry v/as carried by 1,452 votes to 475. The 
t h i r d vras on immigration and a resolu t ion supporting 
the par ty 's o f f i c i a l pol icy was carried by 1,349 votes 
to 954. 
1. NUCUA Conference Report 1963, p 39 
2. See f o r example R Rase 'Between Miami Beach and Blackpool' ( P o l i t i c a l 
Quarterly Oct/Dec 1972 Vol 43 No,4) pp 419-421 
3. L D Epstein ' B r i t i s h Mass Parties i n Comparison vdth American Par t ies ' 
( P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly Vol 71 1956) p 105 
4 . See f o r example NUCUA Conference Report 1969, p 92 
5. Standing Orders approved by Central Council March 1948 - SO No 11 
6. A b a l l o t vras also held i n 1950 on a procedural matter - the venue of 
the next Conference 
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(d) 1971: a second debate on the Common Market also ended i n a 
b a l l o t and a motion supporting entry ms again carr ied -
by 2,474 votes to 324. 
(e) 1972: a reso lu t ion on immigration vas carried by 1,721 votes 
to 736 
( f ) 1973: an amendment on cap i t a l punishment was carried by 1,404 
votes to 1,228 
Only three of these votes, those on PjostsVfarlCrediis and cap i t a l 
punishment represented d i rec t defeats f o r the party leadership. Three 
others - those on education and immigration represented p a r t i a l defeats 
f o r the leadership to the extent that the vote against was s u f f i c i e n t l y 
large to be a substant ia l embarrassment although the f i n a l resu l t 
endorsed the o f f i c i i l po l i cy . I n the tv/o debates on the Common Market 
the leadership's v ic to ry vras f a i r l y unequivocal and the votes viere taken 
more to quan t i fy the extent of the decision than t o establish the resul t 
of the debate. 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that seven of the eight votes took place a f t e r 
1967. To some extent t h i s may have re f l ec ted d i s sa t i s fac t ion wi th the 
leadership but i t also probably r e f l ec t ed a higher degree of a c t i v i t y 
amongst delegates. The increased number of ba l lo t s and an unsuccessful 
attempt by a delegate to c a l l f o r a b a l l o t at the 1970 Conference 
prompted the Central Council to change the Standing Orders i n 1971 to 
require support from 250 delegates instead of 100 before a ba l lo t must 
be called"!. Even so, a b a l l o t has been held i n every subsequent year. 
V/hile examples of motions which are hos t i l e but acceptable to 
the leadership subject to q u a l i f i c a t i o n are not uncommon, outr ight defeat 
of tlie leadership has been rare although not perhaps as unusual as 
sometimes supposed. 
Outright b a l l o t defeats on Post-War Credits and cap i t a l punishment 
have already been noted as vrell as p a r t i a l defeats on education and 
immigration but there have also been a number of cases \iiere opposition to 
the leadership's po l icy has been so strong that the issue has not even 
resulted i n a b a l l o t . 
The most spectacular example v/as the vridely publicised 1950 
Housing debate which pressurised the leadership i n to accepting a target 
of 300,000 houses^a year^ despite widespread doubts amongst the leaders, 
inc luding VJoolton that i t could be achieved. Probably the most s i g n i f i -
cant feature of th is debate was not the defeat imposed on the leadership 
but the f a c t that the Conference's decision was allowed to influence t he i r 
parliamentary p o l i c i e s . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , hovrever, attempts i n 1956 and 
1963 to impose targets of 300 miles of motorway and 500,000 homes a year 
respect ively werie conspicuously unsuccessful because the leadership was 
reso lu te ly opposed to them^. 
1 . Standing Order? adopted by the Central Council A p r i l 1971 (SO No l l ) 
2. NUCUA Conference Report 1950, pp 56-65. Also Times, 15, 16, 17 Oct 1950 
3. Lord Woolton ;?Hemoirs ' (Cassell 1959) See also S H Beer & A B Hlam 
'Patterns of Government' (Random 1967) p 195. For suggestions that 
the target vras only achieved through manipulation of standards see 
D V Donnison 'The Government of Housing' (Penguin 1967) pp 166-169 
4 . iroCUa. Conference Report 1956, p 105 
NOUUA Conference Report 1963, pp 26-33. A 500,000 homes a year target 
was however eventually adopted by the leadership - see 'Action Not 
Words' (Conservative Central Of f i ce 1966) 
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The 1950 Housing Debate i s the only example of the leadership 
taking a conference defeat on a major issue i n modern times but 
Macmillan appears to have accepted feat i f the Conference had voted 
against Common Market entry while he was Prime Minister i t v;ould 
probably have been impossible f o r the parliamentary party to go on . 
Defeats on minor issues id thout even a b a l l o t have however 
been more common and i t has even been suggested that 'no annual conference 
i s complete i^dthout an outburst of f e e l i n g on some lesser non-party 
question ' 
At fee 1948 Conference the ftont-bench's views on Policy fo r V^ omen 
vrere re jected. The Liber t ies of the Subject debate at fee 1955 
Conference was s trongly influenced by the Crichel Down, case and urged the 
Government to reform fee administrative t r ibunals . Alfeough the Attorney 
General pointed out that fee Government had already announced that an enquiry 
would be set up to look at fee tr ibunals and suggested that i n view of 
t h i s the motion might^be wi thdraw the Conference vrent on to pass i t vdth 
a very large ma jo r i t y^ . 
I n 1961 the leadership's pol ic ies on both education and Schedule 
'A' t axa t ion vrere defeated and another defeat on fee health services was 
only narrovjly avoided because fee proposer vathdraw his resolut ion rather 
than press i t to a b a l l o t . Another near miss occurred i n 1953 when the 
Government was lucky to avoid an embarrassing confrontation vrith fee grass 
roots party supporters over the un ivers i ty seats*. The Government was 
pledged to reintroduce feem and fee conference agenda included a resolution 
res t a t ing feat object ive. I t was fortunate f o r fee Government that the 
previous debate dragged on so long that feere vias not enough time to cover 
the subject^ because only a few days l a t e r on 20 October the Prime Minister 
had to answer i n the Commons feat fee Government had decided r e g r e t f u l l y 
that despite thei r e l ec t ion pledge the seats could not be restored". 
On a number of other occasions fee conference has come close t o a 
B i l l o t but has been dissuaded from holding one as i n 1952 when fee 
conference was c l ea r ly s p l i t over a resolution on new tovTns. As i t was 
the l a s t item of business the Chairman persuaded the delegates to register 
'a d i v i s i o n of opin ion ' rather than hold a vote which would reduce the amount 
of time available f o r speeches from the party leadership. I n 1955 the 
Chairman refused to hold a ba l lo t at the end of the Social and Health 
Services debate and i n 1965 on fee advice of fee f r o n t bench, the Conference 
i t s e l f decided not to vote on fee Rhodesian issue while fee Chairman again 
refused a b a l l o t at fee end of the Common Market debate i n 1970. 
1. Times - 23 A p r i l 1971 
2 . Times - 12 October 1953 
3. NUCUA Conference Report 1955, pp 50-54 
4. For previous h i s to ry of this question see T L Humberstone 'Universi ty 
Representation' (Hutchinson 1951) 
5. Times - 12 October 1953 
6. Times - 21 October 1953 
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Although the low number of formal votes at the Conference can 
be seen as a s ign of impotence i t i s probably more accurate to regard 
i t as an i l l u s t r a t i o n o f i t s ro le as a deliberative rather than a 
decision-making forum. This probably explains ifliy many delegates are 
re luc tan t to press issues to a vote and are o f ten content only to 
speak against resolutions or applaud speakers who oppose the leader-
ship 's p o l i c y . 
As a resu l t the voting arrangements have never been seriously 
questioned and there has been no pressure to v r e i ^ t the vot ing power 
o f consti tuent parts of the party so that cer ta in sections have heavier 
representation than others . 
Even i f the Conference has not succeeded i n d ic t a t ing major 
po l i cy issues to the parliamentary leadership, on a v/ide range of 
subjects i t has been f a r from supine. The f a c t that the Conference 
cannot impose i t s vievrs on the leadership does not mean that i t is 
without inf luence and many Conservatives would prefer to avoid a 
conference wYich had unchallenged powers to make pol icy . 
One of the immediate e f fec t s vjould be to sharpen controversy 
and hence the adverse e f f e c t vdiich heavily publicised divisions of 
opinion can have on the image of the party. The party i s anxious to 
avoid what has been described as 'the disarmingly imprudent fo r th r ighb -
ness v/ i th which so mar^ of the Labour Party seem w i l l i n g to dissect 
t h e i r party i n pub l i c . ' Another d i f f i c u l t y i s the slow, ponderous and 
rather vague \ia.y i n which any conference inev i tab ly operates because of 
i t s s ize . Even some Labour Party supporters have begun to doubt the 
value of the conference as a policy-making body:-
' The pol icy of the Conservative Party descends from on high 
' through the mouth of the Leader himself , and the annual 
conference of the party can do no more than comment on i t . 
This may be centralism carr ied too f a r , but i t works. \?hat 
the Labour Party needs i s a much smaller policy-making body 
than Cofiference, preferably the Parliamentary Committee 
supported by the Parliamentary Labour Party, v i t h Conference 
i n a ro le of c r i t i c and adviser, but not master . . . th is is 
i n f a c t the t r a d i t i o n a l re la t ionsh ip of Conference to ihe 
Parliamentary Party, the idea of Conference dominance having 
crept i n only quite recently. Nothing short o f an overn-flielming 
defeat on a v i t a l issue need then sltake the Leader's posi t ion; 
only the Parliamentary Party, which appoints him: , would be 
empowered to throw him out. He would, wi th his colleagues of 
the Parliamentary Committee, be freed from much of the need to 
placate the warring fac t ions . Decisions could be arrived at 
w i t h reasonable speed and reasonable c l a r i t y , vdth the resu l t 
t h a t , on many important matters, the public vrould have the 
inestimable bene f i t of knowing what Labour Party pol icy i s . . . 
i f the change were to be made (or rather i f the t r ad i t i ona l 
1. For practice i n other parties see for . example - S Henig and J Pinder 
(eds) 'European P o l i t i c a l Par t ies ' (Al len & Unwin 1969) pp 35, 47, 55 
P T David, R M Goldman, R C Bain 'The P o l i t i c s of National Party 
Conventions' (Brookings 1960) pp 164-192 . Also see : -
J A Storing 'Norwegian Democracy' (Al len & Umrin 1963) p 127 
2. D Houghton 'leaking MPs Accountable' ( P o l i t i c a l Quarterly; Vol 43 
NO 4 - Oct 1972) pp 375-379 
R Hornby 'Parties i n Parliament 1959-1963 The Labour Party' 
( P o l i t i c a l Quarterly, Vol 34; 1963) p 240 
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relationship of Conference to leadership were to be re-stated) 
there would be an awful row, vdth protests, possible resignations 
and recriminations and it would take a l l the nerve of the 
Leadership to ride out the storm. But unless some means can be 
found of enabling quick and clear decision to be made, feere i s 
only the iJrospect of further decline and defeat"'... ' 
and the Canadian parties have also experienced fee deadening effect vrhich 
Conference policy-making can have on fee parties' capacity to react to 
changing political situations^. 
The temperament of the Conservative Pariy is such that i t finds 
a fair ly autocratic style of policy-making acceptable and so long as 
this remains fee case there are clearly strong practical advantages in 
keeping the relationship between fee Conference and the Parliamentary 
Party as one in which fee Conference confines its role to. one of 
providing:-
' an opportunity for examining the mood of the party - and 
the Parliamentary members will not be insensitive to any 
clear expression of that mood . . . fee Conferences are not, 
hovrever. instruments of popular control over policy or over 
leaders* ' 
1. 'Let's Pace the Future' (Anon) (Political Quarterly Vol 31) 1960 
See also G V/illiams & B Rded 'Dennis Healey' (Sidgwick & Jackson 
1971) p 268 
2. J R Williams 'The Conservative Party of Canada' (Duke UP 1956) p 107 
3. 'The Party Conferences - Reality and Illusion of Popular Control' 
Times - 29 September 1952. See also A.H.Hanson & li.Walles 'Governing 
Britain' (Fontana 1970) pp 52-53 
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6. THE CONFERENCE AND THE PARTY LEADERSHIP 
Elections f o r o f f i c e can play an important part i n party conferences 1 
and usual ly t h i s i s because the Conference i s the f i n a l cons t i tu t iona l 
au thor i ty i n the party or i n order to ensure that the successful candidate 
i s f u l l y i d e n t i f i e d vdth the pol ic ies of the party and enjoys i t s 
unquestioned support. Thus^ although the roles of leader of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party and leader of the extra-parliamentary party are theore t i ca l ly 
separate the posi t ion of a leader of the PLP who could not command the support 
of the Conference at the extra parliamentary party 's leadership e lect ion would 
probably be untenable because he would have been cut o f f from the f i n a l source 
of party authori ty^. 
The U.S. National Nominating Conventions are t yp i ca l of the second kind 
of conference. Their only important func t ion i s to select the Presidential 
candidate and i d e n t i f y him f i r m l y i n the publ ic ' s mind,with the party label 
and although some discussion of the party platform does take place i t s 
importance i s e n t i r e l y secondary to that of choosing and publ ic is ing the party 's 
p res ident ia l candidate^. 
I t i s therefore a s i g n i f i c a n t ind ica t ion o f the Conference's place i n the 
Conservative Par ty 's s t ructure that i t plays no part i n the selection of the 
party leadership. The Party Leader himself i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y chosen by the 
parliamentary party and although t he i r decision i s presented f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n 
a t a meeting which i s attended by representatives of the National Union's 
Executive Committee neither the National Union nor the Conference play any 
s i g n i f i c a n t part i n the select ion process. Appointments to fee Shadow Cabinet 
are the personal prerogative of the Party Leader as i s theoholce of Chairman 
of the Party Organisation and even the President and Chairman of the National 
Union who were elected by the Conference u n t i l the Second World War are now 
chosen by the Central Council rather than the Conference i t s e l f * . 
Although Churchi l l used the 1954 Conference as an opportunity to confirm 
Eden's pos i t ion as h is successor he made i t quite clear that he was t e l l i n g 
the Conference rather than asking f o r i t s approval : 
" You may be qui te sure that we shal l se t t l e our a f f a i r s i n 
the fu tu re between ourselves, governed only by what we believe 
to be the greatest in teres t of the public service and also the 
fortunes of our pa r ty . . . 5 ." 
1. See f o r example G.K. Roberts' "West German P o l i t i c s " (Macmillan 1972) 
pp 53-54 L.LeDuc 'Party Decision-Making:Some Empirical Observations on the 
rship Sele^ctio^. P r < ^ e ^ ; ^ ^ ^ | i ^ "^XJ.^ s^k^i^rV^tftl^^^^^^^^^ &Sr^^\\Hf'^'^ 
p 382 • 
3. For (somewhat dated but s t i l l relevant) c r i t i c i s m of excessive preoccupation 
of U.S. Conventions wi th f i l l i n g o f f i c e s rather than discussing po l icy . 
See J.K. Pollock "The B r i t i s h Party Conference" (American P o l i t i c a l Science 
Review June 1938) p 525 f f . 
4. See J.D. Hofftaan "The Conservative Party i n Opposition 1945-51" (MacGibbon 
& Kee 1964) p 123. 
5. Times 11th October 1954 
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As a res u l t the 1963 Conference provides the only example i n modem 
times of a Conference which may have had some i d e n t i f i a b l e influence on the 
choice of party leader. 
During 1963 Macmillan was under heavy attack and there was considerable 
speculation that he would resign as a leader^ although i t seems almost certain 
that he had i n fact decided to carry on and intended to use the Conference as 
an opportunity to announce a f i r m decision to lead the party into the next 
General Election i n 1964^. Fortuitously his i l l n e s s became c r i t i c a l j u s t 
before the Conference opened and consequently much of the i n - f i g h t i n g between 
his potential successors took place during the Conference. The spectacle was 
not altogether edifying^. The atmosphere was emotional and a number of 
observers were highly c r i t i c a l including the Times :-
" I t i s hoped the decision can be moved away from Blackpool. 
The atmosphere there i s unhealthy. With a l l the hob-nobbing 
i n h o tel rooms, the gossip and the rumours, the Conference 
i s resembling an American nominating convention." The Cabinet 
i s said to have one candidate, the Parliamentary Party another, 
and the constituency associations a t h i r d . However undemocratic 
i t may be to say so, the less the constituency associations 
have to do with the matter the better. They are p o l i t i c a l l y 
naive, hopelessly inexperienced i n the art of government, and 
not to be trusted with anything so serious "4 
The Times' reservations were shared by many senior members of the party 
including Lord Poole:-
" I f only we had had the sense to hold the news up u n t i l 
Saturday, the whole thing would never have got out of control. 
I should never have allowed Home to read that l e t t e r out on 
the Thursday; the trouble was we'd both promised Macmillan that 
we'd do i t then. But keeping that promise was probably the 
biggest blunder I ever made i n p o l i t i c s . , , " ^ 
The Conference did not have any formal part i n choosing Macmillan's 
successor but i t happened to be the stage on which a good deal of the 
manofitBft-ing between r i v a l candidates took place^. 
1. A. Howard "The Making of the Primeo Minister" (Cape : 1965) pp 50-61 
2. See f o r example Lord Swinton "Sixty Years of Povrer" (Hutchinson 1966 
pp 188-189 But c.f G. Hutchinson "Edward Heath" (Longman 1970) p 123 
3. J. B i f f e n "The Conservative Opportunity" (Babford and Conservative Party 
Conference : 1965) pp189-190, 
4. Times 11th October 1965. 
5. A. Howard "The Making of the Prime Minister" (Cape : 1965) p. 72 
6. For suggestions the Conference should have chosen the leader see 
H. Berkeley "Crossing the Floor" (Allen & Unwin 1972) p. 29 
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This could have given Hailsham some i n i t i a l advantage over the other 
candidates because of his popularity with the constituencies^ but i n fact 
i t may well have prejudiced his chances i n the subsequent p o l l i n g of the 
Parliamentary Party because there i s some evidence to suggest that the 
v u l g a r i t y of his peerage disclaimer and the excesses of his- constituency 
supporters actually antagonised the Parliamentary Party^, Although blatant 
support from the constituencies probably damaged Hailsham, lack of , 
enthusiasm from them may have been equally damaging f o r Butler and Maudling. 
The Conference probably also played a s i g n i f i c a n t part i n Home's success. 
Through sheer chance his position as President of the National Union enabled 
him to make a l i m i t e d number of d i g n i f i e d public appearances without appearing 
to be promoting his own interests , w*iich contrasted favourably with Hailsham's 
blatant campaigning. 
As a r e s u l t , although Home was not chosen by the Conference his selection 
can be said to have:-
" begun at the Conservative conference i n Blackpool, at least 
to the extent that his candidacy was successfully launched while 
certain other aspirants had been rather d e f i n i t e l y eliminated 
by the time the centre of a c t i v i t y shifted back to London..."^ 
Clearly i t was u n l i k e l y that the choice of a new leader would coincide 
with the Conference again i n the foreseeable future but the unwelcome 
p u b l i c i t y which the Conference had attracted to the intrigue which almost 
ine v i t a b l y went vath the t r a d i t i o n a l process of 'emergence' was a si g n i f i c a n t 
f a c t o r i n both Home's and the parliamentary party's subsequent decision to 
introduce a conventional election to choose the next leader.5 
11 i s si g n i f i c a n t however that neither the National Union nor the 
Conference were to play any part i n the new procedure and i t v;as generally 
accepted that the choice should remain vested i n the parliamentary party -
only the mechanics of selection were altered and not the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power. 
While there may be a natural presumption that i t would be more 'democratic' 
i f the leader of the Conservative party were to be elected by the Conference a 
case can be made that i t would actually be less so. One aspect was articulated 
by the Times i n i t s c r i t i c i s m s of the 1963 Conference when i t suggested that 
the Conference was unable to assess candidates on adequate c r i t e r i a . This view 
i s shared to some extent by Professor Williams based on Canadian experience : 
1. Hailsham was also widely assumed to be Macmillan's ovm preference -
see K. Young 'Sir Alec Douglas-Home' (Dent ; 1970) p. 165 and 
R. Bevins 'The Greasy Pole' (Hodder & Stoughton: 1965) p. 142 
2. R. S. Churchill 'The Fight f o r the Tory Leadership' (Heinemann 1964) 
pp 100 109 
A. Roth 'Heath and the Heathmen' (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1972) pp 171-174 
D. McKie and C. Cook 'The Decade of D i s i l l u s i o n - B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s i n the 
Sixties' (Macmillan : 1972) p 22-23 
r, Macleod 'The Tory Leadership' Spectator 17th Januaiy 1964 
3. A. Howard 'The Making of the Prime Minister' (Cape 1965) p. 69 
R. S. Churchill 'The Fight f o r the Tory Leadership' (Heinemann 1964) p. 120 
4. E. Janosik 'The American Nominating Convention' (Parliamentary A f f a i r s 
Vol 17 1963-64) p. 325 
5. P. Goodhart 'The 1922' (Macmillan 1973) 
Times 23rd July 1973 
G. Sparrow 'R.A.B. Study of a Statesman' (fO-dhams 1965) p. 216 
- 113 -
" There are a number of cogent reasons f o r believing that the 
parliamentaiy party i s better q u a l i f i e d than the rank and f i l e 
membership of the party to select a national leader. Foremost 
among these are that the caucus i s more l i k e l y to be impressed 
by parliamentary competence and experience and less by national 
notoriety; more by young men with a future than by old men with a 
a past; and more by the prospect of strengthening the party f o r 
the long p u l l and less by considerations of immediate electoral 
appeal. Moreover, delegates to conventions are more inclined to 
be f i c k l e i n the face of defeat and to demand the head of a 
leader who i s unable to p u l l v i c t o r y out of the bag on the f i r s t 
draw.." ^  
Such e l i t i s t arguments clearly beg questions about the v a l i d i t y of a wider 
range of 'democratic' procedures - i f f o r example the r e l a t i v e l y well-
infonned members of a party conference are judged to be incapable of making 
.avalid choice between party leaders, are the even more ill-informed members 
of the electorate at large r e a l l y to be trusted with choosing the President 
of the United States or p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a B r i t i s h General Election which 
to a large extent i s now a choice between r i v a l Prime Ministers? On the 
other hand i t can be argued that the party conference i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y 
U-nrepresentative of the electorate at large as d i s t i n c t from being u n f i t t e d 
to choose at a l l on the grounds that i n d i r e c t assemblies are pa r t i c u l a r l y 
amenable to control by the existing party hierarchy. 
Irrespective of whether the Conference has, or indeed ought to have, 
any s i g n i f i c a n t influence over the choice of leader, i t plays an important 
part i n the on-going relationship between the leadership and the grass roots 
party. I t provides a valuable opportunity f o r the leader to communicate his 
views and his general image both to party supporters and to the electorate at 
larges. The effec t of the Conference on party workers i n t h i s area can be 
aWged from the fact that 709S of the delegates interviewed af t e r the I967 
'Conference a t a time vrhen Heath was under heavy c r i t i c i s m thought that the 
Conference had improved t h e i r opinion of Heath. 
The dominant position occupied by the party leadership remains a noticeable 
feature of the Conference ' and i s not only conceptual but also physical - the 
platform speakers even occupy a rostrum which i s set apart from, and higher 
than, that used by the f l o o r speakers, unlike the U.S. nominating conventions 
the leadership operates from the Convention f l o o r ^ . 
To some extent t h i s r e f l e c t s the general tone of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l l i f e . 
As Christoph has noted : 
" Despite i t s basically democratic content, B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l 
society i s suffused with a r i s t o c r a t i c habits of mind, so that 
the conduct of government i s s t i l l regarded v/ith a degree of awe 
by the populace who are less inclined than Americans to demand 
f u l l exposure of the a c t i v i t i e s of r u l i n g groups." ^ 
T! J. R. Williams "The Conservative Party of Canada" (Dvike UP 1956) p 107 
2. M. Duverger " P o l i t i c a l Parties" (Methuen 1964) pp 135-40 
3. E. A. Nordlinger "The Working Clan Tories" (MacGibbon & Kee 1967) p 20 
4. For comment on these aspects see M. Shaw "An-American Looks at the Party 
Conferences" (Parliamentary A f f a i r s ; Vol 15 ; 1961/2) p 203 
5. J. B. Christoph "The Press & P o l i t i c s i n B r i t a i n and America" ( P o l i t i c a l 
Quarterly; Vol 34; I963) p 144 
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I t s origins are largely h i s t o r i c a l : -
" The three major p o l i t i c a l parties are the children of 
the nation's p o l i t i c a l history. The Conservative and 
L i b e r a l Parties a l i k e s t i l l show characteristics of the 
p o l i t i c s of the early 19th, and indeed, the 18th century, ^ 
when Party allegiance sat more l i g h t l y on the legislators..." 
and stem from the fact that the party was orientated towards Parliament long 
before any mass party organisation had developed:-
" I n the Conservative Party the leader preceded the Conference... 
There was a Tory Party i n Parliament f o r more than 150 years before 
there was any Conservative organisation i n the country and f o r 
about 200 years before there was a party conference. The party 
i n the House of Commons or the House of Lords necessarily had to 
have a leader, and the leader was often called upon to take quick 
decisions on the f l o o r of the house. Sometimes he was able to 
sound his followers at leisure, but frequently he would not be 
able to obtain more guidance than could be obtained from whispered 
consultations on the f r o n t bench, and occasionally he might be 
cal l e d upon to take quick decisions on his own responsibility 
while standing on his feet i n debate. Even during the recesses, 
when communication with other members was slow and uncertain, he 
might f i n d himself called upon to take decisions on policy with 
l i t t l e opportunity of consultation. I n such circumstances i t 
was inevitable that the leaders of the Whig and Tory parties should 
be invested with great re s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the formulation of policy." 
This natxiral strength of the leadership's position has been reinforced by 
a number of factors including the continuity of the leadership,5 and the fact 
that the leader has never been beholden to the Conference f o r electing him to 
his p osition. As a r e s u l t the position u n t i l 1964 was as described by Finer:-
"..although the Leader does not normally attend the annual conferences 
of the National Union, he customarily addresses a mass meeting of 
the delegates immediately a f t e r the conference has adjourned. The 
Leader on these occasions frequently refers to the deliberations and 
resolutions of the conference and may, indeed, indicate that he 
approves of some or a l l of t h e i r decisions. But he i s , of course, 
i n no way bound by these decisions; they are merely "conveyed" to him 
so that he may be kept constantly aware of the mood and opinions of 
his followers..."4 
and although from 1965 onwards Heath did i n f a c t attend the conferences through-
out, i n otheriBspects the s i t u a t i o n has changed very l i t t l e . The Conference 
can however embarrass the leadership as the succeeding chapter on the mass media 
shows while equally i t can provide him with valuable support'' and even c r i t i c a l 
conference debates "can be to the leader's advantage i n that he can face and 
overcome his c r i t i c s ^ . 
1. D. Clarke "The Organisation of P o l i t i c a l Parties" ( P o l i t i c a l Quarterly; 
Vol. 34; 1963) P 144 
2. I . Bulmer-Thomas "How Conservative Policy i s Foimed" ( P o l i t i c a l Quarterly; 
Vol. 24; 1953) P 190 
3. M. Shaw "An American looks at the Party Conferences" (Parliamentary A f f a i r s 
Vol. 15 1961/62) p 204 
4. S.E. Finer et a l "Back Bench Opinion i n the House of Commons 1955-59" 
(Pergamon 1961) c.f. also H.W. Ehrmann " P o l i t i c s i n France" (Little^Broyn 
5. see f o r example.Lord Avon " F u l l Circle-The Memoirs of S i r Anthony Eden" 
Canells I96O) p 508 on the 1955 Llandudno Conference ,also C. King "The Cecil King Diary 1965-1970" (Cape 1972J pp 160,213,292 
6. R. M. Punnett " B r i t i s h Government and P o l i t i c s " (Heinemann 1970) p 118 
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Furthermore there i s a good case f o r arguing that: 
" I t i s wrong, however, to assume the existence of near absolute 
leadership control because outright defeat or veto are rare. I t 
i s precisely becuase they can occur:- that, before taking action 
party leaders t r y to secure that they have or can gain majority 
support f o r t h e i r proposals"^ 
and although the leadership's r i g h t to follow a d i f f e r e n t policy i s broadly 
recognised, an irreconcilable s p l i t on a ma:jor issue could eventually make 
the leadership's position untenable. I t i s a significant indicator of the 
party's general approach to p o l i t i c s however that neither side has ever 
pressed an issue to t h i s point since the V/ar, 
1, P. Y. Medding "A Framework f o r the Analysis of Power i n P o l i t i c a l Parties" 
( P o l i t i c a l Studies Vol. XVIII No,'-1 1970) pp 1-17 
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7. MASS MEDU AMD THE COMFEREMCE 
Ifhil e the Conference plays an important part i n relations between 
party a c t i v i s t s and the parliamentary leadership, heavy media coverage 
of the Conference has also given i t a role tofO-ay i n Influencing the 
relationship between the party and the electorate at large. 
The Conference has become a major public relations exercise for 
the party and although the B r i t i s h party conferences have never attracted 
the same saturation coverage as the DS Nominating Conventions ihey 
provide an important opportunity^ f o r the party to put itsinage and 
policies over to the electorate . While the opportunity i s a t t r a c t i v e 
i t i s not without problems - media coverage may exaggerate internal 
divisions i n the party, r e c a l c i t r a n t minorities may publicise viexra which 
embarrass the leadership, and reactionary f l o o r speakers may tend to give 
the party an image which i t would rather avoid, Neverthel4ss the party 
leadership has a c t i v e l y encouraged media coverage of the conference aid 
although there does not appear to be much evidence that i t has increased 
the conference's responsiveness to public opinion as i t appears to have 
done i n the US^ , party managers have certainly become mere thoughtful 
about the image wMch i t progects and make positive e f f o r t s to t r y and con-
t r o l the sort of events which might embarrass the party i n the eyes of 
the public. 
Television 
Television i s probably the most important single source of p o l i t i c a l 
infoimation f o r the average member of the electora;te and a survey 
conducted by the Opinion Research Centre i n 1970 shovred that 5Sfo of the 
population thought that t e l e v i s i o n 'did most to help them understand what 
i s going on i n B r i t a i n ' with nevra bu l l e t i n s and current a f f a i r s programmes 
as tiie most favoured types of programme^ :-
Nev7s b u l l e t i n s 58 
Current a f f a i r s programmes 34 
Party p o l i t i c a l broadcasts 4 
Don't know v 4 
- the poor r a t i n g attached to party p o l i t i c a l broadcasts confirms ihe low 
value placed on them during election studies and i s probably attributable 
to I h e i r boring presentation and public d i s t r u s t of overt propaganda-'.. 
1. For analysis of time/space given by media to conference coverage see 
J Trenaman & D McQuail 'Television and the P o l i t i c a l Image', : 
(•Methuen 1961) p 59 
2. Heath's decision to attend the 1965 and subsequent conferences was 
reputedly influenced by tiie prospect of additional television 
exposure - see A Roth 'Heath and the Heathmen' (Routledge Kegan 
Paul 1972) p 191 
3. See PT David, RM Goldman, RC Bain 'The P o l i t i c s of National Party 
Conventions' (Vintage 1964) pp 24-28 
4. Sunday Times - 10 May 1970, See also E W Cheater 'Radio & Television 
i n American P o l i t i e s ' (Sheed and Ward 1969), Also D Butler & D Stokes 
' P o l i t i c a l Change i n Britain'(Penguin 1971) pp 269-271 and J Day and 
D Fisher- 'B r i t i s h l i f e and Institutions'(Dobson 1973) pp 23-46 
5. See f o r example D Butler & M Pinto-Duschinsky 'The B r i t i s h General 
Election of 1970' (Macmillan 1971) pp 109 and 199-230. See also 
N Swallow 'Factual Television' (Focal Press 1966) p 116 and 
JG Blumler and D McQuail 'Television i n P o l i t i c s - I t s Uses and 
Influence' (Faber 1968) 
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Conference coverage involves an element of a l l tiiree types of 
presentation . Whilst the conference i s taking place i t usually 
occupies a f a i r proportion of most nem programmes; there are also a number 
of current affairs-type programmes containing conference excerpts plus 
discussion; and i n recent years the entire conference proceedings have 
been broadcas-Eralthough s t r i c t l y speaking they do not late as ft«rta.poliht«.L 
Since 1954 the conferences have received detailed television 
coverage i n some form. Although t h i s i s now well-established, i t s 
introduction caused some controversy. In July 1 953 the BBC offered to 
cover both the Conservative and Labour Conferences but the Labour Party 
refused to give f a c i l i t i e s and was strongly supported by a Times leader 
which argued that l i v e coverage of the whole conference would bore the 
public while p a r t i a l coverage would encoiarage parties to juggle business 
to make the most of the available time and edited versions would place an 
unacceptable e d i t o r i a l burden on the BBC. I t was also suggested that 
t e l e v i s i o n coverage would devalue Uie r d e of the delegates:-
' the delegates i n the h a l l would no longer matter. I t would 
be the potential spectators outside to whom everything would 
be addressed ... ' 
An active correspondence ensued i n which Sir Edward Errington, the 
Chairnan of the National Union's Executive Committee alleged that the 
BBC's decision to withdraw a l l coverage i n view of the Labour Party's 
refusal meant Ihat the Labour Party xras being allowed to 'veto' coverage 
of the Conservative Conference^. Morgan P h i l l i p s , the General Secretary 
of the Labour Party r e p l i e d that the offer had been turned down 'for that 
year only' because there had been no opportunity to consult the conference 
i t s e l f - ^ , while Lord Hailsham claimed that the BBC's obligation to give 
the parties 'equal time' would have been met by offe r i n g coverage to both 
parties irrespective of ndiether they decided to accept or not^. 
I n any event the BBCirithdrew i t s offer and at the 1953 Conference 
Errington reiterated his c r i t i c i s m of the Labour Party 'veto' and 
suggested that:-
• we should not discuss t h i s matter except when i t i s certain,, 
that a decision by this conference can i n fact be carried out ... ' 
By the follovring year, however, the Labour Party had agreed and 
there was some r e s t r i c t e d coverage. Detailed coverage began i n 1955 and 
now runs at a substantial l e v e l . 
1. Times - 25 September 1953. Many of the arguments against te l e v i s i n g 
the conference are identical to those against televising Parliament. 
For a summary see R Day 'The Case f o r Televising Parliament' 
(Hansard Society 1963). Also R Day 'Television: A Personal Report' 
(Hutchinson 1961) 
2. Times, 6 October 1953 and Times, 9 October 1953 
3. Times, 8 October 1953 
4. Times, 8-October 1953 
5. NUCUA Conference Report 1953, P 28 
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TABLE 7.1 BBC TELEVISION AUDIENCE 
Date Time 
of UK 
Populati on 
UK B I p 
Public 
UK B I I ] 
Public 
1955 6 Oct 2130 hrs 8.3 I 
7 2130 11.2 I 8 1930 9.5 ^  
1956 11 Oct 2250 8 
12 2245 6 
13 2245 10 
1957 10 Oct 2245 6 13 7 
11 2245 6 15 7 
12 2245 9 24 9 
1958 8 Oct 2245 6 14 6 
9 2245 7 17 8 
10 2245 4 13 4 
11 2245 10 25 11 
1960 12 Oct 2245 2 7 2 
13 2245 4 12 3 
14 2245 3 11 3 
15 1515 5 8 6 
2245 7 14 7 
1961 11 Oct 2245 3 10 3 
12 2245 3 5 3 
13 2245 5 12 5 
14 2245 5 17 5 
1962 10 Oct 2245 3 7 3 
11 1445 3 
1545 2 
2245 5 12 6 
12 2245 3 8 4 
13 2245 5 14 6 
1963 9 Oct 2245 5 
10 1425 1 
2310 7 
11 1610 1 
2250 6 
12 2205 11 
1964 13 Oct 0930 I 6 
1030 I 
1125 I 1430 I 
1530 ^  
1630 ^  
2255 5!8 
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TABLE 7.1 (contd) 
^ of UK UK B I 2 UK B I I I , 
Date Time Population Public Public 
1965 14 Oct 0930 ^  hrs 0,1 
1030 i 0,1 
1125 5 
1430 I 0.1 
1530 I 0.2 
1630 ^ 0.1 
2255 3.1 
15 Oct 0930 
1030 
1125 
1430 I 0.1 • 
1530 I O.lg 
1630 5 . ^ 
2255 3.8 
16 Oct 1015 
1130 
5 
5 
2145 6.3 
1966 12 Oct 0930 5 
1125 I 0.1 
1430 ^  0.1 
2215 11.6 
13 Oct 0930 
1125 
1430 
1530 I 0.1 
1630 ^  0.2 
2230 9.0 
14 Oct 0930 
1030 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
1125 
1430 
1530 
1630 
2220 9.6 
15 Oct 1015 
1100 
2340 2.7 
1967 18 Oct 0930 5 
1125 I 0.1 5 
2255 21.5 
1430 
2050 16.7 
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TABLE 7.1 (contd) 
1967 
Date Time 
% of m. 
Population 
19 Oct 0930^hrs 0,1 
1150^ • 
1430^ 0.1 
2050 22.5 
2320 3.4 
20 Oct 0930^ • 
1125^ • 
1430^ • 
2050 15.4 
2325 1,4 
21 Oct 1100^ 0,1 
2205 22,2 
2330 2,4 
UK B I UK B I I I -
Public Public ^ 
1. U n t i l 1959» number of persons over 16 years vieidng the progranme, 
expressed as a percentage of t o t a l UK population over 16. I n 
1960 the basis ma changed to viewers over 5 years, expressed as 
a percentage of t o t a l UK population over 5. 
2. Number of persons vievang the programme vrho could receive BBC only, 
expressed as a percentage of the UK population able to receive 
BBC only, 
3. Number of persons vievdng the programme who could receive BBC and ITV, 
expressed as a percentage of the UK population able to receive BBC 
and ITV. 
4. Programne available i n London area only. Total audience expressed as 
a percentage of Ihe t o t a l population i n London region. 
5. BBC2. A l l other prcgranmes are BBC1 or equivalent. 
6. . = less than 0,1^ 
(Source: BBC Audience Research Department) 
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TABLE 7.2 ITV TELEVISION AUDIENCE 
^ of UK 
1957 
1958 
1960 
1961 
1962 
19.63 
Date Time Populat 
10 Oct 2245 hrs 4 
11 2245 4 
12 2200 7 
8 Oct 2300 3 
9 2300 4 
10 2300 4 
11 2300 5 
12 Oct 2305 4 
13 2310 3 
14 2300 5 
15 2230 6 
11. Oct 2305 3 
12 2305 3 
13 2300 4 
14 2305 6 
10 Oct 0930 
1410 
1545 
1640 
1845 
2315 
11 Oct 0925 
1410 
1640 
1845 
2245 
2300 
2325 
12 Oct 0930 
1405 
1525 
1540 
1850 
2315 5 
13 Oct 1355 • 
2305 7 
9 Oct 0915 • 
1415 • 
1645 • 
2300 1 
2310 3 
10 Oct 0915 • 
1415 • 
1645 • 
2300 3 
2310 • 
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TABLE 7.2 (contd) 
^ of UK ^ 
Date Time Population 
1963 11 Oct 
12 Oct 
1965 13 Oct 
14 Oct 
15 Oct 
16 Oct 
1966 12 Oct 
13 Oct 
14 Oct 
1400 hrs • 
1415 • 
1545 • 
2245 6 
2325 • 
2330 2 
1000 • 
1150 • 
1500 • 
1625 • 
1815 0.8 
1835 
2330 2.4 
1000 0.1 
1155 0.1 
1500 0.1 
1600 0.1 
1630 • 
2310 1.6 
0930 • 
1145 • 
1455 0.1 
1600 • 
1630 • 
2325 1.4 
2340 1.5 
1130 • 
1230 • 
2325 1.2 
2340 . 1.1 
0930 0.2 
1030 0.3 
1155 0.3 
1500 0.6 
1600 0.5 
2315 0.1 
2350 0.7 
0930 0.1 
1030 • 
1155 0.2 
1455 0.4 
1600 0.5 
2310 3.5 
2355 0.6 
0930 0.1 
1030 0.2 
1145 0.1 
1500 0.4 
2315 1.4 
2335 • 
2350 0.4 
2359 • 
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TABLE 7.2 (contd) 
of UK 
Date Time Population 
1966 
1967 
15 Oct 1015 hrs • 
1115 • 
2100 4,9 
2340 1,0 
18 Oct 0930 0,1 
1030 0.1 
1130 0.3 
1455 • 
1610 • 
19 Oct 0930 0.2 
1030 0.2 
1200 0.2 
1500 0.5 
1545 0.6 
20 Oct 0930 0.1 
1145 0.3 
1430 0.2 
21 Oct 1100 11.2 
1, U n t i l 1954 number of persons over 16 years viewing the programme 
expressed as a percentage of the t o t a l UK population of 16, I n 
1960 the basis was changed to viewers over 5 years as a 
percentage of t o t a l UK population over 5. 
2, . = less iiian 0.1^ 
(Source: BBC Audience Research Department) 
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REACTION INDICES Table 7o4 
Date Time Reaction 
1956 11 October 2250 hrs 65 
12 October 2245 65 
13 October 2245 66 
1957 10 October 2245 59 
11 October 2245 56 
12 October 2245 61 
1958 8 October 2245 60 
9 October 2245 64 
10 October 2245 64 
11 October 2245 59 
1960 12 October 2245 57 
13 October 2245 63 
14 October 2245 61 
15 October 2245 62 
1961 11 October 2245 63 
12 October 2245 65 
13 October 2245 62 
14 October 2245 61 
1962 10 October 2245 60 
11 October 1445 62 
1545 62 
2245 60 
12 October 2245 57 
13 October 2245 61 
1963 9 October 2245 60 
10 October 2310 65 
11 October 2250 67 
12 October 2205 62 
1965 13 October 2255 59 
15 October 2255 61 
16 October 2145 57 
1966 12 October 2215 65 
13 October 2230 66 
14 October 2220 66 
15 October 2240 56 
18 October 2050 56 
2255 55 
19 October 2050 59 
2320 54 
20 October 2050 55 
21 October 2205 55 
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Audience s i z e i s c l e a r l y an important indicator of the 
influence of conference television coverage.. The available data 
i s not comparable as between the BBC and ITV audiences but 
study of samples of the material for the period 1955-1967 does give 
a f a i r l y good indication of public i n t e r e s t i n the conference 
(See Tables 7.1i 7.2 and 7 
Between 1954 and 1962 t e l e v i s i o n coverage was mostly re s t r i c t e d 
to evening summaries of the proceedings although after 1960 there 
xirere occasional afternoon programmes. I n 1962 and 1965 ITV and the 
BBC respectively started intensive day time l i v e coverage. The 
audience figures show that the demand for t h i s i s very r e s t r i c t e d , 
l a r g e l y r e f l e c t i n g Ihe effects of day time employment and the more 
r e s t r i c t e d a v a i l a b i l i t y of the programmes - the BBC coverage i s on BBC2 
and tiie ITV coverage i s not taken ly a l l of the network. Even so, the 
numbers watching day time prpgramnes are quite substantial i n absolute 
terms and low coverage at this time i s more than compensated for by the 
very large audience which watches the evening programmes and the 
closing speech on Saturday. There are also some indications that 
i n t e r e s t both i n day time and evening programmes i s increasing. 
Although detailed qualitative information on the effects of 
Conference programmes on the p o l i t i c a l opinions of viewers i s not 
a v a i l a b l e and vras beyond the scope of t h i s study because of the large 
sampling frame required^ some infomation on viewers' attitudes to , 
the conference coverage i s available from ihe BBC's 'Reaction Index' . 
I t i s based on questionnaire returns from a panel viio are asked 'to 
sum up their reactions' about programmes i n terms of 'enjoyment or 
i n t e r e s t ' using a five-point scale - A+, A, B, C, C- with A+ covering 
programmes 'of exceptional enjoyment or i n t e r e s t ' and C- covering 
'extreme di s t a s t e , d i s l i k e or boredom'. 
V/hile the survey gives no indication of fee effect of programmes 
on the p o l i t i c a l views of viewers i t does r e f l e c t t h e i r interest in 
the conferences although audience reaction i s highly s\ibjective and 
one has to be cautious about reading undue significance into minor 
fluctuations i n the figures. 
The reaction indices for the BBC programmes during the period 
1956-1967 were remarkably consistent and show that the programmes were 
regarded as s l i g h t l y above average by viewers (see Table 7.4). The 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of 'scores' was also consistent as fee following figures 
for fee evening t e l e v i s i o n programmes i n 1963^ show:-
1, For assessments of methods, see 'Audience Research i n fee United 
Kingdom' (BBC 1966); A. Mitchell 'The Decline of Current 
A f f a i r s Television' ( P o l i t i c a l Quarterly Vol 44 1975) pp 127-156; 
and D Butler and M Pinto - Duschinsky 'The B r i t i s h General 
E l e c t i o n of 1970' (ifecmillan 1971) p 227 
2. For infonnation on s i z e of sampling frames etc see J Trenaman & D McQuail 
•Television and fee P o l i t i c a l Image' (Methuen 1961) and IT Swallow 
•Factual Television' (Focal Press; 1966) 
5. For details of methods used i n compiling the index see 'Audience Research 
i n the United ICLngdom' (BBC; 2nd Edition 1966) 
4. Audience Research Report T VR/65/576 (4 Nov 1963) 
- 128 -
Reaction Index Distribution 1963 Table 7»5 
A+ A B C C-
9 October 9 51 49 11 
10 October 12 44 56 7 1 
11 October 16 45 54 7 
12 October 8 37 49 6 
Average 11,25 58o75 42 7o75 0„25 
The l e v e l of i n t e r e s t appears to remairij^ broadly constant as 
comparison with the figures for 1965 i l l u s t r a t e s-
Reaction Index Distribution 1965 {^) 
Afr A _B C 0-
Average 15 32 59 9 5 
Comparisons with the conferences of the other parties show that 
although the l e v e l of i n t e r e s t i n the Conservative Conference i s i f anything 
s l i g h t l y higher than that i n the Labour Party's, the Liberal Conference i s „ 
noticeably l e s s well regarded than that of either of the other major pa r t i e s s -
Reaction Index (by parties) 1965 (^) Table 7.6 
Conservative Labour Liberal 
Wednesday 60 ' 63 57 
Thursday 65 61 52 
Friday 67 61 52 
Saturday 62 64 58 
1. Audience Research Report T VR/65/574 (17 November 1965) 
2« Audience Research Report T VE/63/576 (4 November 1963) 
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The r e l a t i v e l y high l e v e l of interest i n the conferences contrasts 
with the low l e v e l of l i s t e n i n g and comprehension which has been, found 
amongst the electorate i n relation to party p o l i t i c a l broadcasts . I t 
i s d i f f i c u l t to account for t h i s because the progranmes usually have 
much i n camnon but the explanation probably l i e s i n Ihe additional 
choice available to viewers and the fact that ihe propaganda i s s l i g h t l y 
l e s s blatant. 
The Press 
Although most newspapers r e l y on advertising revenue and allocate 
a high proportion of their available :space to advertisements a surpri-
s i n g l y large share of the remaining space i s allocated to news as d i s t i n c t 
from other types of coverage^ :-
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Telegraph 26 48 52 64 18 2 2 12 1 
Guardian 19 62 38 61 25 5 2 9 2 
Times 21 66 54 69 17 •2 2 8 1 
D Mirror 26 64 56 46 18 1 5 25 9 
D Express 18 60 40 55 22 1 1 15 8 
D Mail 17 61 59 52 26 1 1 14 6 
Sun 14 75 25 55 22 1 2 17 5 
D Sketch 20 ' 81 19 45 22 1 1 25 10 
D VIoiker 4 92 8 54 25 2 2 16 5 
1. W Svrallow 'Factual Television' (Focal Press 1966) and 
The Observer, 11 October 1964 
2. C Seymour-Ure 'The Press, P o l i t i c s & The Public' (HethuLen 1966) 
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The amount of t h i s space which i s devoted to any particular type of 
news i s not necessarily a s c i e n t i f i c indication of i t s importance but i n 
general i t r e f l e c t s the weight which the paper's e d i t o r i a l s t a f f think 
that t h e i r readers w i l l attach to the subject and although occasionally 
events receive coverage which runs well beyond their 'true' value -
p a r t i c u l a r l y i f a human i n t e r e s t or scandal story i s involved - broadly 
speaking the a l l o c a t i o n gives a f a i r guide to the r e l a t i v e level of 
public i n t e r e s t i n different news items'. 
The space allocated by newspapers to conference coverage d i f f e r s 
considerably as Tables 7.8 and 7.9» based on a random selection of the 
major national and regional papers during 1966-69, show. 
Broadly speaking the 'serious* papers such as the *Times^, 
•Telegraph' and 'Gtiardian' cover the conference much more heavily than 
the •popular' papers which seems to indicate that i n t e r e s t i n the 
conference i s considerably higher amongst middle c l a s s voters but 
conference news s t i l l occupies between 5 and 10 per cent of the 
avail a b l e news space i n most of the popular papers and i n some cases 
the figures are h i ^ e r than t h i s . 
Although the amount of space given to conference coverage i s a 
guide to i t s importance i n the eyes of the media the overall impact on 
the public depends not only on fee quantitative coverage but also on the 
way i n which the information i s presented. The importance of feis has 
been i l l u s t r a t e d by r e c a l l checks. A spe c i f i c front page news item on the 
Conservative Conference published i n the Sunday Telegraph on 17 October 
1965 which was the subject of a r e c a l l check run by SeymouivOre showed 
that while 90^ of readers remembered the headline and 80^ could r e 0 a l l 
the accompanying picture, only 66^ could remember reading some of the 
text. By contrast another a r t i c l e on the conference i n the same paper 
which was located off the front page showed that only 40^ could remember 
the headline and 25^ the a r t i c l e which accompanied i t . ^ 
While the method of presentation c l e a r l y affects the impact of 
conference news on the reader, i t i s s t i l l s i g n i f i c a n t that a surprisingly 
high proportion of readers had been s u f f i c i e n t l y impressed to be able to 
r e c a l l even quite minor items of coverage some time l a t e r and the conference 
coverage c l e a r l y makes a considerable impact on fee leadership. 
Although the party leadership i s always anxious to exploit the news 
value of the conference as an opportunity to project a favourable party 
image, i t does so i n the constant knowledge that controversy i s i n f i n i t e l y 
more newsworfey than unity and as a result the media have a natural 
tendency to s n i f f out and exaggerate dissension which may i n turn damage 
the party image. 
1. C Seymoui^Ure 'The Press, P o l i t i c s and the Public' (MethBen 1966) 
pp 60-65 
J K Cunningham »City Newspapers and the 1957 Election • ( P o l i t i c a l 
Science Vol 11 No 2 1959) P 23 
A D Robinson and A H Ashenden Communications and the 1963 
Election' ( P o l i t i c a l Science Vol 16 No 2 1964) p 7 
J Trenaman & D McQuail 'Television and the P o l i t i c a l Image' (Methuen 
1961) pp 74-79 
2. C Seymour^ Ure 'The Press, P o l i t i c s and the Public' (Mefeuen 1966) 
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TABLE 7,9 
GOBSERVATIYE COMFEREISCE HEHS AS A PBRCEMTASE 
OP SPACE (AFTER DEDUCTIOH CP ADVERTISIBS) 
1966-69 - SUNDAY PAPERS 
1967 1968 1969 
22 October 13 October 12 October 
Sunday Telegraph 4.7 3-9 6«8 
Fftople 1.9 2.7 1.9 
Sunday Express 2.2 2.8 3.5 
Observer 2.2 5.8 8.8 
Sundcqr Times 7.9 4.8 9.8 
Sunday Sun 0.3 0.5 0.4 
Ifovs of the World 4.5 1.4 0.8 
Suzday M r r o r 1.6 3.0 6.6 
Siinday Post 1.8 3.2 2.6 
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The problems which t h i s m^ produce can be i l l u s t r a t e d by a 
b r i e f summary of the press coverage of the leadership issue at the 
conferences during the period 1966-69. 
After his election as leader Heafe lacked aufeority i n the eyes 
of the media and as a r e s u l t the party conferences during this period 
were almost invariably reported against a background of controversy and 
speculation. 
I n 1966 pre-conference press coverage concentrated heavily on 
alleged d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the leadership:-
' The Conservatives ... meet i n Blackpool on Wednesday i n the 
shadow of strong c r i t i c i s m of the leader of the party, 
Mr Edward Heath. He w i l l be seeking to establish his 
authority on the party ... ' ' 
and the controversy had been sharpened by the Gallup P o l l results published 
on 6th October^ showing Heath well behind Wilson despite a Conservative 
lead over Labour i n voting intention. Much of the c r i t i c i s m was reported 
to stem from alleged lack of vigour by the Parliamentary party i n 
opposition and an a r t i c l e by Angus Maude MP published i n the Spectator 
a r t i c u l a t e d the views of many party workers:-
• What they (the party's supporters) want their leaders to do i s 
qxiite simply to make an impression on fee country^ ' 
The leadership's d i f f i c u l t i e s were outlined i n the S t a t i s t :-
• The dilemma i s between the h e l l - r a i s e r s who want a blood-curdling 
and exciting struggle with the Wilson Government on every conceiva-
ble issue and non-issue, and the long-haulers, who counsel a more 
cautious long-term strategy with an eye on creating a slow build-
up as fee al t e r n a t i v e responsible government of the future. ' 
which a l s o pointed out feat Heath suffered from an additional personal 
disadvantage i n being the f i r s t Conservative leader i n recent times to 
have been chosen i n opposition without the natural authority automatically 
conferred on a former Prime Minister^. 
Then on 1 2th October a l l papers reported a rumour that Heath planned 
to replace du Cann as Chairman of the Party alongside detailed reports of 
a press conference at which S i r Clyde Hewlett, S i r Dan Mason and du Cann 
himself had h a s t i l y repudiated any such intention:-
'Reports that Mr du Cann m i ^ t be replaced as Chairman alamed 
senior o f f i c i a l s of the party so much that they took fee unusual 
course to-night of c a l l i n g a news conference.- ' 
1. Daily Sketch- 8th October I966 
2. D a i l y Telegraph - 6fe October 1966 
3. Spectator - 7th October 1966 
4. S t a t i s t - 7th October 1966 
5. See also D Butler and M Pinto-Duschinsky 'The B r i t i s h General Elec t i o n 
of 1970^ (Macmillan 1971) pp 62-66 
6. Yorkshire Post - 12th October 1966 
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Most correspondents viewed the press conference as an attempt 
by the grass roots to thwart the Leader:- 'The mass party, s t i l l a 
l i t t l e sore a t having been excluded from fee election of fee party 
leader, has made a pre-emptive^strike to show that they have a view 
about fee party chairmanship' and i t was generally thou^t that 
Heath had planned to replace du Cann but had h a s t i l y backed io\m under 
pressure from the National Union. 
A s l i g h t v a r i a t i o n , reported by fee Express, suggested feat the 
r e a l reason for opposition to the change was not affection for du Cann 
but d i s t a s t e for h i s replacement - reputedly Marples:- 'So deep i s the 
h o s t i l i t y to Mr Marples ... that i f Mr Heafe i n s i s t e d on appointing 
him, he would ajmnediately create a fozmidable block of opposition to 
hi s own leadership ' 
There was l i t t l e hard evidence to show whefeer there was a serioiis 
proposal to replace Du Cann or not. Both i n a speech to fee agents^ and 
at the f i r s t session of fee Conference Heafe went out of h i s way to 
express confidence i n Du Cann but quite irrespective of the true f a c t s 
the press coverage was damaging to his image. The appointment of fee 
Party Chairman was fee Leader's c l e a r prerogative and suggestions feat 
he had to surrender to pressure from the grass roots party were bound to 
r e f l e c t on h i s position^. 
Even considered assessments of Heath's position, predicting that 
the party was unlikely to unseat i t s leader so soon a f t e r Home's r e t i r e -
ment and the loss of an election, inevitably emphasised c r i t i c i s m of 
Heafe i n fee process of discounting i t . So too did frequent references 
to fee d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n maintaining a delicate balance between 
competing pressure groups within the party:-
' They {,Mie party's supporter^ c a l l for a more •aggressive' stance 
by the party, sund above a l l , demand that the Conservatives should 
not only oppose but also be seen and heard to oppose. I n short, 
the electorate a t large i s not seriously aware of the identity of 
fee modernised Conservative party ... By the end of this week i t 
i s to be hoped that the Conservatives w i l l emerge with a c l e a r 
reaffinnation of thei r principles, stressing the party's basiCg 
standards of individual freedom, i n i t i a t i v e and s e l f reliance • 
1. Times - 12 October 1966. See also Daily Telegraph 12 October 1966 
2. D a i l y Express - 12 October 1966, See also Daily Express 23 October 
1966 
3. See Daily Mail -12 October 1966 and 'Yoikshire Post' 12 October 1966 
4. See also A Alexander and A Watkins 'The Making of the Prime Minister 
1970' (Macdonald 1970) p 85 
5. Daily Telegraph - 12 October 1966 and Guardian - 12 October 1966 
6. Journal - 12 October 1966 
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Despite the rather gloaay pre»conference coverage and publica» 
tion of an NOP P o l l which showed that of voters f e l t that the 
Opposition had been i n e f f e c t i v e over the previous twelve months , once 
the conference began almost a l l papers reported a popular reception 
for Heath a t the opening sessions:-
' Heath: He's I n Command » Mr Edward Heath f i n a l l y onerged 
to-day as leader of the Tory Party. For the f i r s t time he 
took f i m possession ofgthe o f f i c e to irtiich he was elected 
more than a year ago.' 
' Fighting Heath gets a f i m grip on Tories <» a l l c r i t i c i s m s 
of himself and h i s high command melted i n the white heat of 
h i s appeal for a policy based on freedom and honesty« '^ 
' Tories Cheer as Heath Takes a Grip - What had pronised to 
be a grand inquest on the election defeat l a s t spring and 
the conduct of the Opposition since turned into a succession 
of eulogies for the leader and h i s p o l i c i e s . '^ 
' Mr Heath has no challenger for the leadership ' (Guardian)^ 
' Mr Heath's day of triumph « leadership secure and Tories 
shown the way ahead » At h i s f i r s t party conference as leader 
at Brighton l a s t October Mr Heath was given a cordial 
receptione Toeday there was genuine enthusiasm and a general 
f e e l i n g that a t ^ l a s t his leadership has been thoroughly 
consolidated. ' 
His speech, using an up-dated version of 'Set the People Free' 
as i t s tbeme^ found pcu>ticular favour with the Express :-
" Pride and Freedom » Mr Edward Heath goes to the heart of 
B r i t a i n ' s problems to<=>day. On t h i s simple inspiring theme 
the Leader of-^the Opposition has made the speech of h i s l i f e 
at Blackpool.' ' 
and. also got support f»m the Sketch:-
' A breath of fresh a i r blew through the stuffy corridors of 
B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s yesterday. Freedom was the theme of Ted 
Heath's send-off to the Party Conferencg at Blackpool. And 
never was there a more timely raninder. ' 
1. Daily Mail = 13 October 1966 
2 . Daily Express - 1 3 October 1966 
3o Daily Mirror - 13 October 1966 
It-. Northeni Echo - 13 October 1966 
5« Guardian - 13 October 1966 
6. Yorkshire Post - 13 October 1966 
7 . Daily B]q)ress = 13 October 1966 
8. D a i l y Sketch - 13 October 1966 
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There was even broad, althou^^ admittedly somewhat c y n i c a l 
support from the Guardian: ' Mr Heafe was ef f e c t i v e as well as 
moderate. He spoke mainly about l i b e r t y and evexyone votes for 
l i b e r t y . Everyone also votes for Santa Glaus... ' and only the 
Star was, predictably, unimpressed - viewing the speech as a ' soggy 
performance' under a headline 'Heath neatly side-steps h i s c r i t i c s * 
wife almost as much distaste as Wilsaiwho i t alleged 'has turned h i s 
back on S o c i a l i s t p o l i c i e s and i s operating measures s i m i l a r to feose 
of fee Tories. * 
Heafe's success was partly attributed by the press to fee f a c t . 
that he had 'learnt fee a r t of Conference oratory*-' but i n fact i t 
probably also owed much to fee c r i t i c a l pre-conference media coverage 
which pressured delegates into closing feeir ranks and reacting wife 
an effBsive display of lo y a l t y . 
The chain of events whidi was summed up i n the Scotsman's 
headlines: • Mr Heafe Triumphs I n Revolt That Never Was^ * was to be 
repeated several times i n subsequent years. 
While Heath* s position had ' seemed firmly established a t fee 
1966 Conference fee following year feere was again intense press 
speculation about the leadership. Du Cann's resignation on i l t h 
September 196? was preceded by leaks i n the *S3qpress* ^ reminiscent 
of fee previous year's campaign to *save' him^, alleging that Heath 
and Du Cann had quarrelled and a change of Chairman was beiqg consideredo 
Heafe denied any disagreement and h i s 'a l o t of damned l i a s ' rebuttal 
received wide coverage, but commentators noted that fee possibili-ty of 
a replacement was not s p e c i f i c a l l y rejected. Consequently fee press 
was not surprised when Du Cann's departure was formally announced and 
the subsequent coverage was largely f a c t u a l . 
Ostensibly Du Cannes resignation was for personal reasons and 
t h i s was given some c r e d i b i l i t y by Heafe's i m p l i c i t offer of front bench 
status i n h i s l e t t e r accepting Du Cann's resignation but most of the 
press was frankly s c e p t i c a l , suspecting feat Du Cann had l o s t an internal 
power struggle. 
S i r Gerald Nabarro, speaking i n his Worcestershire constituency on 
2 3 r d September, touched o f f renewed controversy by commenting publicly 
on fee elusive gap between Heafe's personal popularity and feat of fee 
party: ' Wilson i s now so widely mistrusted feat I reckon h i s party may 
chopper him feis winter. Paradoxically Heath goes down and down i n 
public estimation while Tory stock r i s e s . • ' 
1 . Guardian - 13 October 1966 
2. Star - 13 October 1966 
3 . Times ^ 13 October 1966 
4. Scotsman - 12 October 1966 
5 . Daily Express - 9 September 196? 
6. Observer - 10 September 196? 
7. Sunday Times « 2i^  September l967. See also Sunday Express and 
People - 24 September 196?. 
- 157 -
I n normal circumstances Nabarro's remarks might have been seen 
as an exaiqple of h i s amiable e c c e n t r i c i t y but the press interpreted 
them as articulaiic^MPs' growing d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with Heath's leader-
ship :-
' U n t i l now a l l comments i n the Tory Party on Mr Heath's 
handling of the leadership have been made 'off the record*. 
I t remains to be seen i f Mr Heath can r e s i s t the pressure for 
a f u l l discussion of the leadership issue nfaen Parliament 
reassembles. And the outlook f o r him enjoying a good party 
conference^ at Brighton next month has suddenly become much 
stonder.. ' 
Further adverse p u b l i c i t y came when Lewes Constituency Assoeiatim 
cancelled an in v i t a t i o n for Nabarro to speak to them during the 
conference as even such gestures of support tended to highlight Heath's 
d i f f i c u l t i e s ^ . Nabarro's protestations that he was merely tzying to 
encourage party workers to redouble t h e i r e f f o r t s on Heath's behalf 
received s a r c a s t i c treatment 
' S i r Gerald Nabarro, who has made himself known on the subject 
of the Conservative leadership, now says that h i s views represent 
h i s a ffection for Mr Heath and h i s loyalty to the Conservative 
Party. I t i s a comfort that the ancient B r i t i s h profession of 
humbug should s t i l l have qualified modem practiHoners ^ ' 
Speculation was kept a l i v e by a very h o s t i l e TV interview frith 
Heath immediately before the Conference opened^. The tone of question-
ing was extremely aggressive and Heath had to suffer the indignity of 
watching filmed excerpts of 'men i n the street' c r i t i c i s i n g him but he 
was able to turn the interview to advantage. His dignified response 
drew a generally sympathetic response from the press7._ 
' Mr Heath made an impressive reply to cr i t i c i s m s of h i s leader^ 
ship of thScConservative Party iriien he was interviewed on TV 
l a s t night.^ ' 
' Mr Heath survived t h i s barrage with dignity and i t may be 
that the p u b l i c i t y given to c r i t i c i s m of h i s leadership by the 
press and t e l e v i s i o n w i l l have guaranteed^him an easy passage 
through the Conservative Party Conference ' 
* There i s a l i m i t to irtiat ought to be allowed on the t e l l y and 
i n our view i t was reached i n Panorama's interview Aith 
Mr Edward Heath on Monday^... ' 
1 . Sunday ISxpreaa - 24 September l 9 6 7 
2 . Sunday Mirror - 8 October 1967; People - 8 October i 9 6 7 ; 
Sunday Express - 8 October 1967; Sunday Telegraph «» 8 October 1967 
Times - 9 October 1967 
3 . Times - 1.7 October 1967 
4 . BBC TV - 16 October 1967 
5 . Yorkshire Post •» 17 October 1967 
6 . Guardian - 17 October 1967 
7 . News of the World - 22 October 1967 
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0 Mr Heafe i s generally held to have extricated himself wife 
dignity from the brew stewed up for him by BBC 'Panorama* on 
Monday eveningi * 
The press also c a r r i e d a l i v e l y exchange of readers* l e t t e r s " 
mostly sympafelsing wife Heath^ but even the impressive Conservative 
bye-election v i c t o r i e s at Walfeamstow and Cambridge were seen as 
r e f l e c t i n g lack of confidence in Heafe because of the coverage given 
to Du Cann's remarks that fee r e s u l t s showed disenchantment with fee 
Government rafeer fean confidence i n the Opposition^. 
Host of fee press did not seriously feink feat he would resign 
as leader and fee 'Times* leader on 1 ? October^ was f a i r l y t y p i c a l 
when i t pointed out feat although Heath lacked charisma changes were 
highly unlikely before fee next election. 
Strong support also came from the Mall:» 
* Now fee Knocking has to Stop - One overriding duty faces fee 
Conservative conference which opens to-day. I t i s to r e -
e s t a b l i s h Mr Edward Heath i n public and party esteem by giving ' 
him the support he has earned and well deserved^ * 
Even so, the very f a c t feat h i s position was being publicly 
debated i n the press must have been damaging to Heafe* s image and 
enhanced fee inuresslon of Insecurity. 
The Conference debates on Rhodesia and education bofe had 
implications for fee leadership. The Rhodesia debate was generally 
seen as a success for Heafe:-
* Mr Heafe succeeded to»nl^t i n uniting a l l sections of 
Conservative opinion on a new and urgent approach to the 
Rhodesleui problem. Scarcely a hand was raised against a 
resolution liilch c a l l e d f or Umost pressure* upon the 
Government to resume negotiations with Mr Smife° ' 
'Heath outflanks fee Rhodesia dlehards - Lord Salisbury and 
h i s supporters were outmanoeuvred by a very firm Mr Heafe. 
He overrode feeir demands for de facto recognition of fee 
Smife regime and fee immediate end of sanctions' ' 
1 . Telegraph - 18 October 196? 
2o Dally Telegraph - 19 October 1 9 6 ? ; Dally Mall - l 8 October 196? 
Times - i 9 , 2 0 , 21 October 196? 
3« People - 24 September 1967 
4 . Times - 17 October 1967 . See also Telegraph l 8 Oct 1967 
5 . Dally Mail - 18 October 1967 
6 . Daily Telegraph - 20 October 1967 
7 . Norfeem Echo - 2 0 October 1967 
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The Times, however, took a more sc e p t i c a l view, suggesting 
that the Conference had only 'neatly patched over the s p l i t on 
Rhodesian p o l i c i e s ' ?diile the Express argued that Heath was wrong 
to hold out against demands for the abolition of sanctions although 
i t took the view that 'on the whole the speech represented a 
de f i n i t e s h i f t towards the Right Wing Tory position on the Rhodesian . 
question but so d e l i c a t e l y accomplished that the Tory L e f t scarcely 
noticed it'^'^ o The Express leader was even more f l a t t e r i n g about 
Heath's performance: 'In h i s handling of the Rhodesian issue at 
B r i x t o n Mr Heath wins more than the plaudits of the lo y a l i s t s o He ^ 
gains the respect of the public by a demonstration of statesmanship' 
and statesmanship was also the theme of the Yorkshire Poslfs coverage: 
'Mr Heath seems at l a s t to have found a concensus which a l l can 
siqsport' and described i t as *a serious and responsible speech which 
avoided polonies and the t r i c k s of oratory.'^ 
But there was some dopbt amongst the papers iriiether a new i n i t i a t i v e , 
although desirable, would i n f a c t succeed on the grounds that the 
Conservative premise that the 'Tiger' talks only f a i l e d over,the 
arrangements f o r the return to l e g a l i t y was not w e l l founded • 
Heath's personal success on Rhodesia was however rather tarnished 
by the, education debate nhere even the l o y a l Telegraph had to admit 
i n i t s leader:-
' I t would be i d l e to deny that yesterday's conqprehensive 
schooling vote a t the Conservative Party Conference at 
Brighton was a rebuff f o r Uie party leadership. I t i s true 
that the o f f i c i a l resolution was approved by a b a l l o t . That 
resolution, however, was couched i n terms which would have 
made i t possible for anyone not firmly convinced of the 
Operation's education policy to support i t ^ ' 
And both the Daily Mail and Hie Daily Mirror took a more dramatic Hine:-
' School vote s p l i t s Tories « S i r Edward (Boyle) and h i s 
supporters won^ but i t was by no means em overwhelming 
majority...6 ' 
' A shock rebel l i o n against the Tory leadership by angry hard 
core opponents of comprehensive schools eroloded the Tory 
Party Conference into l i f e at Brighton...' ' 
1 . Times - 20 October 1967 
2 . Daily Eacpress - 20 October 1967 
3o Yorkshire Post « 20 October 1967 
4* See for example Sunday Times - 22 October 1967 
5 . Daily Telegr«s>h - 20 October 1967 
6o Daily Mail » 20 October 1967 
7 . Daily Mirror - 20 October 1967 
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Despite the education setback the press generally saw Heath*s 
position as secure. His f i n a l speech received favourable comment -
peu-ticularly on fee i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s proposals - and feere was 
extensive comment on fee confidence of h i s approach and h i s relaxed 
delivery . He had even introduced a few successful jokes and the 
audience reaction to fee sfpeech was generally reported as one of 
•genuine warmth'2. The Telegraph^ reported that'fee Confdrence was 
of a mind to give Mr Heath proof of i t s affection as well as i t s 
loyalty*, and papers as diverse i n feeir e d i t o r i a l s t y l e s as fee 
Observer and the News of fee World^ bofe chose fee words *wlld 
enthusiasm' to describe the applause at the end of Heafe's speech. 
Heath's reception was regarded as somefelng more fean the 
predictable cheers of party followers for feeir leader and i t was 
recognised feat the party rank and f i l e were giving expression to a 
strong reaction. There were suggestions feat i t was designed to 
impress doubters within the party:-
' I t was more than feeir appreciation f o r his closing speech. 
I t was a calculated b l a s t of loyalty to blow away the fecu's 
of those within fee party who doubt Mr Heafe's q u a l i t i e s of 
leadership.6 ' 
but as i n 1966 however i t seems l i k e l y that much of fee delegates • 
enfeusiasm was pronqpted by a reaction against the media coverage 
( p a r t i c u l a r l y the 'Panorama' interview)' and the Yorkshire Post 
echoed the Scotsman's view from fee previous year when i t wrote feat 
'for nearly f i v e fervent minutes fee Conservative Party rank and 
f i l e dmonstrated feat fee pseudo ' c r i s i s ' over the party leadership 
was ended^ ' 
I f the exceptional weumth of Heath's reception was a gesture 
by the Conference delegates intended to convince fee Press feat 
there was no foundation i n fee reports feat fee grass roots party 
had l o s t confidence i n Heath's leadership i t was largely successfulo 
1. Sunday Express ) 
News of fee World ) 
Sunday Times ) 22 October 196? 
People ) 
Sunday Post ) 
2 . Sunday Times - 22 October 1967 
3 . Daily Telegraph « 23 October 1967 
4* Observer « 22 October 1967 
5 . News of fee World - 22 October 1967 
6 . Sunday Sun « 22 October 1967 
7 . News of fee World - 22 October i 9 6 7 
F i n a n c i a l Times 'o 23 October 1967 
a. Yorkshire Post - 23 October 1967 
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Press comment on Heath's position made i t quite c l e a r that 
there were few doubts about his immediate future as leader. Some 
of the comments were f a i r l y sober:-
' Tories r a l l y round the Heath bcumer' ^  
' Mr Heath's immediate troubles with the Conservative Party 
are over ' 2 
' Mr Heath yesterday confidently applied for and received 
rom the Tc 
leadership 
f Tor^ party conference here endorsement of his 
lAiile others were perhaps l e s s accurate:-
' To-day a new chapter opens i n the history of the Conservative 
Party. No longer can anyone doubt that Mr Heath i s the boss '^ 
' The Tory party purged i t s e l f of -the leadership issue ' 3 
' Mr Heath i s i n the strongest position of any Tory leader 
since Harold Macmillan i n h i s prime ' ^  
but o v e r a l l there were indications that a better relationship between 
Heath and the party supporters was being developed^. 
I n 1968 two major issues which attracted extensive press 
attention and re f l e c t e d on Heath's position were the education debate 
and Powell's leadership 'threat*. 
As i n 1967 the education debate was seen as a reverse f o r the 
party leadership: 
' Mr Angus Maude, MP for Stratford, was allowed to add a tough 
amendment to the conference's o f f i c i a l resolution on education. 
I f he hadn't been, Mr Maude would have ca l l e d for the o f f i c i a l 
motion to be thrown out - and might have succeeded ... ° ' 
' Constituency representatives forced the platform to accept 
an addendum to a motion idiich condemned the Government's record 
on education ... ^  ' 
1. Sunday Mirror » 22 October 1967 
2 . F i n a n c i a l Times » 23 October 1967 
3 . Sunday Express = 22 October 1967 
4. Daily Mail - 23 October i967 
5. Sunday Mirror - 22 October 1967 
6. People « 22 October i967 
7. Sunday Times - 22 October 1967 
8. Daily Mirror « 10 October 1968 
9. Times - 10 October 1968 
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' A mass revolt over comprehensive schools shook the 
Conservative Party Conferenoe here to-night and embarrassed 
Sir Edward Boyle, their education spokesman ... ' 
I t was significant, however, that the debate was seen as an embarrass» 
ment for the leadership rather than a crushing defeat and this to some 
extent reflected the press's general belief that Heath's position was 
increasingly secure as a general election approached. 
There was some strong criticism of the Conference's line: 
' The delegates from the suburbs love their grammar schools 
and hate to think of nicely brought up children having to 
mix with those common and un«clever kids for whom the secondary 
modem schools were made ... ' 
but equally there was strong support for the Conference delegates from 
the Yorkshire Post: 
'(Boyle's defeat) i s a l l to the good. What the Opposition 
should be offering i s not watered»down Socialism but mbust 
Conservatism ^ ' 
while the Telegraph leader commented that on certain issues the delegates 
could 'think more clearly than the forty leaders'. 
While the education debate implied some criticism of the leader^ 
ship the press devoted considerably more attention to the 'threat' 
which was presented by Powell^. Ostensibly the division between Powell 
and the party leadership centred around immigration policy but i t was 
generally recognised that there was a much more fundamental difference 
of philosophy cud that the leadership were opposing Powell: 
' « . 6 not so ffluoh because of his views on immigration irtiich they 
know are widely shared, but because so much of what he says 
looks lik e a c a l l to retum to a harsh 19th century market c 
econooQr. And that, they know, the electorate won't take ... ' 
1. Sun ) 
2. Daily Mirror ) I0th October 1968 
3. Yorkshire Post ) 
4. For assessments of Powell's role see 
R Rhodes James 'Ambitions and Realities « British Politics 
1964-1970' (WeidenfeldA Nicolson 1972) pp 149-214 
J Wood (ed) 'Powell and the 1970 Election ' ( E l l i o t t 1970) 
Smithies W & Fiddick P 'Enoch Powell on Immigration : An 
Analysis' (Sphere 1969) 
P Foot 'The Rise of Enoch Powell' (Penguin 1969) 
A Roth 'Enoch Powell » Tory Tribune' (Macdonald 1970) 
5. Sun - lOth October 1968 
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Although Poirell's criticisms of the leadership crere vridely 
covered there was l i t t l e evidence that he would dislodge Heath but 
the real challenge was whether the leadership would be strong enough 
to prevent the party's polipy from being edged towards the extreme 
right wing by pressure from Powell's supporters.'' 
Barber's speech with i t s savage criticism of those who wanted 
to denationalise the mines and the railways and withdraw trom East 
of Suez seen as a vezy thinly veiled attack on Powell. I t was 
not merely the fact that Powell was being counter-attacked but also 
the fact that i t was a meniber of the Shadow Cabinet who was doing i t 
which was seen as significant: 
• A big * rally round Heath' drive opened this year's Tory 
. party conference . 0 0 for the f i r s t time since Edward Heath 
became leader three years ago, his chief lieu^nants came 
into the open to drum up support for him .o. ' 
although i t hardly rated the importance which the Eatress attributed 
to i t ; 
' Even the most savage cr i t ic of the T0X7 party could not 
deqy that here i n Blackpool to-day the event that took 
place was not so much a polit ical get-together as a moment 
of poli t ical histozye I t was a moment of rebirth of a 
great party rediscovering i t s sense of direction and purpose 
0 0 0 the party showed i tself to be in no mood for any break-
away movement such as mi^ t be encouraged by Mr Powell'^  ' 
Coverage of the immigration debate the following day generally 
saw the outcome as a defeat for Powell although opinion varied over 
i t s completeness - the Northern Echo saw Powell as 'down but not out'^ 
whereas other papers saw the result as much more f i n a l : 
' Enoch Powell has lost the immigration battleo More than 
that, he is being isolated remorselessly from the whole 
leadership of the Conservative Party, He is too dangerous, 
too intense, too unyielding for a party concerned with 
winning power and so necessarily read|y for compromises which 
Powell rejects ..« 5 • 
Powell got considerable support from the Telegraph however: 
' In opposition, senior politicians can justly claim more 
latitude in opinion than idien bound by collective responsi-
b i l i t y in office. Mr Powell may seem to be a thorn in 
Mr Heath's side; he could be a tower of strength. His 
proper place is in the Shadow Cabinet.^ ' 
1 Times ) 2, Daily Mirror ) 10 October 1968 
3 o Daily Egress ) 
4 . Northern Echo ) 
5. Sun ) 11 October l9&o 
6. Daily Telegraph ) 
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and the following day he succeeded in attracting major coverage for 
his views on the econoiqy by making a highly controversial speech 
at Morecambe advocating extensive public expenditure cuts: 
' The Morecambe speech was cleverly timed and placed. Because 
of the limitations of five minutes to a l l rostrum speakers at 
the conference this week, he could not have made i t at the 
conference. I t had to be outside the hal l , and yet he wanted 
to receive maximum publicity just before the party leader 
Mr Heath makes his speech of the week to-morrow . . . 1 * 
His views also received considerable press support: 
• The importance of Mr Powell's speech lies in i t s enlargement 
of the bounds of poli t ical possibility which have become far 
too narrowly drawn for the public good or comfort . . . I t mifjat 
have a great liberating effect, thus releasing energies capable 
of making good far more well-being than was in i t i a l ly lost. . .^ ' 
although they were also criticised as advocating a reactionaxy return 
to laissezfaire economics: 
' His 'budget* i s , of course, a caricature designed to illustrate 
his argunent - which the modem world has long rejected - that 
the Govexnment has no business interfering with the operation 
of the free market ' 
' ooo a challenge to a l l Conservatives to choose between the 
middle-of-the-road traditions that they created for thoDselves 
in the l950s and the older, fiercer traditions of the nineteenth 
century . . . ^ ' 
' Bnoch rides again... with a breath-taking plunge into the early 
nineteenth Century Mr Enoch Powell last night proclaimed a 
policy to halve income tax and Surtax and cut public spending 
by £2,833 million a year. I t would be an achievement comparable 
to the Miracle of the Loaves and the Fishes . . . ' 
While Powell's views received heavy coverage. Heath's crushing reply on 
television that 'no responsible politician could make specific proposals 
about rates of taxation' was widely publicised^ and the media's broad 
assessment of the Conference was that the leadership had successfully 
defeated Powell's challenge: 
' I f Mr Heath has suffered any nightmares over the challenge ^ 
of Mr Snoch Powellp he should have slept peacefully last night ' 
1 . Financial Times ) 
2. Daily Telegraph ) 
5- ^ ^ 1 2 October 1968 4 o Guardian ; 
5. Sun 
6 . Guardian 
Times 
7 o Sun - 14 October 1 9 6 8 
- 145 -
More signifieantly, however, there was fa i r ly general agreement that 
the leadership had also successfully resisted any pressure to force 
party polipy to the right: 
' The big question at Blackpool this week has been whether 
the party leaders could keep their grip on Tory policy . . o 
what matters is not so much the balance of opinion on any 
issue: to assume that would be to give the Conservative 
Conference too great a significance. I t is rather that the 
leaders have retained the freedom to act responsibly 1 ' 
and i t was recognised that the party had 
' succeeded in satisfying much of the demand for a set of 
coherent policies which were plainly distinctive fk'om the 
Labour Party. There was always a danger that this demand which 
had been growing rapidly since last year's conference, might, 
under Mr Powell's s k i l f u l exploitation, stampede the party into 
a fatuous right wing policy . . . ' 
By 1969 the general election was clearly imminent and the press 
was generally convinced that there was no likelihood of Heath giving 
up the leadership but doubts about the Conservatives' capacity to win 
the election^ inevitably generated speculation: 
' they {the Conservatives] have a leader in Mr Heath who 
commands their loyalty more than their affections. There is 
no leadership crisis. There is no possibility of the party 
fighting the next election under anyone else, and no atten9>t 
to supplant him. But the bond is one of ccdeulation rather 
than identity of view. So long as the Tories seem to be 
marching confidently back to office there is not so much 
d i f f i cu l ty in muffling the difference of approach between 
the leaders and the rank and f i l e . But as the journey becoiDes 
hcurder so the real conflicts of conviction become apparent ^ ' 
The Conference i t se l f included at least four issues which the 
press saw as potentially reflecting on the leadership - immigration, 
capital punishment, the Common Market and education. 
On immigration the press was generally sympathetic to the leader^ 
ship's moderate line and although Hogg's impassioned closing speech was 
subject to some criticism^, on the idiole the leadership was thougfafcto 
have controlled the Conference successfully. The capital punishment 
debate brought an o u t r i ^ t defeat for the leadership's polipy despite 
a widely publicised speech by Heath to the party agents before the 
Conference opened in which he made his own views clear. While most of 
the press saw the defeat as a set-back for the leadership there was 
widespread support for Heath: 
1 . Times - 1 4 October 1 9 6 8 
2 . Economist - 1 3 October 1 9 6 8 
3 . Observer = 1 2 October 1969 
Sunday Express - 1 2 October 1969 
Financial Times) « Oo+«ho,. 4 « : Q 
Daily Telegraph) ^ ^^69 
4 . Times 1 1 October 1 9 6 9 
5 > See for example Daily Mail - 1 1 October 1 9 6 9 
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MPs and Mr Heath ' I t (jbhe decision) cannot bind the Tory 1 
w i l l be well advised to forget i t . . o 1 ' 
and there was a general view that i t should not be allowed to become 
a general election issue. 
The Conference vote on the Common Market showed strong backing 
for the leadership's policy and there was some press support for the 
leadership's unequivocal stand on entzy which was contrasted with the 
Labour Conference's *fence°'sitting attitude' : 
2 
' I t is to their credit that the issue was confronted squarely ' 
although the Express was predictably cr i t ica l of the decision: 
' A l l the Tories proclaimed last week that the Labour Party 
'fudged' the Common Market issue. The Tories for their part 
resorted to the old stratagem of saying one thing and , 
immediately announcing that i t meant something else . . . ' 
On education the press continued to support Bpyle and the overall 
verdict was that he had at last succeeded in persuading the party 
workers to accept moderate and f a i r l y liberal policies. 
Despite the leadership's success on a l l of the issues except 
capital punishment, which was largely regarded as a minor issue, there 
was widespread coverage of the disagreements within the party and the 
constant emphasis given to controversial issues enhanced the impression 
of the leadership's somewhat precarious character. This was enhanced 
by the party's poor showing in the opinion polls which was heavily 
carried, and intense publicity for Powell's activities including a 
speech at Preston strongly opposing Common Market entry'*' and a f u l l 
page advertisement in a Brighton evening paper placed by an anoqymous 
Sussex businessman urging support for Powell^. 
As a result, althou^ Heath's position at the end of the 
Conference was portrayed as temporarily secure, there was widespread 
doubt about his capacity to survive an election defeat and this in 
turn cast doubt on the true strength of his positim. 
The press coverage of the leadership question highlights the 
party manager's dilemma over the relationships between the Conference 
and the media. 
On the one hand the Conference provided an important opportunity 
for Heath to project his image and policies and the success of the 
efforts to publicise him as a 'man of principle' reflected in the 
results of a survey run by the Gallup Poll after the 1 %7 Conference 
in vfaich voters were asked ' I f Mr Heath makes a statement about an 
1 . Sun ) 
2. Sun ^ 1 0 October 1969 
3 . Daily Express ) 
4* Sunday Time - 5 October 1969 
3 . Evening Argus ° 10 October 1969 
6. Sunday Express - 12 October 1969 
Daily Telegraph- 1 3 October 1969 
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important issue and Mr Wilson makes a statement which f l a t ly centra^ 
diets Mr Heath, who would you be (Host inclined to believe ? 1 ' 
Mr Wilson 3 1 
Mr Heath 3 6 
Neither 17 
Don't Know l 6 
On the other hand, however, every conference was surrounded by 
speculation about Heath's position as leader. Although most of the 
papers claimed to discount any real threat the constant emphasis on 
minor 'challenges' was clearly damaging to the party's image at a time 
idien cohesion was oiielOf i t s most important assets. Coverage of each 
of the conferences went through a predictable pattern of the press 
emphasising party divisions and controversy during the build-iqp period 
only to conclude at the end of the conference that the party was once 
again united behind i t s leader. While i t was inevitable that the 
press should emphasise the party's tensions because they were more 
newswortl^ than i t s unity, in some cases there was almost an air of 
the press actually txying to foment criticism of the leadership in 
order to create good 'copy'. 
Such pressures were reinforced by the donands for more genuinely 
controversial debates at the conference both from party members (who 
f e l t that democratic discussion was being at±f]ted) and from the media 
(who claimed that they wanted to promote democratic disunion but were 
probably equally interested in the additional newsworthiness of more 
controversy). 
As a result, while the party managers were under constant pressure 
to allow more genuine controversy and debate at the conference in order 
to sustain the media interest^ they were equally conscious of the vezy 
damaging effects of excessive media emphasis on controversy^and were 
anxious to keep the conference as: 
* This annual display of unity T^hidd has done so much, 
especially with the televising of the party conferences to 
enhance the image (however accurate an image) of the. 
Conservative Party as a united and responsible body ' 
Although they generally avoided steps to overtly manipulate the business 
of the conference in order to prevent publicity for unwelcome proposals'^  
1 , Poli t ical Index No 9 0 (Gallup Poll October 1 9 6 ? ) 
2 . See I Gilmour 'The Body Poli t ic ' (Hutchinson 1 9 6 9 ) pp 8 0 - 8 i on the 
competing demands for controversy and unity. Also Observer -
5 October 1 9 6 9 
3 » For vexy dcunaging effects of adverse media coverage on Liberal 
Conferences see ^^ A Watkins 'The Liberal Dilemma' (MacGibbon and 
Kee 1 9 6 6 ) pp 91-92; 1 0 7 - 1 0 8 
4 . a M Punnett 'British Government and PoliUcs' (Heinemann 1 9 7 0 ) p 1 2 3 
5 . cf US experience in JH Ibn;is' The Convention Problem' (Brookings 
1 9 7 2 ) p 1 3 0 . For suggestions that media coverage may intensify 
efforts to 'manage' British party conferences see U W Kitzinger 
'Listener' I 8 November 1 9 6 5 
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careful agenda selection and quiet behind-the-scenes coinpromises with 
dissident supporters'* have generally been successful in preventing 
controversy ciystallising in an embarrassing form. 
While i t has been suggested that the heavy media coverage of 
the conferences has beenpresponsible for generating above normal 
interest in by-elections there is not much evidence of any dramatic 
effects on voting intention^. 
A survey carried out by the Gallup Poll in I96l stewed that most 
voters' views were not significantly affected by the conferences. 
Interviewed^ were asked 'Has your attitude to the Labour Party been 
affected in aqy way by the recent Labour Party Conference ? I f so, in 
what way ? ' and 'Has your attitude to the Conservative Parly been 
affected in ax^ way by the recent Conservative Party Conference ? I f 
so, in what way ? ' The replies were^ : 
Table 7.10 
Attitudes to Labour Party 
Total Conservative Labour Rest 
Affected: Favourably 1 4 
Unfavourably 3 
Not affected 8 l 
Attitudes to Conservative Party 
Affected: Favourably 7 
Unfavourably 9 
Not affected 8 4 
1 0 2 2 9 
6 3 3 
8 4 7 3 8 6 
1 3 2 3 
4 1 3 7 
8 3 8 3 8 8 
1 . But see Economist Qct/Dec 1 9 3 8 Vol l 8 9 p p 2 i l for suggestions that 
the 1 9 3 8 Crime Debate was deliberately timed to avoid embarrassing 
media coverage. 
2 o Times - 1 2 October 1 9 3 4 
3 . But fo r effects of media generally on voting intention see 
£ S Milne & H C Mackenzie 'Marginal Seat 1 9 3 3 ' (Hansard Society 
1955) 
J G Blumler & D McQuail 'Television in Politics: Its Uses and 
Influence' (Faber 1 9 6 8 ) 
J Tunstai (ed) 'Media Sociology' (Constable 1 9 7 0 ) 
The Gallup Poll has been used as the main source of infoxmation 
in this study. For details of other polls and their methods 
see :-
£ Hodder-Williams 'Public Opinion Polls & British Politics' 
(Eoutledge Kegan Paul 1 9 7 0 ) pp 9 - 3 1 
4 . 'Poli t ical Index' No 2 2 - 1 2 - 1 6 October I 9 6 l ; (Gallup Poll) 
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I t is significant; houever, that i n tbe case of each conference 
the majority of those who cLalsiedthat Iheir attitudes had been affected 
mre supporters of the party in question and their vleHS had been 
strenirthened. This appears to correlate vl th the experience of observers 
who have studied Ihe effects of political broadcasts and found that: 
' most people irrespective of their politics or the perfomers, 
said liiat the broadcasts had no effect on their voting inten-
tions - tbey had merely been reinforced^ ' 
but generally speakiqg voting intention has tended to move s l i ^ t l y 
towards -Qie Conservatives during the Conference montbr although as -'.'x 
fable :.:7^11 .'.Tn shows this has not Invariably been so. 
Elimination of Don't Know replies can sometimes reveal a more 
distinct change i n voting intention after the Conference as Ihe follouing 
example from 1967 shows : -
Table 7.12 
Gallup Poll - Voting Intention - 1967 
Pre Conference Post Conference 
(12 October) (26 October) 
Conservative 
Labour 
Liberal 13 
Others 3 
(Source: Gallup Poll) 
and the effects of the Conference on assessments of liie party leadership 
appear to be more marked tban on voting intention (see Table 7.13). 
There is l i t t l e evidence however that ifae Conference has any immediate 
decisive Impact in determining voter attitudes as the liatlonal Conventions 
apparently do i n -file IBiited States? and although voter assessments of tiie 
leader have sometimes improved after liie Conference, this has not been a 
lasting effect as tiie tiearea in Table 7.14 show. I t does seem possible 
1. U Swallow 'Factual Television ' (Pocal Press; 1966) p 114 
2. For Labour Party experience see R Hodder-Williams 'Public Opinion 
Polls and British Polities' (Routledge Eegan P&ul 1970) pp 41-42 
3. A Campbell, 6 Gurin, W E Ml le r 'The Voter Decides' (Bvanstoa 1954) 
pp 14-18; 150 
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GALLDF POLL - PARTI LBADESSHIF 1960-1970 
J A B I £ 7.1? 
Reply to question 'Do you think Kr HacmUlan/ 
Sir Alee Douglas Home/ttr Heath is proving 
a good Prime SUnlster/Leader of the Conservative 
Party ? ' 
l a Is Not Don't Enow 
(95) (5^ ) (J«) 
1960 September 74 16 10 
October 72 14 14 
Siovember 69 19 12 
1961 September 43 44 13 
October 55 33 12 
November 54 34 12 
1962 Septeniber 42 50 8 
October 49 41 10 
November 47 48 8 
1963 September 40 48 12 
October 41 48 11 
November 42 36 22 
1965 September 49 44 7 
October 47 38 15 
November 48 34 18 
1966 September 34 44 22 
October 46 35 19 
November 34 41 25 
1967 September 31 43 26 
October 43 34 23 
November 44 41 15 
1968 September 27 52 21 
October 27 50 23 
November 37 40 23 
1969 September 32 46 22 
October 33 44 23 
November 33 43 24 
1970 September 35 27 38 
October 42 27 31 
November 39 45 16 
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TABLE 7.14 
VOTING IHPEBnON {%) 1960-1968 
Conservative Labour Uberal Others 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
September 
October 
Nbvember 
December 
September 
October 
November 
Decenber 
September 
October 
November 
December 
Septeidber 
October 
November 
December 
Septenber 
October 
Noveiii>er 
December 
September 
October 
November 
December 
September 
October 
November 
December 
Septoaber 
Octciber 
November 
Decenber 
47^ 
50 
46 
47^ 
40 
42 
41i 
3< 
34 
34i 
39 
37 
32 
36 
31 
39 
42 
4 l i 
42 
40-
42i 
43 
44 
42 
45 
^ll 
47 
47 
50^ 
55 
40^ 
^ , 
40:: 
37;-
45-
4>-
43 
43 
45 
43^ 
47 
46 
49 
48 
49^ 
47 
48^ 
49 
48-
48-
45 
44i 
42 
46 
4 l i 
38 
36 
32 
37 
39 
29^ 
1^  
12 
14:-
IT -^
20 
20 
13 
16 
16--
14-
12 
13 
9 
10 
Hi-
l l • 
la-
ia-
10-
14 
H i 
12 
14 
11 
3 
3 
6 
H 
4 -
4 -
3^ 
4 -
(Source: Gallup Poll) 
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that the sheer volume of media coverage associated id.th the Conference 
may on occasions attract temporary support far the partjr twt the closeness 
of the three party conferences and their dissociation tvm Ihe General 
Election places them in a vexy different position to Ihe American 
ITatlonal Conventions aid i t seems likely that the effect of heavy media 
covera^ of the Conferences is more l ikely to confirm existing political 
convictions and colour 1he long-term attitudes of voters rather than 
effect any direct change i n their viem^. 
1. Daily Telegraph - 20 October 1966. Also R Hodder-Williams 'PubUc 
Oidnion Polls and British Politics* (Routledge Esgan Paul 1970) 
p 92 and D Graber 'The Press on Opinion Resource in Ifae 1968 
Presidential Campaign' (Public Opinion Quarterly Vol 22X7 1971) 
pp 168-182 
2. D Butler and D Stokes 'Political Change i n Britain' (Peaguin 1971) 
pp 265-300 
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8. COHCLUSIOIT 
The external ctppearances of the modern conference d i f fe r greatly 
from those of the ori^rinal conferences in Ae nineteenth Century -
middle class delegates now predominate idiereas Ihe conference's original 
composition was largely wrkLqg class; discussion centres around policy 
rather than organisational matters; the numbers attending and the 
leadership's participation are both much higher; and tiie conference is 
now subordinated to the Central Council as the National Dtaion's 
governing body. I t can be axg^ ied hotrever that such changes are purely 
cosmetic and that the really important features which were established 
at the early conferences - the independence of Ifae Parliamentary Party 
over policy, and the absence of any participation i n leadership selection 
- have passed down unchanged ts Ifae present day despite Ifae efforts of 
Lord Randolph Churchill. 
While the conference's negligible influence over leadership selec-
tion is self-apparent (with the possible exception of some influence in 
1963) i t s role in relation to policy is more controversial. There have 
been suggestions that ' i n Ifae main parties to-d^ the Parliamentary Party 
is vir tually independent of tkxe rank and f i l e outside Parliament^' and 
a number of commentators have taken tiie view that Ifae Annual Conferences ^ 
are increasingly ineffectLw i n making any genuine impact on party policy 
In Ifae case of the Conservative Party Ifais i s certainly true to the extent 
that 'no observer suggests that the mass organisation, in annual meeting, 
could compel the Conservative Members of Psurliament to adopt and carry 
out a policy idiich was definitely opposed by the Parliamentary Leadership 
but i t does not necessarily follow that i t i s totally ineffectual. 
The conference does not pretend to make party policy across the 
vbole spectrum cf issues. Its main role ma put very bluntly by the 
Chaizoan of the 1952 Conference idien he said that: 
' We are met here to-day, not to form policy but to review Ifae 
progress of the nation and the Enqpire under our Conservative 
Party, and to consider the affairs of our party. lou wil l 
have an opportunity of expressiDg your opinions, of hearing 
Ifae views.of Ifae Ministers concemed, and of recording your 
decisions ' 
3. 
1. 'Party Conferences - Reality and Illusion of Popular Control' Times 
29 September 1952. See also 'The Dubious Role of Party Conferences' 
Times, 18 September 1967 
2. See for example H Morrison 'Government & Parliament' (ODP 1954) p 138. 
Also R T McEisnzie 'Policy Decision in Opposition: A Rejoinder' 
(Political Studies June 1957) pp 176-182; S Rose 'Policy Decision 
i n Opposition* (Political Studies June 1956) np 128-138; R Miliband 
'Party Democracy & Parliamenbazy Government' (Political Studies 
1958) pp 170-174 
3. L D Epstein 'British Man Parties i n Comparison with American Parties' 
(Political Science Quarterly Vol 71 1956) p 97 
4. NOCIIA Conference Report 1^2, p26 
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but Conference pressure appears to have had a f a i r l y direct effect 
on the Parliamentary Party's policy ofa a number of questions 
Including housing, electoral reform, taxation and agriculture whilst 
more indirect pressure appears to have had some effect on Hbs 
leadership's attitude to Issues such as Immigration, education and 
Rhodesia. 
The Conference is primarily a forum for communication - both 
for the grass roots to put across their fears to 'tiie leadership^ and 
for the leadership to sell i t s policies to liie grass roots and in 
the process i t provides an important opportunity fbr delegates to 
build up morale and enthusiasm. 
Leaving aside the question of idiether the Conference does in 
fact exercise Influence there is considerable scope for argument 
whether i t ought to Influence or even In certain clrcumsteuces dictate 
poliqy.ft can be argued that the real power of the constituency «> 
associations lies in liie choice of candidates^ and liiat the Conference 
is not really equipped to take policy decisions. The case for 
l i n l t i ng the power of the Conference was clearly put by Bagehot 
(although admittedly in a s l L ^ t l y different context) : -
' A representative public meeting is subject to a defect over 
eu3d above those of other public meetings. I t may not be 
Independent. The constltueades may not let i % .alone. 
But i f they do zK>t, a l l tiie checks liiich have been enumerated 
upon HhB evils of a parly organisation would be f u t i l e . The 
feeling of a constituenqy is the feeling of a dominant party, 
and that feeliqg is elicited, stimulated, sometimas even 
manufactured by liie local political agent. Such an opinion 
could not be moderate; could not be subject to effectual 
discussion; could not be In dose contact wLtii pressing 
facts; could not be framed under a chastening sense of near 
responsibility; could not be formed as those form tbeir 
opinions who have to act upon them. Constituency government 
is liie precise opposite of Parliamentary government. I t is 
the government of immoderate persons far from the scene of 
action, Instead of the government of moderate persons close 
to the scene of action; i t is -be judgement of persons 
judging i n Ihe last resort and without a penally, i n l ieu of 
persons judging in fear of a dissolution, and ever conseious 
that ttiey are subject to an appeal?... ' 
1. For potential effects see J C WahlJoe, W Buchanan, H Eulan and 
L C Ferguson 'American State Legislators' Role - Orientation 
Towards I^essure Groins' (journal of Politics Vol 22 1960) 
pp 202-207 and JV Kingdom 'Politicians' Beliefs about Voters' 
(American Folitieal Science Review March 1967) p 139. For value 
of Conference as a sounding board for opinion see D Claike 'The 
Organisation of Folltleal Parties' (Political Quarterly Vol 21 
1950) p 79 ^ ^ 
2. See J Bif f en 'The Conservative Opportunity' (Batsford 1965) p 187. 
Also A Ranney 'Pathways to Parliament' (Hacmlllan 1965) and 
EA Nordlinger 'The tfox^cing Class Tories' (lliacGlbbon and Kae 1967) 
pp 39-40 
3. tf Bagehot 'The English Constitution' (Fontana 1963) p 161. See 
also L S Amery 'Thou^ts on the Constitution' (OOP 1947) pp 43-47 
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The party leadership almost inevitably has a sharper awareness of 
the practical constraints on policy than Ifae grass roots:-
' Too often tfae ordinary member does not consider the 
situation in which a demand is made. In moving a resolution 
he is not concerned so much with i ts practicability as with 
i t s desirability. A pressure group moves in a w<rld of 
restraints, and the member dees not always realise this so 
readily as Ifae leaders. He ccaes to Ifae conference isLth a 
l i s t of demands. In his view i t is Ifae task of the group 
to satisfy these demands. Often he merely receives ezplan»-
tions of the diff icul t ies Involved becaus^  Ifae demands are 
not adjusted to Ifae capacity of the group . . . ' 
and i n any case there is the vezy real d i f f icu l ty that although 
criticisms of the Conference's lack of 'power' carry em implicit 
suggestion that Conference policy making must somehow be 'democratic * 
there Is no real assurance that tfae Conference Is more representative 
of the electorate at large than a thoughtful leadership trying to 
anticipate Ifae voters' aspirations. The Times in particular has been 
h i ^ l y c r i t i ca l of Ifae Conference's character: 
' A polit ical leader who commits himself to a line dictated 
by a party conference binds himself to the decision of a 
body other than tfae sovereign people . . . In no conceivable 
way can the party conferences be considered representative 
of the electors - i f only because they are composed of Ifae 
polit ically active while the vast majority of Ifae electors 
are polit ically indolent . . . Constituency parties are among 
the most narrowly exclusive concentrations of power in this 
country, and the del^ates to emnual conferences represent 
only those pockets of power and not the mass of tfae people 
who provide ifae bulk of electoral support for the tvo main 
parties . . . The danger of the exaggerated prestige of tiie 
party conferences is. that I t wi l l make the true policy-
makers at the top more and more responsive to an unrepresen-
tative minority and less and less responsive to, Ifae nation^ ' 
and a number of American commentators have shared tfae more general 
concern about the extent to vhich party assenfalies can really succeed 
in interpreting Ifae demands cf the electora.te^. In Britain Ifaere 
have eOfio been sharp differences cf opinion about the extent to vhich 
party activists are typical of the electorate. In 'The Paradox of 
Party Difference'4 Butler has suggested that tiie conferences are 
largely dominated ty militants demanding socially divisive policies 
as Ifae price for keeping the poli t ical machinery in working - order 
1. J D Stewart *British Pressure Groups* (OUP 1958) p 40 
2. Times - 25 September 1954. See also J D B HiUer ' The Nature of 
Politice' (Penguin 1969) pp 210-217 
3. See for example E E Schattschneider etal. 'Towards a More 
Reponsible Two-party System' (American Political Science Review 
Vol XLVr 1950) and L D Epstein 'British Han Parties i n Comparison 
with Amsrican Parties' (Political Science Quarterly Vol 71 1956) 
pp 97, 118 and A Leiserson 'Parties & Politics* (Ehopf 1958) 
pp 204-208 
4. D E Butler *The Paradox of Party Difference* (American Behavioral 
Scientist Vol IV 1960) pp 3-5 
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while there i s other evidence that the grass roots par-^ voxkers are 
by no means as militant as has been supposed and i t may well be that 
par-^ y leaders do not really face a situation where: 
' their most loyal and devoted followers tend to have more 
extreme views than they have themselves, and to be s t i l l 
further removed from the mass of those who actually vote 
. . . Differences i n policy exist within parties, and conflict 
is sometimes great but this is not conflict between a 
monolithic 'bloc' of activists and a monolithic leadership. 
Rather i t would seen that factional disputes divide parties 
vertically, joining some Privy Councillors, MPs,lobbyists, 
activists and voters into a faction «hich is i n conflict 
with another, which also contains members drawn tram a l l ranks 
of the party ' 
Certainly even i n a party Uke liie Labour Party which purports 
to give I t s ccDferenee extensive powers i t is significant that the 
leadership has retained a high degree of control over policy making 
ti irou^ careful use of the trade union block vote and overlapping 
membership between the Parliamentaiy Party and the NEC^ . Quite apart 
froa liie conference's capacily to represent the eleetoiate's views 
fa i th fu l ly there are severe practical problems in giving the conference 
an active role in deciding as distinct from influencing poliqr. Its 
size makes i t too large to cootider questions in any detail and i t s 
experience in handling such comparatively minor matters of detail as 
liie Maxwell F^fe Report and i t s own venue Illustrate how unsuitable i t 
would be as a mechanism for taking detailed policy declsiozB in its 
present fozm. 
At liie same time, however, Ihe conference does provide the party's 
closest supporters with an opportunlly to ' le t off steam' and: 
' . . . the truth is that these annual sessions by Ihe sea now 
provide tiie only large forum to which thousands of dedicated 
party woxkers who labour unrewarded in the constituencies 
and who speak for grass-roots democracy s t i l l have access. 
Party activists who go unheard during the rest of the year have 
this one opportunity to say what they really tiink to the 
politicians who rapresent them at Westminster and to be seen 
and heard doing so on the television screens. Without the conferences 
V&rty managers would have things a l l their own vay and British 
democracy would become a sjiBtem of alternating party oligarchies 
i n which the eitisen's only surviving right would be to express 
a preference at election time for a government managed by one of 
the two party machines .^.' 
1. R Rose (ed) 'Studies in British Politics' (Macmillan 1966) p 307 
2. I Yates 'Power i n the Labour Parly' (Political Quarterly Vol 31 
1960) p 300 
3. Naw Statesman - 8 October 1971 
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While the conference's capaclly to represent public opinion may 
be open to some question, I t almost certainly plays some port in 
creating that opinion as part of the process which Beer notes: 
' The role of party In shaping public opinion has often been 
noted. I t has been said, for instance, that a principal 
function of a major party is to aggregate the demands of a 
large number of groups i n the electorate. Where party 
govemmant is highly developed . . . party does not merely 
aggregate the opinions of groups, i t goes a long way towards 
creating those opinions by fixing liie framework of public 
thiziking about policy and the voteta* sense of the alterna-
tives and the possibilities. In turn, of couzse, the parly 
may find i t se l f under pressure from such opinion . . . liie 
parties . . . ha-ve themselves in great part framed and 
elicited the very demand to idiich they then respondl ' 
and idiile the conference continues to perform an Important function in 
providing a means of communication between party workers and the leader-
ship the heavy media coverage vblch. i t at treats is also responsible for 
giving i t an increasing role as a means of communication wilii the 
electorate at large^ ' 
This may be partly responsible for the tendency which some 
observers have detected for the conference 'increasingly . . . to serve 
primarily as a demonstration of parly solidarl-fy and of enthusiasm for 
i t s own leaders^... ' but a much more important aspect is the 
confeirence's fkinction in conmuni eating policy - liie conferences during 
tile period 1945-1950 and 1965-1969 were extensively used to publicise 
the work of the party's policy study groups and also reflects in tiie 
way in «hich the conference is regularly used by Klnlsters as an 
opportunity to announce policy decisions within Ihe limits allowed by 
Parliamentary courtes^r. 
1. S H Beer 'Modern British Politics' (Paber 1965) pp 347-348 
2. See for example S H Beer 'The Future of foitish Politics : An 
American View' (Political Quarterly Vol 26 1 955) p 37 
3. R T McKanzie 'British Political Parties' (Mercury 1964) p 189 
Also Spectator 4 October 1969 and Observer 26 November 1961 
4. See for example Sir Alee Douglas Home's announcement of l i f t i n g of 
Rhodesian restrictions - WJCTJA. Conference Report 1970, pp 61-66. 
Also announcement of Road Transport B i l l and Environmental 
Protection B i l l by Geoffrey Rippon - NUCOA Conference Report 
1973, pp 18-21 
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AgaioBt such a background i t i s prolaUy unrealistic to see 
the conference as a policy foimulatLng body. I t s main role la as 
a communications mediua and as a foram for discussion. Although 
i n a sense this may l i m i t i t s value the conference s t i l l has a 
valuable function to psrfoxm i n the party's structure: 
' Representative assemblies are often taunted by their 
enemies with being mere places of taHc and 'bavardage*. 
There has seldom been more displaced derision. I knov 
not hoV a representative assembly can more usefully 
employ i t e e l f than i n talk, when ihe subject of talk i s 
the great pub He interests of the c ountiy ... A place 
MUxere every interest and shade of opinion i n the country 
can have i t s cause passionately pleaded, i n tiie face of 
the government and of a l l other Interests and opinions p 
can compel tiiem t o l i s t e n , and eitiier comply or state 
clearly why they do not» is i n i t s e l f , i f i t answered no 
other purpbde, one of the most important p o l i t i c a l 
institutions that can exist anyidierep and one of the 
foremost benefits of free government. Such 'talking' 
would never be looked t^on with disparagement i f i t were 
not allowed to stop 'doing'; which i t never would, i f 
assemblies knew and acknowledged that talking and 
discussion are their proper business, idiile 'doing'* as 
the resi i l t o f discussion, i s the task not of a misceHlaneaus 
body, but of individuals specially trained to i t ^ . . . ' 
1. J S M i l l 'Considerations on Representative Government' 
(Dent 1910) p 240 
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AIPENDIX 
NORTHERN ABEA SURVEY - 1967 
Date of Interview Name 
• 1 * 
Constituency/Orgn Sex .. H / F 
Occupation 
lype of Rep: Chman / Treas / Womens Chman / TUAC Chman / YC Chman / 
Agent / Other / Elected 
Age Marital Status .. S / M / W 
Are there any matters which were not on the agenda at this year's 
Conference which you f e l t should have been on ? 
.. Y / N / DK (Details: 
What do you feel was the most important topic debated at the 
Conference ? 
(SHOW CARD): . 
Do you think that the Conference ou^t to be able to mandate the Party 
to follow a particular policy ? 
o , Y / N / DK 
How were you chosen as a Conference delegate ? 
EX-OFFICIO / OPmSD & RATIFIED / NOMINATED & RATIFIED / ELECTION / 
OTHER ( ) 
RESPONSE TO 'DELEGATE' : NIL / POSITIVE 
Do you hold any office with your Association ? 
.. Y / N / DK (Details: ) 
Do you feel that a Constituency Chairman should attend the Conference 
whenever possible ? 
Y / N / DK 
Do you fe e l that a Constituency Treasurer should attend the Conference 
whenever possible ? 
Y / N / DK 
Do you feel that the Conference has a definite effect on Party policy ? 
Y / N / DK 
Did you vote i n the ballot at the Conference ? 
,, Y / N / DK 
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Did you apply to speak at the Conference ? 
.. Y / N / DK 
I f Y : (A) How many times did you apply ? 
(B) On what issues ? 
(C) Why did you wish to speak ? 
Did you send i n a vote for balloted resolutions ? 
Y / N / DK 
I f Y : How many of the items which you voted for came up ? 
. . 1 / 2 / 3 
I f N : Why were you unable to participate 7 
l O 
Did your Association give you any financial assistance with the cost of 
attending the Conference ? 
.. Y / N / DK 
I f N : Would such assistance have been available i f requested ? 
.. Y / N / DK 
Are you a current or former member of: 
(A) YCS - C/P (B) TUAC - C/P (C) Cons Teachers - C/P 
(D) PUCUA - C/P (B) PEST - C/P (P) Primrose L - C/P 
(H) TU - C/P ( I ) Bow Gp - C/P 
(J) Monday Club C/P (K) Local Public Body - C/P 
(G) Professional or Employers Association - C/P 
Have you participated i n the CONTACT 67 Programme ? 
Y/U/ DK 
I f Y : Were you a Group leader ? .. Y / N / DK 
Have you reported/will you report back to your Brancl\/Association on 
the proceedings at Brighton ? 
o . Y / N / DK 
I f Y : Wi l l this be Oral / Written 
Did you attend any meetings at Brighton other than the actual Conference 
sessions ? 
. 0 Y / N / DK (Details 
o ) 
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Did you know your Association's views on any resolutions before going 
to Brighton ? 
. . Y / N / DK 
I f Y : 
SUBJECT SOURCE OF INFORMATION 
Could you give me an indication of your activities during the last 
Parliamentary Election ? 
CANVASSED / CAR DRIVER / CAR LOAN / ADDRESS CIRCULARS / SECRETARIAL HELP / 
POLLING BOOTH CLERK / OTHER 
Have you addressed any public meeting/a organised by your Association 7 
Y / N / DK 
How long have you been an active party member ? years 
How maxty annual conferences have you attended ? 
Have you attended any conferences other than annual national ones during 
the last 3 years ? 
Y / N / DK 
I f Y : How many ? 
Do you personally support Common Market entry ? . » Y / N / DK 
By and large, does your Association support Common Market entry ? 
, 0 Y / N / 50-50/ DK 
Do you personally believe that Capital Punishment should be brought back ? 
• o Y - unqualified / Y - after 5 years / Y « for certain offences only/ 
N / DK 
Do you believe that by and large, your Association holds the same view as 
yourself ? 
. . Y / N / SPLIT / DK 
Does Party policy believe that a l l schools should be made into 
comprehensive ? 
. „ Y / N / DK 
Does Party policy believe that Council house tenants with high incomes 
should pay the same rents as those with low incomes ? 
Y / N / nK 
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Does the Conservative Party support a National Freight Authority ? 
.. y / N / DK 
Does the Conservative Party believe that bus services should be supported 
by investment allowances ? 
. o Y / N / DK 
Does the Conservative Party believe that the payment of National 
Insurance benefits should be selective ? 
., Y / N / DK 
Would a Conservative Government reduce indirect taxation ? 
.. Y / N / DK 
Does the Conservative Party support a Mortgage Option scheme 7 
.. Y / N / DK 
Does the Conservative Party believe that agricultural subsidies are 
preferable to import control as a means of agricultural support ? 
.. Y / N / DK 
Does the Conservative Party believe i n special tax allowances for 
working wives 7 
.. Y / N / DK 
Would the Conservative Party retain the Land Commission 7 
oo Y / N / DK 
Would the Conservative Party abolish SET completely 7 
.. Y / N / DK 
Does the Conservative Party believe that employers should be legally 
obliged to recognise and negotiate with trade unions i f more than 
50^ of their enqployees so desire 7 
.. Y / N / DK 
Bees the Conservative Party support Industrial Courts 7 
.. Y / N / DK 
Does the Conservative Party believe that a solution to the Rhodesian 
question must be based on the 3 Principles ? 
.. Y / N / DK 
Do you personally feel that Trade Unions are damaging the economy 7 
.. Y / N - but some individuals / N - but insufficient control / N 
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What types of school did you attend ? 
(A) PRIMARY (B) SECONDARY (c) UNIVERSITY 
(D) PROIESSIONAL (E) SECRETARIAL (F) FULL-TIME TECH 
(C) PART-TIME FURTHER (H) OTHER 
( I ) PRIVATE ( j ) STATE (K) DIRECT GRANT 
Did you speak with your MP/Candidate at the Conference ? 
Y / N / DK 
Did other delegates from your own constituency stay at the same 
accommodation as yourself i n Brighton ? 
o . Y / N / DK 
Are you a member of your local Council ? o o . o Y / N 
I f N : Have you evem been a candidate for your local Council ? 
. o Y / N 
Who did you think was the best platfom speaker at the Conference ? 
l e e o e e e e o e o e o o o o e o o o o o o * 
Did you have any doubts about Mr Heath's leadership before you went 
to Brighton ? 
.. Y / N / DK 
Did his performance: IMPROVE YOUR OPINION / LOWER YOUR OPINION 
UNCHANGED / DK 
Which sessions did you miss entirely ? (SHOV CARD) 
In your own words, why did you attend ? 
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